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CHAPTER I 
 
 
JOHN DEWEY AND ECONOMICS 
 
Thus there is here supplied, I think, a first-rate test of the value of any 
philosophy which is offered us:  Does it end in conclusions which, when 
they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, 
render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings 
with them more fruitful?  Or does it terminate in rendering the things of 
ordinary experience more opaque than they were before, and in depriving 
them of having in “reality” even the significance they had previously 
seemed to have? 
 
It is the fact, I repeat, that so many philosophies terminate in conclusions 
that make it necessary to disparage and condemn primary experience, 
leading those who hold them to measure the sublimity of their “realities” 
as philosophically defined by remoteness from the concerns of daily life, 
which leads cultivated common sense to look askance at philosophy.1 
 
Economists are only one class of “scientific” inquirers into human subjects 
who cannot professionally admit the part played by need, purpose and an 
unceasing valuing (as distinct from evaluating judgments) in the 
generation and management of human affairs. 
 
But whatever reasons scientific economists may use to justify excluding 
from their professional concern the human consequences of economic 
enterprise, philosophy cannot agree that economics is a domain having its 
own independent subject-matter and career without denying its claim to be 
comprehensive in scope.  Philosophy which does not take into account the 
economic enterprise and its human consequences is an escapist intellectual 
gymnastic.2 
 
 
 
John Dewey and the Place of Economics in his Philosophy and his Life 
 
In 1879, at his undergraduate commencement ceremony at the University of 
Vermont, the nineteen-year-old John Dewey delivered an address entitled “The Limits of 
Political Economy.”  Just three years before his death (on June 1, 1952), Dewey 
                                                
1 LW1, 18. 
2 LW1, 359. 
 2 
forwarded a new introduction for a reissue of Experience and Nature to his close friend 
and editor Joseph Ratner.  The introduction was never finished, though it was more than 
one hundred pages long at the time of Dewey’s death.  This stands in sharp contrast to the 
seven-page preface that accompanied the republication of the 1925 edition (in 1929).  
One of the reasons for this extensive introduction was surely Dewey’s desire to defend 
one of his most important works.  Another reason was that he had included an entire 
subsection in this introduction that criticized the work of “scientific economists.”3  I 
believe it is fair to say that, in the seventy three years between his college graduation and 
his death, Dewey never stopped thinking about economics. 
 Dewey was close to his older brother, Davis Rich Dewey, and Davis was an 
economist and historian of great influence.  A professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Davis edited the American Economic Review from 1911 until 1940.4  
Throughout his own work, John Dewey made reference to some of the greatest economic 
thinkers in history, and he was clearly familiar with the subtleties of their work.  In a 
letter in 1886 to his wife, Alice Chipman Dewey, John Dewey wrote “that he was 
‘reading up on machinery & wages…It has opened up a new field to me—I almost wish 
sometimes I were in pol[itical] ec[onomy]; it is so thoroughly human.’”5  In the same 
year, Dewey spoke before the Political Science Association, and the title of his talk was 
“The Rise of Great Industries.”  A review described Dewey’s lecture as “’a masterly 
study of the economic, industrial, social, and moral effects…of the great corporate 
undertakings of modern times.’”6  Shortly after earning his doctorate at Columbia in 
                                                
3 LW1, 357. 
4 Martin, 172. 
5 Ibid., 109. 
6 Ibid., 109. 
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1913, Dewey’s son, Frederick Archibald Dewey, taught economics at Bryn Mawr.7  
Dewey was deeply interested in economics himself, and he was surrounded by 
professional economists in his own family. 
Though Dewey, of course, chose a profession in philosophy, he considered a 
career in economics, and it would be a surprise to find that he had not thought himself 
accomplished in the study of economics.  After reviewing the more than three hundred 
references Dewey made to economic concerns and study throughout the Collected Works, 
I am convinced that there is much to be learned about Dewey’s pragmatism through a 
careful study of its relationship to economics.  The relationship is a complex one and it is 
not always consistent, but it is nonetheless very interesting.  Though the connection 
between Dewey’s version of pragmatism and psychology, sociology, and other social 
sciences has been given much scholarly attention, relatively little has been written about 
Dewey and economics.8  This strikes me as odd, especially given the fact that his work is 
replete with references to economic issues and the fact that he was himself very much 
interested in economics.  More importantly, Dewey was explicit in his belief that 
philosophy had to concern itself with economics:  “Philosophy which does not take into 
account the economic enterprise and its human consequences is an escapist intellectual 
gymnastic.”9  Thus, without some attention to Dewey’s “pragmatic economics,” I believe 
Dewey scholarship is incomplete. 
 
                                                
7 Ibid., 115. 
8 One significant exception to this statement has been very recent.  In June 2003, the Journal of Economic 
Methodology dedicated an issue to “John Dewey and Economic Theory.”  See Khalil, Mousavi and 
Garrison, Stikkers, Shook (2003), Klamer, Stuhr, White, and Ryan.  See also Brodsky, Parker, and Min.  
There are several other examples, though none longer than article (or contribution) length. 
9 LW1, 359. 
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Thesis 
In this dissertation, I argue that many of the mistakes Dewey identified 
throughout the history of philosophy had been replicated or had parallels in economic 
thinking.  This can be established by considering the criticisms that Dewey makes of 
traditional philosophic thinking and comparing these to work in the academic discipline 
of economics.  To some extent, I have done this in what follows.  But I have also 
attempted to undertake what I would consider to be a more Deweyan project:  I have tried 
to identify the ways in which Dewey’s pragmatism and his use of the experimental 
method might have affected practical economic systems and institutions and how this, in 
turn, has the power to affect the lives of those who must live within them. 
Though Dewey was not always explicit in distinguishing the academic study of 
economics from more simple matters of commerce and material well being as they affect 
the “common man” (though, of course, this is a part of the academic study of economics), 
it is clear that he had more interest in one than the other.  It was not uncommon for 
Dewey to respond to the work of professional economists, but he was far more interested, 
for instance, in considering the ways in which capitalism had shaped the modern man’s 
life than he was in debates about marginal analysis.  In this dissertation, the distinction 
between these two things will generally be referred to as a distinction between 
“economics” (the academic study of economics) and “economic life” (non-academic 
discussions of things like wages, well-being, trade, etc.).  The two are, of course, related, 
but when Dewey spoke of one, he did not always mean to include the other. 
The distinction is an important one for my thesis:  I will argue that Dewey 
dedicated himself to criticisms of economic life as that existed for most people during his 
 5 
lifetime.  This is particularly true during the 1920s and 30s, and it is more generally true 
for his later work than his early and middle work.  On the other hand, I believe that 
Dewey, though critical of mistakes that economists had made in their own methodology, 
was an enthusiastic supporter of the social sciences in general and economics in 
particular.  This is not surprising, since, although he was critical of the mistakes 
philosophers had long made, he was, nonetheless, an enthusiastic supporter of the role of 
philosophy in improving the lives of individuals. 
Apart from his own words to his wife (which demonstrate at least a passing 
interest in having become a political economist), he devoted much of his life to studying 
economics and the work of economists.  In the same way that Dewey would never have 
abandoned the practice of philosophy, I believe he would never have called for the 
abandonment of economics as an academic discipline.  Instead, as he did with 
philosophers, Dewey would have encouraged economists to turn to the experimental 
method and the “laboratory habit of mind” in their studies.  Economics, no less than 
philosophy, was in desperate need of reconstruction during Dewey’s lifetime (and, like 
philosophy, perhaps still needs such a reconstruction today). 
This brings me to the second major claim of my dissertation:  I will argue that 
these appeals to the experimental method and the “laboratory habit of mind” are, at once, 
the most important and the most underdeveloped parts of Dewey’s pragmatism.  
Dewey’s specific claims that the experimental method can be employed to resolve many 
of the problems that have plagued philosophers for thousands of years is an original and 
provocative one.  Though there are other pragmatists who make similar claims, I believe 
none were as thoroughgoing as Dewey in their attempts to “naturalize” the laboratory 
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habit of mind in philosophy and “ordinary experience.”  Dewey believed that the methods 
and successes of the natural and physical sciences could be translated into the social 
sciences and the humanities, and this makes him someone well worth studying.  
Accordingly, however, as this belief stood at the center of his philosophical thinking, it 
made him terribly vulnerable:  without some sort of verification that the experimental 
method could indeed be used as he thought it could be, Dewey’s calls for reconstruction 
in philosophy should rightly go unheeded. 
Though I am intrigued and excited by Dewey’s convictions about the power of 
the experimental method in traditionally non-empirical disciplines, I will argue that he 
largely fails to provide specific examples of how this method will be put into practice in 
the manner he suggests.  What would it mean to apply the experimental method to 
philosophy?  What would it mean to employ the “laboratory habit of mind” in 
economics?  Recent work in economics has certainly begun to answer the second 
question, but it is highly doubtful that Dewey’s work was influential to this development.  
Moreover, it seems unlikely that his work has been successful in effecting any similar 
change in the methodology of philosophers.  This dissertation claims that, without 
specific examples of how this method might work in practice, the reconstruction Dewey 
envisioned was bound to fail or—worse yet—was never likely to be attempted. 
Finally, despite my criticisms of Dewey’s project, I continue to believe that 
Dewey was truly a philosophical pioneer in his attempts to draw philosophy closer to the 
demands and difficulties of “everyday experience,”10 and the fact that he gave any 
attention whatsoever to economic concerns, theories, and issues makes him someone well 
                                                
10 Dewey uses this phrase and “ordinary experience” repeatedly, and the instances are too many to cite 
here.  For one example, see LW4, 156. 
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worth studying.  In some respects, as the next chapter will demonstrate, Dewey’s interest 
in the nature of economic science and its methodology predates economists’ own 
attempts to reflect about the nature of their discipline.  Thus, there is no question in my 
mind that Dewey deserves praise for his willingness to engage subjects that philosophy 
had traditionally left to others.  Dewey’s interest in economics led him to believe that 
there was an important relationship between philosophy and economics, and this project 
also represents an attempt to determine what that relationship might be. 
I will argue that Dewey believed the proper relationship between philosophy and 
economics was a complementary one.  On the one hand, economics can provide 
important insights into “economic life,” and the models and theorems of economists will 
also help supply information that will enable us to make the goods we desire and seek 
more secure.  Philosophy, on the other hand, can serve to provide critiques of economics, 
economic life, and the methodology of economists.  For instance, as I have noted in the 
next chapter, economists have long debated whether economics is a positive or normative 
practice.  Dewey’s pragmatism attempts to provide a resolution to this debate.  Though 
the work of the natural and physical sciences might inform Dewey’s philosophy (and, in 
turn, economics), philosophers have an even stronger connection to economics than they 
do to these other sciences.  Dewey demands of philosophers that they be engaged in the 
world of “ordinary experience,” and few matters are more significant and influential in 
the world of “ordinary experience” than those of economics and economic life.  
Economists and philosophers are engaged in similar work, and another important reason 
to consider Dewey’s writings on economics is to demonstrate this very fact. 
 8 
Economics and the Methods of Science 
The title of Dewey’s college commencement address (“The Limits of Political 
Economy”) suggests a skepticism about the goals of political economy, and the addition 
he intended to make more than seventy years later to Experience and Nature supports this 
conclusion.  In this “Unfinished Introduction,”11 Dewey harshly criticizes the work of 
economists who seem to separate the study of economics from human activity and 
practice.  There is little to be surprised about in this criticism since it is the same one that 
Dewey leveled at philosophers from Plato forward.  What is surprising, however, is the 
fact that Dewey repeatedly refers to these economists (in a manner that I am unable to 
find replicated anywhere else in his work) as “scientific economists.” 
 In these pages, Dewey berates “scientific economists” for their commitment to 
methods of inquiry that enable them to dissociate the “economic” from the “moral and 
political.”  I think Dewey’s criticism is apt and, as I shall venture to demonstrate in this 
thesis, it points to further criticisms of the scientific method that Dewey himself did not 
take up.  Though Dewey praised the “scientific method” in his work, I believe that, very 
late in his life, he may have come to recognize that the problems he identified in 
traditional philosophic methodology were not confined to philosophy.  In his account of 
the “scientific method,” he spoke of the importance of “abstraction” and “isolation.”  The 
same “abstraction” or “isolation” which was one of the characteristic defects of “non-
empirical” philosophy was, oddly, one of the first steps in the experimental method as 
Dewey described it. 
As is clear from his criticisms of “scientific economists,” he was not convinced 
that all science ends with the return to experience which made the experimental method 
                                                
11 Ibid., 329-364. 
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praiseworthy for him.  This claim can conveniently be supported by the success of an 
exciting new field in economics, experimental economics.  I will argue that this is the 
sort of economics of which Dewey would have approved, but that economics, like other 
sciences (physical and natural, as well as social), has instead long been dominated by a 
tendency similar to that which began thousands of years ago in philosophy:  a tendency to 
shy away from “ordinary experience.” 
Dewey was absolutely right to call philosophers to task for their misdirected 
“quest for certainty,” but he should have expanded his criticisms beyond philosophy.  
Much of what Dewey criticized in philosophy had been repeated or mirrored in the study 
of economics.  I believe that Dewey was close to making this more explicit in his work 
near the end of his life as the “Unfinished Introduction” shows, and I think he would have 
come to argue that economists had unwittingly adopted the mistakes of philosophers in 
their own methodology.  There is every reason to believe that he would have found the 
same mistakes in other disciplines as well.  This is not a deficiency which is unique to 
economists, and Dewey should have recognized the dangers that were inherent in the 
“scientific method” as well as in the “philosophic method.” 
 One of the reasons I think this point is so critical to Dewey scholarship is that it 
bears directly on his appeals to the scientific method.  I will argue that, despite its central 
place in his philosophy, Dewey’s account of the scientific or experimental method may 
well be one of the most underdeveloped themes in his pragmatism.  Dewey repeatedly 
praises the advances of the natural and physical sciences, and he calls again and again for 
their application in other disciplines.  He wistfully imagines a time when the “laboratory 
habit of mind” will become naturalized into human inquiry and intelligent action.  But, as 
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is clear from these very late criticisms of “economic scientists,” Dewey was not 
unconditionally enamored of science, and it is significant, I think, to try and determine 
exactly what sort of experimentalism Dewey favored and which of the dangerous 
tendencies of scientific methodology he failed, at least in his early and middle work, to 
acknowledge.  I think a study of his “economics” can bring about that understanding. 
 
Dewey’s “Economics” 
Unquestionably, there is some difficulty in speaking of “economics.”  Do we 
mean by this term the academic discipline or do we mean household management?  Are 
we referring to the fiscal health of a nation?  Or do we simply mean to speak of matters 
associated with money and finance?  In some contexts, we may use the term “economics” 
to refer to more than one of these things.  Thus, the first order of business must be to 
define what we mean when we speak of “economics” in this context. 
 The meaning of the term will here be dependent on its use in John Dewey’s work.  
I will not argue that Dewey was an economist, nor will it be necessary to demonstrate 
that he had a specialized knowledge of the term “economics” in any of its many technical 
usages.  For the purpose of this thesis, I first wish to define what I think Dewey meant 
when he spoke of “economics.”  In the Middle and Later Works alone, there are more 
than three hundred separate references to “economics.”  By contrast, the phrase 
“experimental method” appears just forty-nine times in the same texts.  Is there any 
consistency in the way Dewey uses “economics” or are these references divided among 
many different usages of the term? 
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 Many of Dewey’s references to “economics” are explicitly about a subject matter 
that has a history and that is studied by academics.  Often, “economics” is mentioned in 
conjunction with politics, history, sociology, and law.  In the passages in which 
“economics” appears alongside other academic subjects it is reasonable to assume that 
Dewey means the disciplined study of economics.  In some cases, Dewey also intends to 
include the study of the history of economic thinking in this discipline. 
 In Human Nature and Conduct, for example, there are more than thirty references 
to “economics.”  In this book, Dewey attempted to demonstrate the value and necessity of 
considering human nature from a perspective informed by “scientific knowledge.”12  In 
particular, he hoped to encourage a study of morals from this perspective: 
A morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it 
would find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and 
would thereby ally ethics with physics and biology.  It would find the 
nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other human 
beings, and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law 
and economics.13 
 
Thus, this human-nature-based-morality enables ethical studies to be related to other 
studies that view the “nature and activities of one person coterminous with those of other 
human beings.”  From this claim, I believe we are to understand that these other 
studies—history, sociology, law and economics—already consider human nature from a 
perspective informed by physics and biology.  The historian and the economist may still 
fall short of Dewey’s ideal standard; that is, the average historian or economist may not 
fully understand the significance of the physical and biological underpinnings of human 
nature with regard to his or her discipline.  Yet Dewey seems to suggest here that 
                                                
12 MW14, 5. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
 12 
researchers in these fields have done a far better job of understanding this connection 
than have ethicists. 
 Further evidence of his approbation for this approach exists in Dewey’s later 
works.  In a brief article entitled “What is Social Study?” published in Progressive 
Education in 1938, Dewey considers the “social” aspect of “social studies”, a discipline 
receiving new emphasis in education at the time.  Here, Dewey explicitly links the study 
of economics to the natural sciences: 
The industrial and commercial change which has taken place in the world 
in the last century, in the past forty years, is the product of the great 
change which has taken place in physical, chemical, and more recently 
biological science.  The prime factor in the economic and political history 
of this period is what is known as the industrial revolution.  The story of 
that revolution is the story of new technologies in the production and 
distribution of goods, which are themselves the result of a scientific 
revolution.  Any vital comprehension of existing economic and political 
issues demands insight into processes and operations that can be grasped 
only through understanding of fundamental physical and chemical 
operations and laws.14 
 
If “economics” is a discipline that aims at “vital comprehension” of “existing economic” 
issues, it must first gain insight into the natural sciences.  Presumably, Dewey believes 
that the discipline at its best will explore “economic issues” through a solid grounding in 
and attention to the natural sciences.  Of course, the value of the natural sciences lies in 
their reliance on experience as “the avenue that leads to the facts and laws of nature.”15  
One would expect, therefore, that a “science” of economics would also show deference to 
experience as a means of understanding the world.  What that entails, then, for 
economics, is that economics approaches its subject matter in such a way that it will 
return the products of any intellectual reflection to “ordinary” experience.  The only 
                                                
14 LW13, 339. 
15 LW1, 11. 
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method which will achieve this is experimentalism, and, therefore, the only “economics” 
which can qualify as “pragmatic” for Dewey is one which utilizes the experimental 
method. 
 It is also worth noting that, in the above citation, Dewey relates “industrial and 
commercial change” (as factors of economic life) to the natural and physical sciences.  
The “production and distribution of goods,” important aspects of the economic lives of 
individuals, are “the result of a scientific revolution.”  We can understand the conditions 
of economic life better if we first understand the underlying empirical science upon 
which these conditions are established.  Thus, this citation demonstrates another 
important way that Dewey uses the term “economics.” 
Dewey does appear to make distinctions (though not always explicitly) between 
the study of economics as an academic discipline and economics as a part of the normal 
business of everyday life.  “Economic” issues for Dewey are those which occupy debates 
between professional economists, but they are also issues which the average person faces 
on a daily basis:  how will I pay for my next meal?  How will I be able to afford to retire 
when I am older?  What sort of life can I live in a capitalistic society?  Can I say that I 
have meaningful freedom if I cannot afford to pay my bills?  “Economic history,” for 
Dewey, is more than just the study of David Ricardo, Adam Smith, John Maynard 
Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, and Milton Friedman.  Economic history must also include 
an account of the way the “common man” makes his living from day to day. 
I believe references such as those cited above demonstrate that, in at least some 
contexts, Dewey appeals to “economics” as a discipline, and, perhaps, even as a science.  
As a discipline, “economics” is on a par with sociology, history, law, politics, and 
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religion, and Dewey demonstrates familiarity with this discipline throughout his work.  In 
Human Nature and Conduct, he notes that the modern industrial structure has resulted in 
something that would be unexpected from the point of view of traditional economics (as a 
discipline).16  In the Ethics, Dewey cites Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics,17 
and a description of the “economic theory” of Adam Smith constitutes several paragraphs 
of Dewey’s entry on “Altruism and Egoism” in the Cyclopedia of Education. 
Much discussion of his understanding of economic theory appears in Freedom 
and Culture.  Here, he claims that “economic explanation” and theory from the 
eighteenth century forward have differed from such reasoning in previous history.  
Dewey argues that the role of economic theory in culture has become much bigger than it 
once was, so much so that many mistake it for the single defining characteristic of 
culture.18  His understanding, in this text, of the “classic school of economic theory” is 
clearly dependent on the work of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, not just The 
Wealth of Nations.19  He also demonstrates more than passing familiarity with Karl 
Marx’s economic ideas in the same book in a chapter entitled “Totalitarian Economics 
and Democracy,” and he compares the “mistakes” of “laissez-faire individualism” with 
problems of generalization in Marxism.  Dewey’s knowledge of Marxist economics can 
also be discerned in “Anti-Naturalism in Extremis,” an article published in the Partisan 
Review in 1943.20 
                                                
16 MW14, 100:  “From the standpoint of orthodox economic theory, the most surprising thing about modern 
industry….” 
17 MW5, 401. 
18 LW13, 72-73, 137-139. 
19 Ibid., 74. 
20 L15, 46-62. 
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There are other references to “economics” that suggest Dewey also used the term 
interchangeably to mean that which is “material” (as well as a “scientific discipline”).  In 
Human Nature and Conduct, he wonders “why process is so definitely subservient to 
product in so much of modern industry” and concludes that the answer is, at least in part, 
because “An increasingly large portion of economic work is done with machines.”  Here, 
“economic” seems to mean “material,” and, again, this use of the term demonstrates that 
Dewey believes economic considerations also belong to the world of those who are not 
professional economists. 
We need not rely on inference, however.  In Dewey’s criticisms of Marxism in 
Freedom and Culture, he explicitly acknowledges that “economic” and “material” are 
terms used interchangeably by Marx, and he seems to concur with Lionel Robbins’ later 
criticism of that terminology as overly restrictive.21  In response to the “accusation” that 
“the essence of Marxism, at least as a practical doctrine, is appeal to the motive of self-
interest,” Dewey replies: 
But actually it comes close to reversing actual Marxist doctrine—the 
doctrine that the state of the forces of production is the sole causal force.  
For according to this view, all the factors of human nature are shaped from 
without by “materialistic,” that is economic, forces….A much juster 
criticism would be that Marxism systematically neglects everything on the 
side of human nature with respect to its being a factor having efficacy, 
save as it is previously determined by the state of the forces of production.  
In claiming to replace “Utopian” socialisms, Marxism throws out 
psychological as well as moral considerations.  Whether the theory is in 
fact able to live up to this claim—without which its “materialism” is 
meaningless—is another matter.22 
 
As we shall later see, Marxism, not unlike “laissez-faire individualism” and other 
economic theories, makes a mistake with respect to human nature, its richness, and its 
                                                
21 Robbins (1946), 17. 
22 LW13, 133. 
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adaptability.23  The present point, however, is simply to show that Dewey sometimes uses 
“economic” synonymously with “material” and he recognizes that tendency in others as 
well. 
Again, many of Dewey’s references may be intended to incorporate more than 
one meaning of the word “economics.”  Further, the various meanings are not unrelated:  
though the economist Lionel Robbins argued that “economics” is not simply a study of 
the causes of material well being, material well being is indeed one of the important 
concerns of the discipline of economics and it is one that is of tremendous importance to 
Dewey’s philosophy.  Dewey may be aware of the subtle distinctions made within the 
professional field of economics, but he is also aware that the “common man” cannot be 
bothered with such distinctions.  Material well being is one of the most immediate 
concerns of human beings, and it is therefore of immediate concern to Dewey.  Though 
he was well prepared to engage in theoretical debates with professional economists, 
Dewey was far more interested, in his philosophy, to examine how economic systems and 
institutions affected the material well being of individuals.  In short, while Dewey 
undoubtedly understood and was intrigued by comparisons between Smith and Marx’s 
work, he was ultimately most concerned with how their work had shaped the lives and 
well being of individuals in the twentieth century. 
I certainly will not argue that, to have something meaningful to say about the 
relationship of pragmatism to economics, Dewey must use the term “economics” 
consistently or in the same context throughout the thirty-seven volumes of his collected 
                                                
23 Chapter V below. 
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works.   As I will note in the next chapter, if Robbins is to be believed, this is a standard 
that economists themselves have historically found too difficult to satisfy.24 
 
Project History and Explanation 
 I began this project after having been exposed to some of Dewey’s most 
important later works:  Experience and Nature, Human Nature and Conduct, Art as 
Experience, the 1932 Ethics, and his Logic:  The Theory of Inquiry.  My study of these 
books led me to believe that Dewey’s work was largely repetitive; that is, he had several 
significant and original themes to contribute to philosophical thinking, and he applied 
them to various topics, but the results were often strikingly similar to those in a previous 
book.  The preparation of this dissertation has demonstrated to me that this claim is both 
true and false.  On the one hand, there is little doubt that themes such as the scientific 
method, experimentalism, reconstruction, empiricism, and naturalism are present in 
Dewey’s work as early as 1902 and reappear in each subsequent work until his death.  
But my early belief was false in the sense that I gave Dewey little credit for any 
development in these themes, and a careful reading of the early middle works25 showed 
me immediately that these were ideas he re-worked throughout his life.  Though his most 
mature works like Experience and Nature, Art as Experience, and the Logic demonstrate 
that his thought on these subjects had begun to crystallize, the fact that he expected to add 
more than one hundred pages of introduction to Experience and Nature at the age of 
ninety tells me that he had not yet said all he wanted to say. 
                                                
24 See II.A., note 1 below. 
25 MW1 – 4 especially. 
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 I am sorry to say, however, that another hypothesis I had at the outset of this 
project was, in fact, confirmed.  Dewey’s relationship with economics, albeit complex 
and interesting, is, I believe, ultimately a flawed one and one that, for all his study of 
sophisticated economic literature, was sadly unsophisticated.  This should hardly be 
damning criticism of a philosopher:  after all, Dewey was a philosopher and never 
pretended or claimed to be something else.  But I will argue that his unique brand of 
philosophy (as well as his writing on public policy and politics) obligated him to be more 
sophisticated in his economic thinking and, perhaps more importantly, more explicit and 
concrete.  We cannot, for instance, fault Descartes for failing to take up an analysis of 
diminishing marginal returns.  We most certainly can, however, fault someone who 
repeatedly makes claims about the modern and increasing “subordination of the political 
to the economic”26 without giving more detail about what that means and how it might be 
different than previous political and economic relationships.  We can, in fact, fault 
someone who speaks again and again about the reform of “economic structure” and 
“institutions” without first giving more than a caricatured account of the same. 
 To be clear, this thesis is not an entirely negative account of Dewey’s work as it 
relates to economics.  As noted above, I believe that Dewey was truly a philosophical 
pioneer and there is much about his pragmatism—and its relationship to economics in 
particular—that demands further study.  But Dewey was also a philosopher who happily 
accepted the mantle of “pioneer,” and his criticisms of “classic” philosophy could be 
systematic, unforgiving, and severe.  I do not condemn Dewey for this:  it is one of the 
traits of his work that makes the other thousands of pages of dense, often overly complex 
prose tolerable.  Yet I also take Dewey at his word, and I believe we should employ the 
                                                
26 LW13, 130. 
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guidelines he himself set.  He spoke of “a first-rate test of the value of any philosophy 
which is offered us”: 
Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary 
life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, 
more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?  Or 
does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more 
opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in “reality” 
even the significance they had previously seemed to have?27 
 
Did Dewey’s philosophy, particularly with respect to his economic thinking, meet this 
test?  Will the application of the methods and successes of the physical and natural 
sciences help economists as well as philosophers to “criticize” and “re-create” “the casual 
goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art”?28  If so, how is that end to 
be effected?  In order for Dewey’s philosophy to pass his own test, it must be specific 
enough to give us direction toward achieving this goal especially since, as he himself 
argues, his philosophy departs from the methods of traditional philosophy. 
My worry, in short, is that Dewey cannot meet the criticism raised by Richard 
Rorty in his article “Dewey’s Metaphysics.”29  There, Rorty argues that “the talk of 
‘observation and experiment’ is as irrelevant to the accomplishment” of Dewey’s work in 
Experience and Nature  “as it was to the great predecessor of all such works of 
philosophy-as-criticism-of-culture, Hegel’s Phenomenology.”30  The accuracy of Rorty’s 
criticisms hinge, I believe, on examining Dewey’s own examples of the application of the 
“experimental method” to various problems in philosophy, economics, education, and 
religion.  What will it mean to apply the experimental method to problems that are 
outside the realm of the physical and natural sciences?  If his pragmatism is to “render 
                                                
27 LW1, 18. 
28 Ibid., 326. 
29 Rorty, 72-89. 
30 Ibid., 74. 
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ordinary life experiences” “more fruitful,” Dewey must explain this and, as an 
experimentalist, he must provide the details and outcomes of his experiments in order to 
support his explanation and to allow others to verify his work. 
I will argue that Dewey’s interest in economics provided an exceptional 
opportunity for him to demonstrate the value and the operation of the experimental 
method as it might be applied in a non-traditional setting.  Instead, at the end of his life, 
Dewey came to criticize economists for the increasingly “scientific” character of their 
work.  In October of 2002, however, four months and fifty years after Dewey’s death, the 
Bank of Sweden announced that Professor Vernon Smith had been awarded the Nobel 
Prize in economics for the use of the experimental method in economics.  Dewey 
anticipated and advocated this very application, yet he played no part whatsoever in its 
development. 
 
Plan of Chapters and Methodology 
 Despite his own hopes, there are certainly places in Dewey’s work where he 
professes to be somewhat pessimistic about the likelihood that philosophy will become 
better integrated with other disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences.  This 
pessimism was justified, and the unfortunate fact is that, while philosophical thinking has 
made an impact in many fields outside of itself, economics has been one area that has 
resisted the intrusion of philosophy.  This is especially ironic since early political 
economists would have been far more likely to describe themselves as “philosophers” 
than “economists.”  Adam Smith, after all, was first famous for his work in moral 
philosophy, not economics. 
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 In any event, the distance between philosophy and economics that persists 
requires that this thesis begin with a brief discussion of the history of economics as a 
discipline and the sorts of concerns that have persistently engaged the attention of 
economists.  Little will be said about Dewey here as the purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a point of comparison between Dewey’s philosophical concerns and the way 
economists have historically treated the same subjects.  Subsequent chapters take up 
those concerns one by one, beginning, in Chapter III, with behavior.  This chapter focuses 
almost exclusively on Dewey’s account of behavior, though it does connect his account 
to the study of behavior in economics. 
 Chapter IV takes up the issue of rationality, and, as means and ends are integral to 
Dewey’s understanding of rationality, they are discussed here as well.  The difference 
between traditional economic thinking and Dewey’s philosophy is perhaps most marked 
in this chapter.  Dewey describes means and ends as part of a continuum, while 
economists have historically taken them to be distinct.  Again, this chapter attends 
primarily to Dewey’s work and only incidentally deals with the specifics of economic 
thinking on rationality.  This account of rationality leads naturally in Chapter V to 
Dewey’s conception of human nature and habit.  Since rationality has, for Dewey, 
everything to do with practice and action, it is important to understand how Dewey 
conceives of action and its relation to instinct and habit.  This, in turn, leads to Dewey’s 
account of intelligence as a sequence including ordinary or primary experience, reflection 
or secondary experience, and a return to primary experience which incorporates the 
products of reflection. 
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 The model for this sequence is the experimental method, and Chapter VI turns to 
that method and the role of models in science.  Again, though the bulk of this chapter 
deals with Dewey’s work on the experimental method and models, connections are drawn 
between that work and economic thinking on the same.  In particular, this chapter 
introduces the work of Vernon Smith and experimental economists.  A detailed account 
of that work, however, is postponed until Chapter VII.  There, I have attempted to find, in 
Dewey’s collected work, specific instances of examples of the application of the 
experimental method.  This proved even harder to do than I had expected, and I fear that 
the results are not particularly helpful.  The chapter ends with an emphasis on 
experimental economics, and I believe that the specific illustrations I have been able to 
provide from that field will demonstrate both that Dewey’s own account of the potential 
of the experimental method was prescient and that his work would have benefited from 
concrete suggestions as to how the method might be applied in other fields, particularly 
economics. 
 Finally, the last substantive chapter on Dewey’s work highlights the importance 
of certainty, uncertainty, and risk in his philosophy.  In contrast to the subject of means 
and ends, questions of certainty and uncertainty show how similar Dewey’s 
“metaphysics” was to economists’ own assessments of the nature of existence.  
Economists, like Dewey, are willing to embrace the “contingency” that characterizes 
human experience, and it is somewhat surprising that Dewey never capitalized on this 
parallel in his own work.  This chapter is followed by a concluding discussion of my 
thesis and some final thoughts on the prospects for “pragmatic” economics. 
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 One of the most challenging things about studying John Dewey is, of course, the 
sheer quantity of work that he produced during the course of his impressively long life.  I 
believe that, even in professional philosophy, most attention is given to his so-called 
“middle” (1899-1924) and “later” (1925-1953) works.  I confess that I did not deviate 
from this tendency, and the reader will note that most of the citations drawn from 
Dewey’s work fall into one of these two periods.  Throughout, I have relied on the 
Southern Illinois University Press’ thirty-seven volume Collected Works, and each 
citation of Dewey refers to a volume number in that collection.  References from The 
Early Works are referred to in the notes as EW followed by a number (which indicates 
the volume from which the citation was drawn).  Similarly, citations from The Middle 
Works and The Later Works are referred to as MW and LW, respectively.   I have 
attempted, in each case, to name the original work from which the citation is drawn.  
Though there is an equally daunting body of critical work in secondary sources on 
Dewey’s philosophy, I have used these sources only sparingly, preferring instead to 
compare Dewey’s work with sources drawn from the history of economics and economic 
theory. 
Finally, the appendix is a catalogue of Dewey’s references to “economy” or 
“economics.”  Though the thesis does not rely on this catalogue for argumentative 
support, I found this to be a handy reference as I worked.  I did not attempt to deal with 
each citation in the body of the thesis (this would likely have been impossible in less than 
a thousand pages), but I thought it an interesting document nonetheless.  I should 
acknowledge that this catalogue was done “manually” and drawn primarily from 
references listed in the index to the Collected Works, though, unfortunately, as my work 
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progressed, I found this index to be incomplete.  Thus, I do not claim that this catalogue 
is exhaustive.  The Collected Works are, of course, now available on compact disc and 
fully searchable by means of computer, and a more accurate catalogue could be derived 
thereby.  I did not, however, have access to the digitized version and relied entirely on 
good old-fashioned books, and any oversights or omissions are, accordingly, solely my 
responsibility. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE ECONOMIST’S “ECONOMICS” 
 
Economics and Dewey’s Philosophy 
 
The famous economic theorist and historian, Lionel Robbins, believed that 
understanding the history of economic thought was a prerequisite for being able to speak 
intelligently about contemporary economic issues.  At the same time, however, he 
recognized the difficulty of defining the discipline of economics: 
The efforts of economists during the last hundred and fifty years have 
resulted in the establishment of a body of generalizations whose 
substantial accuracy and importance are open to question only by the 
ignorant or the perverse.  But they have achieved no unanimity concerning 
the ultimate nature of the common subject-matter of these generalizations.  
The central chapters of the standard works on Economics retail, with only 
minor variations, the main principles of the science.  But the chapters in 
which the object of the work is explained still present wide divergences.  
We all talk about the same things, but we have not yet agreed what it is we 
are talking about.1 
 
Interestingly, this description might have suited Dewey just fine.  That is, he would have 
had less interest in whether economists could speak intelligibly about the “ultimate 
nature” of what they do as long as their “generalizations” were accurate and played some 
role in making “ordinary experience” more meaningful.  According to Robbins’ 
description of it, economics might well have passed the test that Dewey set for 
philosophy:  relevance and clarity in prediction and management of day-to-day affairs.  
Nonetheless, economists continue to struggle to define the “ultimate nature” of what they 
do. 
                                                
1 Robbins (1946), 1. 
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In an inaugural lecture at Cambridge in 1885, Alfred Marshall, the renowned 
Victorian economist, recounted significant moments in the history of economics and 
described the discipline’s future prospects.2  Many accept this lecture and Marshall’s 
work as the point at which economics broke away from philosophy and became a 
“specialized discipline in its own right…[one whose] concerns…are of a more concrete 
and practical kind than those of philosophy.”3  The “chief task of economic science,” 
according to Marshall, is the “measurement of motives.”4 
This account of economics is an important one, not simply because of its author’s 
prominence.  It may be argued that a number of disciplines exist which either consider 
the nature of motives or examine the causes of motives.  Economics does neither, and 
Marshall’s description reflects this by its emphasis on measurement.  The “economic 
organon” concerns itself “with those motives to which a money price can be directly or 
indirectly assigned.”   Marshall is careful to note that money has no special meaning 
beyond the fact that it serves as the most efficient means to measure motive in “the world 
in which we live.”5  Thus, according to Marshall, economists do not need to concern 
themselves with the “ultimate nature” of their discipline.  Rather, economics is a 
discipline which is concerned with a certain type of measurement, and, more specifically, 
measurement of one particular kind of thing:  motives. 
Elsewhere, Marshall defines economics as a discipline whose subject matter is 
“the world in which we live” (as opposed to any ideal theoretical construct or utopia): 
Political Economy or Economics is a study of mankind in the ordinary 
business of life; it examines that part of individual and social action which 
                                                
2 Marshall (1956), 152-174. 
3 Roy, 49.  There are many other examples to support this claim. 
4 Marshall (1956), 159. 
5 Ibid., 158, 161. 
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is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the 
material requisites of wellbeing.  Thus it is on the one side a study of 
wealth; and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study of 
man.  For man’s character has been moulded by his every-day work, and 
the material resources which he thereby procures, more than any other 
influence unless it be that of his religious ideals; and the two great forming 
agencies of the world’s history have been the religious and the economic.6 
 
If we accept Marshall’s definition, then the implications for philosophy and pragmatism 
in particular are clear.  Dewey’s own “test” for philosophy demanded that philosophers 
deal with and improve “the world in which we live.”  Economics, like philosophy, studies 
that world and the people who live in it.  In particular, economists are concerned with 
those material aspects of “the world in which we live” and how individuals satisfy their 
material needs and desires. 
In an article published in the Journal of Philosophy in 1923, Daniel Sommer 
Robinson critically named John Dewey as an advocate of the “sociological” motivation in 
philosophy.  Dewey responded by accepting the label, and he proceeded to describe its 
strengths.  He quoted favorably (in response to Robinson’s citation of the same) Josiah 
Royce’s The Spirit of Modern Philosophy to characterize his assumption about the task of 
philosophy.  It was an assumption that he shared with Royce: 
It is the assumption that Philosophy, in the proper sense of the term, is not 
a presumptuous effort to explain the mysteries of the world by means of 
any superhuman insight or extraordinary cunning, but has its origin and 
value in an attempt to give a reasonable account of our own personal 
attitude towards the more serious business of life.  You philosophize 
when you reflect critically upon what you are actually doing in your 
world.  What you are doing is of course, in the first place, living.  The 
critical inquiry into what all these things mean and imply is philosophy.7 
 
                                                
6 Marshall (1947), 1. 
7 Royce, 1.  Quoted in part by Dewey in “Tradition, Metaphysics, and Morals” in MW15, 19.  The 
emphasis is mine. 
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The “ordinary business of life,” as Marshall puts it, and those parts of it “most closely 
connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing,” 
“every-day work, and the material resources which [man] thereby procures”:  for the 
pragmatist, these are the materials of philosophy and the subject matter of critical 
reflection.  Thus, Dewey’s philosophy and economics (as described by Marshall and 
Robbins, at least) share the same objectives, though they may employ different 
methodology. 
Dewey accepted Royce’s definition of philosophy as the practice of critical 
reflection upon “living.”  Marshall claims that the subject matter of economics is man’s 
“every-day work, and the material resources which he thereby procures.”  Though 
Marshall’s definition is a bit more specialized than Royce’s in the sense that it focuses on 
the economic aspects of life, we can easily see why Dewey believed that a philosophy 
which did not concern itself with economics (as the study of “every-day work” and the 
“material resources” earned through this work) was an “escapist intellectual gymnastic.”  
Marshall claims that the economic is largely responsible for the shaping of a man’s 
character.  Dewey’s philosophy, because it is the sort that addresses itself to the concerns 
of daily life, must be one which is also preoccupied with the things that influence 
character.  Both Marshall’s “economics” and Dewey’s pragmatism are a “part of the 
study of man.” 
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, John Dewey regularly appealed to 
“economics” and the “economy” in his written work, and his frequent references and 
personal letters demonstrate that the topics were often on his mind.  Dewey even cites 
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Marshall’s Principles of Economics in the Ethics of 1908.8  In the thousands of pages of 
Dewey’s writing, however, there is no single essay or book dedicated to “economics” or 
the “economy” alone.9  Dewey published on many different topics in many different 
forums, and yet, on the subject of economics (with the exception of these frequent, brief 
references) he is strangely reserved. 
It is surprising that, in these references, Dewey does not elaborate or provide 
much detailed analysis of his thinking on economics because he repeatedly connected 
economics with matters of material wealth, and he criticized ancient and medieval 
philosophy for denigrating the “material” in favor of the “spiritual.”  In fact, in an address 
given at Cooper Union on December 7, 1941, Dewey asserted that the rise of Nazism and 
totalitarian regimes was bound up with “The heritage from philosophies which thought to 
advance the cause of the ideal and spiritual by cutting it off from the material….”10  
Human flourishing first requires, apart from any concern for sophisticated philosophical 
ideals, attention to the material, and economics is the social science that occupies itself 
with important information about the material aspects of “ordinary life.”  Thus, we might 
expect Dewey to have had much more to say in detail on the subject, and it seems odd 
that he would not have addressed the subject of economics in monograph form as he did, 
for instance, aesthetics, ethics, or individualism.  In the absence of Dewey’s own detailed 
treatment of the subject, it is important to have some brief background on economists’ 
accounts of the issues which mattered to Dewey.  The remainder of this dissertation 
attempts to connect these issues to Dewey’s work. 
                                                
8 MW5, 401. 
9 There are, however, essays regarding economic crises and the importance of educators learning about 
economic conditions. 
10 LW14, 320 (“Lessons from the War – in Philosophy”) 
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Behavior and Rationality 
 
 Lionel Robbins defines economics as “the science which studies human behaviour 
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.”  This 
definition, he notes, is not classificatory.  That is, it does not “attempt to pick out certain 
kinds of behaviour, but focuses attention on a particular aspect of behaviour, the form 
imposed by the influence of scarcity.”  Thus, for the economist, any sort of behavior may 
serve as the subject matter of economics as long as it “involves the relinquishment of 
other desired alternatives.”11 
 Other economists have also relied on behavior to describe their field.  As recently 
as 1996, David Friedman defined economics as “that way of understanding behavior that 
starts from the assumption that individuals have objectives and tend to choose the correct 
way to achieve them.”12  More than fifty years prior to this, Frank Knight presented a 
paper at the American Philosophical Association on “Social Science.”  His description 
was very similar to Friedman’s:  “Economic behavior implies or is, in the degree in 
which it is economic, the use of means in such a way as to realize the maximum quantity 
of some general end or objective, embodied in specific wants and conditioned by the 
limited means available to an individual subject.”13 
 Economists, then, see economics as the study of behavior.  In particular, their 
interest lies in human behavior that involves means and ends.  They assume that human 
beings behave “rationally”; that is, that human beings, faced with the desire to achieve 
certain ends, will employ the limited means they possess in such a way as to maximize 
the possibility that they will achieve their ends.  Economic “rationality,” therefore, can be 
                                                
11 Robbins (1946), 16-17.  The emphasis is Robbins’. 
12 Friedman, 3. 
13 Knight (1956), 127. 
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demonstrated by this assumption.  The economist identifies the rational being as one who 
makes choices between limited means in order to successfully achieve certain ends.  This 
“rationality” is not, however, a normative standard.  Economists do not argue that human 
beings should work to become rational in this sense.  The economist assumes that people 
are rational in this sense and then uses this assumption to better understand behavior and, 
often, to make predictions about behavior.  Economic rationality is, for the economist, an 
assumption about human nature. 
 
Human Nature and “Economic Man” 
 What does it really mean, however, to say that “economic rationality” is, for the 
economist, an assumption about human nature?  First, it is a characteristic that all human 
beings possess, and it is evidenced in their behavior when faced with limited means and 
unlimited desires.  Does this mean that the economist believes that behaving in an 
economically rational fashion is the defining characteristic of human nature?  In other 
words, is the concept of economic rationality exhaustive when we seek to understand 
human nature? 
 These questions probably first arose from John Stuart Mill’s essay “On the 
Definition of Political Economy” and his conception of the “economic man” (often 
referred to as Homo economicus).  The essay was published in 1844, but written in 1829 
or 1830.  In the essay, Mill defined “political economy” as a science concerned with man  
solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of 
judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that 
end….[Political Economy] makes entire abstraction of every other human 
passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually 
principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of 
the present enjoyment of costly indulgences….Political Economy 
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considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; 
and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, 
living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, except in the 
degree in which it is checked by the two perpetual counter-motives above 
adverted to, were absolute ruler of all their actions.14 
 
Given this description of the activity of political economy, it is rather ironic that, in 
Dewey’s letter to his wife (cited above) in 1886, he would say, “I almost wish sometimes 
I were in pol[itical] ec[onomy]; it is so thoroughly human.”  Mill’s description of the 
economic man is of a person who seems thoroughly inhuman and an individual who has 
been reduced to little more than a few base desires. 
In fact, Mill’s description of the “economic man” spurred debate among later 
economists as to the significance of this “man” in economic theory.  Many claimed that 
Mill’s description of “economic man” was intended to describe man as he always is in 
fact, a being solely concerned with the possession of wealth.  On this interpretation, 
Mill’s description of “economic man” would be exhaustive of human nature.  Economists 
would impute to human beings a natural and complete preoccupation with “acquiring and 
consuming wealth.”  Mill’s own words do not support this interpretation, however.  In the 
essay, Mill follows the passage cited above with the qualification, “Not that any political 
economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but 
because this is the mode in which science must necessarily operate.”15  As I will note 
later, Dewey agrees with this assessment of the “mode in which science” necessarily 
operates.  One of the first characteristics Dewey identifies within the “experimental 
method” is abstraction and isolation.  Mill continues: 
With respect to those parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even 
the principal object, to these Political Economy does not pretend that its 
                                                
14 Mill, 137-138. 
15 Ibid., 139 
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conclusions are applicable.  But there are also certain departments of 
human affairs, in which the acquisition of wealth is the main and 
acknowledged end.  It is only of these that Political Economy takes 
notice.16 
 
Dewey is clear that philosophy cannot similarly narrow its vision; that is, philosophers 
cannot say that there is only one aspect of human behavior or character which is of 
interest to them.  His condemnation of “scientific economists” in the “Unfinished 
Introduction” to Experience and Nature suggests that he is unwilling to grant Mill’s 
point.  If “science” means ignoring the “part played by need, purpose and an unceasing 
valuing….in the generation and management of human affairs,” Dewey wants no part of 
it. 
Alfred Marshall later agreed that Mill’s “economic man” was indeed a scientific 
construct.  In his Principles of Economics, however, he claimed that economists study 
man “as he is,” as “a man of flesh and blood.”  They do not deal with “an abstract or 
‘economic’ man.”  Thus, for Marshall, the “economic man” Mill describes could not 
represent man “as he is.”  Yet Marshall continues, describing the “one side of man’s life” 
that interests economists as “those aspects of life in which the action of motive is so 
regular that it can be predicted, and the estimate of the motor-forces can be verified by 
results”.17 
This implies that between Mill and Marshall there exists a difference of 
terminology, but not of concept.  Mill’s “economic man” provides a useful analytic tool 
that abstracts one particular aspect of human nature at the exclusion of all others.  
Economists, according to Marshall, focus on the “man of flesh and blood.”  Their focus 
is, however, on “one side of man’s life” and that side simply happens to be the same 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Marshall (1947), 26-27. 
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aspect that Mill’s “economic man” illustrates.  Again, this isolation or abstraction of a 
particular aspect of behavior is, as we shall later see, one of the defining characteristics of 
the “scientific method,” as Dewey understands it.  In order to better understand a 
phenomenon (in this case, economic behavior), one must first isolate that phenomenon 
and remove it from an uncontrolled context.  In essence, this is what both Mill and 
Marshall have described in the accounts they provide of economics (or political 
economy). 
It would seem, therefore, that neither Mill nor Marshall conceive of “human 
nature” as wholly constituted by “economic rationality.”  Both do, however, understand 
untutored human nature to include behavior that attempts to employ limited means to 
achieve particular ends in the most efficient manner.  Philip Wicksteed in his important 
work The Common Sense of Political Economy emphasized this aspect of human nature 
and, at the same time, discouraged the reliance on Mill’s term: 
We shall therefore have to consider what constitutes an economic relation 
rather than what constitutes an economic motive.  And this does away at a 
stroke with the hypothetically simplified psychology of the Economic 
Man which figured so largely in the older books of Political Economy, and 
which recent writers take so much trouble to evade or qualify.  We are not 
to begin by imagining man to be actuated by only a few simple motives, 
but we are to take him as we find him, and are to examine the nature of 
those relations into which he enters, under the stress of all his complicated 
impulses and desires—whether selfish or unselfish, material or spiritual,—
in order to accomplish indirectly through the action of others what he 
cannot accomplish directly through his own.18 
 
Mark Blaug has argued that “all modern economists” have adopted Wicksteed’s view of 
the “theory of ‘real man’” and that they “take the whole man as he is, staking [their] 
claim on correctly predicting how he will actually behave in economic affairs.”19  Mill’s 
                                                
18 Wicksteed, 4. 
19 Blaug (1980), 61-62. 
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“economic man” was decidedly not “the whole man”, but Mill believed the concept 
nonetheless supplied the subject matter of economics.  His concern for the “economic 
man’s” behavior was a scientific one.  As Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek put it, the 
question economists attempt to answer is “Can we explain variations and regularities in 
economic performance, outcomes, and behavior with a simple set of assumptions?”20 
Despite economists’ disagreements about the significance of the concept of 
“economic man” and how it might operate in economic analysis, it seems clear that they 
agree that at least some part of human nature involves economic rationality.21  This 
should not be taken to mean that economic rationality is a fixed characteristic, however.  
Economic rationality may well be an aspect of human nature, but economists also believe 
that it is influenced by education.  If economic rationality entails using available means to 
achieve desired ends, it follows that beliefs about the effectiveness of alternative means 
will be repeatedly revised in the face of new information.  In this sense, economists’ 
understanding of human nature is not dissimilar to Dewey’s.  Though Dewey argued that 
many economic accounts of human nature were mistaken and reductive (in precisely the 
way that Wicksteed describes them), he would have applauded those economic thinkers 
who believed that “human nature” was “adaptable.” 
The presence of uncertainty in the world requires rational actors to continually 
reconsider the instruments and behaviors they employ to achieve their objectives,22 and 
education often provides both the impetus and the means for this reconsideration.  
Economists also acknowledge the influence of other factors such as environment and 
                                                
20 Shepsle and Boncheck, 21. 
21 In the last fifty years there has been extensive work by economists on the limits of this rationality.  See 
particularly the work of Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Ariel Rubinstein 
22 Shepsle and Boncheck, 18. 
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culture on rationality and beliefs about the effectiveness of alternative means of obtaining 
ends.  Again, Dewey’s pragmatism is suffused with attention to environmental factors, 
and his account of human nature includes habituation as well as instinct. 
 
Means, Ends and Efficiency 
Though economists rarely speak in terms of “means” and “ends,” traditional 
economic theory assumes that concern regarding means and ends shapes individual 
behavior.  As Robbins’ definition of economics above demonstrates, economists study 
the choices individuals make between limited alternatives (means) in order to maximize 
the ends they seek.  Kenneth Arrow uses slightly different terminology, but the effect is 
the same:  “the basic question of the individual is a choice of actions.”23  In the same way 
that economists do not focus on particular kinds of behavior, neither do they speak of 
particular ends as “economic.”  Again, according to Robbins’ definition, the economist’s 
interest in any “end” is confined to its role as the product of scarce means: 
The economist is not concerned with ends as such.  He is concerned with 
the way in which the attainment of ends is limited.  The ends may be noble 
or they may be base.  They may be “material” or “immaterial”—if ends 
can be so described.  But if the attainment of one set of ends involves the 
sacrifice of others, then it has an economic aspect.24 
 
Traditionally, then, economists have prided themselves on their neutrality between 
possible ends.  This is one of the aspects of economics that Dewey would come to 
criticize late in his life.  Again, in the “Unfinished Introduction” to Experience and 
Nature, he condemned economists who failed to interest themselves in the consequences 
of seeking particular ends.  Part of Dewey’s pragmatic project entailed efforts to draw 
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moral theory and economic concerns closer together, and economists’ neutrality between 
different ends represents the antithesis of this project.  It would be unfair, however, to say 
that economists are neutral between alternative means since they believe that the most 
useful assumptions about behavior are those that illustrate efficiency.  In an economic 
sense, “efficiency” and “inefficiency” describe the relationship between ends and means.  
The relationship is “efficient” if the means employed to achieve the end were not wasted.  
Very simply, means have been wasted if more utility could have been achieved using the 
same means. 
 Means and ends also figure in economic subject matter through issues of 
preference and ordering.  Economists assume that an individual’s preferences are 
comparable and can be ordered.  That is, given a set of ends or objectives, an individual 
can compare these ends to one another and thereby order them.  This may take the form 
of preferring one end to another or it may involve an individual expressing indifference 
between two (or more) ends.25  This is clearly related to means in the sense that a rational 
individual’s beliefs about how likely alternative actions are to achieve a particular end 
will affect his or her choice of action.  This also suggests that an individual will likely be 
able to order his or her preferences regarding particular actions.  These preferences will 
be based on the strength of the individual’s belief that a particular action will more 
directly result in the desired effect (end). 
 
                                                
25 Ordering also entails an assumption about transitivity.  See Arrow (1967), 5; Shepsle and Bonchek, 26. 
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Certainty, Uncertainty and Risk 
 For the economist, beliefs are “probability statements”26 about the likelihood of a 
particular action to result in the desired effect.  If the probability that the action will lead 
directly to the desired end is high, the individual is acting under conditions of “certainty” 
or “risklessness.”  Alternatively, if the probability that the action will lead to the desired 
end is low, the individual acts under conditions of “risk.”  Finally, if the individual is 
unable to determine the probability between the action and the desired end, the individual 
is operating under conditions of “uncertainty.”27  Though models of perfect competition 
have classically tended to assume “practical omniscience on the part of every member of 
the competitive system,”28 economists have increasingly acknowledged that this is an 
assumption which requires further investigation and study. 
 Recent Nobel Prize winners in economics have been cited for their willingness to 
challenge traditional assumptions about behavior.  In 2002, Daniel Kahneman was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for “having integrated insights from psychological 
research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-
making under uncertainty.” 29  Concerns about the presence of uncertainty and risk in 
economics are not entirely new, however.  They were at the heart of Frank H. Knight’s 
important book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, originally published in 1921, thirteen years 
before Kahneman was even born.  Knight, in this work, explicitly links the study of risk 
and uncertainty in economics with epistemology and philosophy: 
It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty.  We 
live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of 
                                                
26 Shepsle and Bonchek, 32. 
27 Knight (1948), 19-20. 
28 Ibid., 197 
29 Bank of Sweden. 
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life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little.  This 
is as true of business as of other spheres of activity.  The essence of the 
situation is action according to opinion, of greater or less foundation and 
value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect information, but 
partial knowledge.  If we are to understand the workings of the economic 
system we must examine the meaning and significance of uncertainty; and 
to this end some inquiry into the nature and function of knowledge itself is 
necessary.30 
 
This description of the “world of change in which we live” is very similar to the 
description Dewey gives in his work and particularly in Experience and Nature.  Knight 
subsequently traces these concerns to the mid-eighteenth century and the infancy of 
political economy through the work of Adam Smith. 
 Risk and uncertainty also play important roles in economics through price theory.  
Prices reflect the anticipated and real costs of risk and uncertainty.  That cost may be the 
owner or producer’s insurance against risk, and the cost of this insurance will be 
communicated through price.  Alternatively, consumers must consider risk and 
uncertainty in their own calculations regarding price.  In The Common Sense of Political 
Economy, Philip Wicksteed demonstrates just such a calculation: 
Indeed, whether I buy fewer potatoes at this stall in order that I may in five 
minutes’ time buy more plums at that; or whether I spend less in the 
market to-day altogether that I may spend more on my holiday six months 
hence; or whether I spend less in the whole year to make provision for the 
education of my children if they live to want it, or for my old age if I ever 
reach it, I am always estimating future wants of more or less remoteness 
and uncertainty (for I shall not use even the potatoes for some hours, and 
events may happen that will prevent my using them at all), and am always 
balancing them against each other and asking at what price I care to 
renounce relatively certain satisfactions in order to provide for relatively 
uncertain ones; and I am always making smaller or larger provision for 
some contingency according to whether the terms are harder or easier.31 
 
                                                
30 Knight (1948), 199.  The emphasis is Knight’s. 
31 Wicksteed, 113. 
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Consumers, as well as producers, will figure the cost of an uncertain or risky future when 
they determine value.  In the same way, Dewey believes philosophers, like “ordinary” 
people, must acknowledge and respect the presence of uncertainty and risk in their 
environment.  The main challenge of a pragmatic philosophy, according to Dewey, is to 
reverse the tendency of traditional philosophy to deny the presence of uncertainty in the 
world.  Beyond that, the philosopher must strive to help produce meaning and stability 
(where possible) in this “contingent” world. 
 
Economic Models and Theories 
 Attention to certainty, risk, and uncertainty seem to incorporate the practical, day-
to-day concerns of men and women into the science of economics, but the models used 
by economists are often criticized for failing to do precisely this.  Though he intends to 
clarify the methodology of economics, David Friedman thereby provides an example of 
the sort of reasoning that often frustrates non-economists:  “Economics is based on the 
assumptions that people have reasonably simple objectives and choose the correct means 
to achieve them.  Both assumptions are false—but useful.”32  If the assumptions made by 
economists are acknowledged by economists to be false, how can they possibly be of any 
use?  If an economic model requires significant abstraction from complicated 
circumstances, how can the model be said to provide any valuable information about the 
“real world”? 
 Although other disciplines use models, economists tend to be the object of more 
criticism than other scientists who use models—physicists and chemists, for example.  In 
part, this may be a result of the fact that many people have an intuitive understanding 
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both of the subject matter of economics and its significance in their day-to-day lives, 
while the same might not be said of physics and chemistry.  Many of us can look at the 
simplest graphs that demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium price between a 
supplier’s production curve and a consumer’s demand curve, and we can argue that the 
neatness and clarity of the graph do not seem to represent our own experiences with 
supply and demand and, further, that some of the information on such graphs seems 
counterintuitive.  On the other hand, a graph representing elastic scattering crosssections 
for hydrogen-antihydrogen atoms might be the sort of thing we have no intuition about 
whatsoever, and we likely do not know enough about the behavior of antihydrogen atoms 
to have any opinion about whether that graph seems “too neat” or not. 
 Frank Knight suggests another explanation for the fact that economists’ models 
have become the targets of intense criticism.  In a manner similar to that of theoretical 
physicists, Knight argues, economists have “developed a historic body of theoretical 
economics which deals with ‘tendencies’, i.e., with what ‘would’ happen under 
simplified conditions never realized, but always more or less closely approached in 
practice.”33  The success enjoyed by those who use models in theoretical physics has not 
been shared by economics, however, and Knight believes this can be accounted for 
“largely because” economics “has failed to make its nature and limitations explicit and 
clear.”  He continues: 
It studies what would happen under “perfect competition,” noting betimes 
respects in which competition is not perfect; but much remains to be done 
to establish a systematic and coherent view of what is necessary to perfect 
competition, just how far and in what ways its conditions deviate from 
those of real life and what “corrections” have accordingly to be made in 
applying its conclusions to actual situations.34 
                                                
33 Knight (1948), 5. 
34 Ibid. 
 42 
 
Thus, for Knight, models may be the targets of criticism, but not simply by virtue of their 
being accessible.  The concerns voiced in these criticisms are less about the use or nature 
of models than about the use and nature of economic science.  Knight believes that 
economics must do a better job of stating its own principles, as it is the “vague and 
unsettled state of ideas on this subject” which leads to disagreements about and criticisms 
of the use of models in economics.35  In short, Knight believes that economists must do a 
better job of applying themselves to the problems of “ordinary experience.”  Dewey 
would agree, and he certainly did criticize economists for their tendency to stray from 
such problems. 
All models and theories involve abstraction at some level, however, and the 
methods of the economist are no different.  Dewey identifies “abstraction” as one of the 
first steps of the experimental method.  First, though, we must consider what it means to 
speak of an economic “model.”  The word “model” itself can be used synonymously with 
many others,36 but it is the economist’s use of the word that interests us here.  Have 
economists, though they disagree on so many issues fundamental to the discipline, agreed 
about their use of the word “model”?  Surprisingly little has been written on this topic 
explicitly, though economists tend to use the word “model” easily, as if some agreement 
has been reached.  Perhaps several attempts at definition will suffice to demonstrate that 
any such agreement may be premature. 
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36 Fritz Machlup provided a rather lengthy list of such synonyms:  “concept, mental construct, conceptual 
scheme, schema, ideal type, abstraction, idealization, useful fiction, fictitious construction, schematic 
representation, analogy, hypostatization of analogies, postulate, assumption, system of fundamental 
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and probably other things.” Machlup, 175. 
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Joseph Schumpeter, in his landmark book History of Economic Analysis, 
confidently asserts, “The total or ‘system’ of our concepts and of the relations that we 
establish between them is what we call a theory or a model.”37  In his book Methodology 
of Economics and Other Social Sciences, Fritz Machlup disagrees with this definition, 
noting that economists have a “need for a word connoting more than a construct and less 
than a complete theory; ‘model’ can do this very well.”38  Donald McClosky writes 
It is pretty clear that an economist, like a poet, uses metaphors.  They are 
called “models.”  The market for apartments in New York, says the 
economist, is “just like” a curve on a blackboard.  No one has so far seen a 
literal demand curve floating in the sky above Manhattan.  It’s a 
metaphor.39 
 
Between Machlup and McClosky, however, there is some measure of agreement.  Both 
believe that an economic “model” falls short of “theory.”  Machlup argues that a theory 
entails a model “plus a specification of the empirical observations to which it applies.”40  
McClosky’s terminology differs, but the meaning behind the terms echoes Machlup’s.  
McClosky claims that, while economic “models” (as well as those in other sciences) can 
be viewed as metaphors, “theories” similarly should be seen as stories which employ 
metaphors, thereby broadening our understanding of the world. 
 But consider the most elementary account of economic models, the sort that 
appears in an introductory level college textbook.  Comparisons between economics and 
other sciences often first appear in such books when the issue of models is discussed.  
Here, we see explanations such as, “Like these other sciences, economics uses models, or 
theories.  Economic models and theories are simplified representations of the real world 
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39 McCloskey, 1. 
40 Machlup, 178. 
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that we use to help us understand, explain, and predict economic phenomena in the real 
world.”41  This, then, seems to return us to Schumpeter’s conviction that “models” and 
“theories” are words that can be used interchangeably. 
 One suspects that this debate is not unique to economics, and the same questions 
regarding the relationship of “models” to “theories” might well be raised in chemistry, 
physics, and biology.  The exact nature of this relationship falls within the purview of 
philosophy of science, and, therefore, somewhat outside the subject matter of this thesis.  
Before proceeding, however, it will be important to establish some common 
understanding about the nature of economic models. 
Economic models do, as the textbook definition above notes, serve to help 
economists understand, explain, and make predictions about the world.  In the process of 
trying to understand, explain, and make predictions, the economist will be forced to 
abstract.  This abstraction involves more than just describing “classes or types of things.”  
Indeed, “for purposes of analysis we must often go much further and abstract from still 
more of the familiar features of the thing or event or whatever it is we are thinking 
about.”42  Quickly, these abstractions may reach a level which seems absurd:  the 
“models of the firm, the industry, and the whole system that are used in price theory 
are… ‘shockingly’ unrealistic,”43 for example. 
 Again, though reflections about the nature of abstraction are better suited to the 
philosophy of science or social science, a few words about the relationship between 
models and “realism” are nonetheless appropriate.  In economics, as in other sciences, 
models are not meant to represent the “real world” accurately to the smallest detail.  
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Instead, models are expected to “capture only the essential relationships that are 
sufficient to analyze the particular problem or answer the particular question with which 
we are concerned.”44  Economic models, then, will not be judged by virtue of their 
accuracy in re-presenting the world as it is.  Rather, “good” models abstract from the 
world as it is and make numerous assumptions that may not apply in individual 
circumstances, but they do so in such a way as to demonstrate accuracy in prediction, 
understanding, and explanation of real world phenomena.45  Dewey’s account of the 
experimental method provides support for the economist’s use of models, but one of the 
aims of this dissertation will be to show that Dewey did not unconditionally support the 
use of models in science.  Models, for Dewey, are only valuable insofar as they 
contribute to the furthered understanding of “ordinary” experience, and, thus, models 
must be used in conjunction with some sort of full experimentation (as Dewey describes 
that process). 
 
Economics as Positive or Normative 
 Shortly after the 1977 annual assembly of the American Economic Association, 
an editorial about the meeting was published in Business Week.  The editorial bore the 
title “The Furniture Movers” and likened economists to “moving men” because they do 
no more than “collect money and hours” for “pushing the furniture around.”  In the 
economists’ case, “furniture” amounted to ideas and theories that have already been 
shown to be ineffective, and are, therefore, akin to inanimate objects.  Business Week 
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criticized the attendees for their lack of humility and competence.46  In addition, the 
editorial also criticized economists more generally for their inability to agree with one 
another.  The editorial prompted several members of the Association to undertake a more 
careful study of these criticisms. 
 The study surveyed a random sample of 600 U.S. based economists:  some were 
full professors in leading graduate economics programs, others were economists with 
academic appointments, and the remainder were economists who were employed by the 
government or the private sector.  The authors of the study hypothesized that agreement 
is far more widespread among economists than has been widely reputed, but they did 
qualify this.  They expected, in part, to see “greater consensus about questions of what 
can be done than about those concerned with what ought to be done.”47  This hypothesis 
represented, for the authors, their belief that economists have significant disagreement 
about the status of the discipline:  is it positive or normative?   
The results of the survey bore out the authors’ hypothesis.  There was little or no 
consensus for statements like “Antitrust laws should be used vigorously to reduce 
monopoly power from its current level” and “The economic power of labor unions should 
be significantly curtailed.”  The respondents split almost evenly between strong 
agreement, agreement with provisions, and general disagreement with these propositions.  
However, for propositions such as “Tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic 
welfare” and “A ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available,” 
all but two or three of the respondents agreed.48  The authors concluded that, though there 
is generally more agreement among economists than is often reported to the public, “The 
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normative nature of many issues also allows ideological considerations to become 
important.”49 
Evidence of disagreement between economists as to the question of economics as 
a positive or normative discipline existed well before 1977, however.  Lionel Robbins 
discussed the issue at length in the 1946 edition of The Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science.  In answer to those who asserted that economics and ethics cannot be 
“dissociated,” Robbins replied that any association between the two would be “mere 
juxtaposition.”50  Economics and ethics deal with very different types of subject matter, 
according to Robbins, and there can be no connection between them.  Economics 
operates in the realm of “is” and ethics in the world of “ought.”  For Robbins, this 
represents a difference in “kind:”  “The two fields of enquiry are not on the same plane of 
discourse.”51  As an example of the distinction between these two sorts of discourse, 
Robbins suggests the difference between the price of pork and the way in which pork is 
valued: 
The proposition that the price of pork fluctuates with variations in supply 
and demand follows from a conception of the relation of pork to human 
impulses which, in the last resort, is verifiable by introspection and 
observation.  We can ask people whether they are prepared to buy pork 
and how much they are prepared to buy at different prices.  Or we can 
watch how they behave when equipped with currency and exposed to the 
stimuli of the pig-meat markets.  But the proposition that it is wrong that 
pork should be valued, although it is a proposition which has greatly 
influenced the conduct of different races, is a proposition which we cannot 
conceive being verified at all in this manner.52 
 
The task of ethics and philosophy, according to Robbins, is to examine the proposition 
that “it is wrong that pork should be valued.”  Economics, on the other hand, should 
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concern itself with the proposition that “the price of pork fluctuates with variations in 
supply and demand.”  Though Robbins acknowledges that the “methodological axioms” 
of economists “involve no prohibition of outside interests,” he also notes that economists’ 
talents are better suited to economic (i.e. non-ethical) concerns. 
The only agreement that appears to exist within economics on the question of the 
nature of the discipline is that there is no agreement.  Many economists have, historically, 
agreed with Robbins’ position; i.e. that ethical issues are merely “outside interests” for 
the economist.  Still others have been vehement in their belief that there is no such thing 
as (ethically) value free economics.  Gunnar Myrdal, who shared the 1974 Nobel Prize in 
economics with Friedrich Hayek, called the belief in “neutral” economics “naïve 
empiricism.”53  Even those who seem to be entirely confident in their views on the 
subject seem to have difficulty expressing their opinions with clarity.  In a book entitled 
Essays in Positive Economics, another Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman, claimed: 
that “economics can be, and in part is, a positive science” and that 
“positive economics is in principle independent of any ethical position or 
normative judgments” and “is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science in 
precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences.”54 
 
Many, many examples can be cited of the difference of opinion among economists on the 
question of economics as positive or normative science,55 but the brief summary of these 
examples is simply that there is little agreement among economists on the issue. 
 It should also be noted that there are intermediary positions as well as those 
mentioned above.  Many economists do not believe that economics is either positive or 
normative, but that it includes elements of both.  Joseph Schumpeter provides one such 
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example.  He argued that while economics should largely be concerned with that which 
had typically been the subject of positive science (“objective” facts), it would be 
ridiculous to suggest that the subject matter of economics (the behavior and choices of 
men and women) was unaffected by “value judgments.”56  In effect, “value judgments” 
and normative claims become observable “positive” facts in the economist’s study:  a 
person’s “motivation may, and as a rule does, imply also propositions about causes and 
effects, some or all of which may come within the province of the economic analyst.”57  
A person may hold the belief that one “ought” always to respect binding agreements, and, 
while an economist may withhold judgment about what people “ought” to do, she will 
certainly find valuable the information that an individual actor holds such beliefs since 
they will likely affect the person’s behavior. 
 There is more significance in the lack of consensus among economists than 
simply the failure to resolve philosophical questions about the nature of the discipline.  
Discussions intended to determine whether economics is positive or normative (or both) 
often occur because of economists’ desire to influence public policy.  Schumpeter, 
though his position was moderate on the positive vs. normative issue, criticized attempts 
by economists to engage in policy-making:  “the progress of economics—including 
progress in its practical usefulness—has been and is being severely impeded by 
economists’ quasi-political activities.”58  Thus, regardless of the nature of economics, 
Schumpeter believed economists had no business meddling in political matters. 
 Others are less sanguine about the resolution of this issue.  To many, the potential 
of economics rests on its definition as a positive or normative endeavor, and the 
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economist’s contribution to political issues and debates constitutes the most important 
part of his or her profession.  T.W. Hutchison worried that, if some consensus on the 
question of positive vs. normative was not reached by economists, “the applications to 
public policy of economic theorizing [would] consist to a large extent of arraying rival 
political points of view in impressively persuasive pseudo-technical jargon” and “the 
discussion of policies by economists [would] amount to [nothing more] than a clash of 
rival brands of political propaganda dressed up in esoteric patter.”59  It is hard to imagine 
that Schumpeter would be unfazed by this worry:  why would someone invest nearly 
1200 pages (as Schumpeter does in his History of Economic Analysis) in a subject that 
has little more to offer us than “a clash of rival brands of political propaganda dressed up 
in esoteric patter”?  Hutchison argues convincingly that the “practical applications” of 
economics depend upon some sort of consensus about the positive or normative nature of 
economic science, and one suspects that Schumpeter, insofar as he is concerned with the 
practical application of the science, would agree that this is an issue with which economic 
theorists must contend. 
 We will see shortly that Dewey agreed with those economists who believed 
economics had to concern itself both with political issues and moral issues.  Many of the 
references Dewey makes to economics occur within his work on moral theory.  In 
particular, his Ethics focuses throughout on the history of moral conduct and this conduct 
is often strongly influenced by economic conditions.  In fact, when Dewey re-wrote the 
Ethics, much of the additional material included in the revision was further detailed 
information about the economic conditions which have led to particular moral 
developments.  Throughout his life, Dewey worried about the impact of economic 
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activity on the quality of human life, and he was especially interested in the way 
economic activity had shaped moral conduct.  In the same way that he would deem a 
philosophy that ignored economics an “escapist intellectual gymnastic,” one suspects that 
Dewey would have argued that an economics which ignored moral issues would also be 
of little use to “ordinary experience.” 
 
Human Development and Fulfillment 
 Some of the disagreements described above clearly have a source other than 
differences in belief about the nature of economic science.  Despite protestations that 
economists have little or no concern with ethical value, one must wonder whether their 
own views of what constitutes the “good life” for humans play a role in their work.  John 
Neville Keynes, author of The Scope and Method of Political Economy and father of John 
Maynard Keynes, recognized this problem and likened it to a similar problem in 
philosophy:  “Even if philosophers are agreed as to facts, they may still arrive at contrary 
solutions…because they differ as to the true ideal of human society.”60  Do economists 
have a conception of the “good life” or of ideal human development and fulfillment, and, 
if so, how does that affect the work they do? 
 Many economists will argue that, while they may have a conception of the “good” 
for humans or the “good life,” this conception is irrelevant to their work.  In the same 
way that the physicist’s conception of the ideal human life would be unimportant in his 
study of quantum mechanics (or so the argument goes), so the economist’s view of “the 
best life” for humankind would be immaterial to her study of the leading indicators of 
inflation.  On this understanding of the economist’s work, the only “good” that would 
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matter would be the “good” of utility maximization.  It is no coincidence, however, that 
economics employs the term “goods.”  As Marshall notes in his Principles of Economics, 
“In the absence of any short term in common use to represent all desirable things, or 
things that satisfy human wants, we may use the term Goods for that purpose.”61  
Questions about why it is that an individual or institution derives utility from a particular 
good, on the other hand, would be left to the philosopher, and such questions would 
interest the economist only insofar as they enable her to measure aspects of the individual 
or institution’s economic behavior. 
 Consider the words the winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics, James 
Buchanan, uses to open his book The Limits of Liberty: 
Those who seek specific descriptions of the “good society” will not find 
them here.  A listing of my own private preferences would be both 
unproductive and uninteresting.  I claim no rights to impose these 
preferences on others, even within the limits of persuasion….  Consistency 
demands that we list our private preferences as being neither more nor less 
significant than those held by others….  A situation is judged “good” to 
the extent that it allows individuals to get what they want to get, 
whatsoever this might be, limited only by the principle of mutual 
agreement.62 
 
Buchanan seems to suggest that his own interests are only incidental to the work, and 
that, as an economist, he is required to disclose any possible conflicts of interest at the 
outset of the book.  He could not be more explicit that, if an ideal political life exists for 
human beings, it matters little to his own work:  “We live together because social 
organization provides the efficient means of achieving our individual objectives and not 
because society offers us a means of arriving at some transcendental bliss.”63  But most 
philosophers (Dewey not least among them) would argue that using “good” to describe 
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“individuals getting what they want” suggests certain moral (and perhaps metaphysical) 
commitments on Buchanan’s part (whether Buchanan acknowledges these commitments 
or not). 
Other economists will find this reading of their profession lacking, and they will 
argue that economics, while a science, is a science of a different sort than physics.  While 
one might be able to ignore considerations of “the good” for human beings in examining 
time asymmetries in quantum cosmology (and even this might be more than they are 
willing to grant), similar disregard cannot be abided in questions of employment 
protection in labor economics.  Many would contest the claim that a physicist’s 
understanding of human development and fulfillment is irrelevant to his work on any 
topic.  On this argument, the physicist’s work, no less than the economist’s, is always 
affected in some manner by his beliefs about the “best life” for human beings. 
 In fact, George Frankfurter and Elton McGoun make precisely this argument in 
their 1999 article “Ideology and the Theory of Financial Economics.”  They do not 
dispute that economists, particularly neoclassical economists, attempt to use methodology 
similar to that of physicists and those engaged in the natural sciences.  However, work 
done by natural scientists, like that of economists, is also “imbued with certain beliefs”64 
and, according to Frankfurter and McGoun, neoclassicsts “have been using their 
ideological cravats…as scientific belts to hold up their theoretical trousers.”65  
Schumpeter seems to agree, arguing that both the social structure in which an economist 
(or physicist) lives and the one that she favors will affect the way she works.  At a very 
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fundamental level, “the scientific worker’s choice of problems and of approaches to 
them, hence the pattern of an epoch’s scientific thought, becomes socially conditioned—
which is precisely what we mean when speaking of scientific ideology rather than of the 
ever more perfect perception of objective scientific truths.”66  The very problems that an 
economist chooses to focus on are determined, at least in part, by the societal conditions 
in which she works, according to Schumpeter.  The neoclassicist who lives in a free-
market economy, then, will make decisions about what to study based on a neoclassical, 
free-market framework. 
 But the influence of this “ideology” is more pervasive than selective emphasis.  
Douglass C. North, winner of the 1993 Nobel Prize in economics, argues that these 
ideologies will affect the sorts of theories that economists will design: 
By ideology I mean the subjective perceptions (models, theories) all 
people possess to explain the world around them.  Whether at the 
microlevel of individual relationships or at the macrolevel of organized 
ideologies providing integrated explanations of the past and present, such 
as communism or religions, the theories individuals construct are colored 
by normative views of how the world should be organized.67 
 
If North is right, both the way economists think about the world and the theories they 
produce to describe or understand or to make predictions about the world will be 
“colored” by their understanding of “the best life” or the “good.”  North stands in clear 
opposition to those who believe that economics can be “value free” and this demonstrates 
one more difficulty of the positive-normative problem in economics. 
Though economists like North and Schumpeter may be willing to acknowledge 
the influence of their views about human fulfillment on their work in their discipline, 
many of their colleagues are unwilling to admit such views play any role in professional 
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economics.  While it might be useful, in an attempt at a brief history of economics, to 
consider economists’ views about the best life for human beings and their understanding 
of the good, this is, unfortunately, impossible.  By and large, economists have been 
reluctant to make claims about ideals of human development or to even admit that such 
ideals might play a significant (or even insignificant) part in their theorizing.  Thus, the 
default position has simply been that human development and fulfillment, for the 
economist, are realized through utility maximization.  If “utility maximization” seems an 
indistinct concept, the economist will likely direct those with further inquiries to one of 
her counterparts in the humanities. 
Dewey, of course, believed that there could be no separation between an 
economist’s environment, his habits, instincts, beliefs, and theorizing.  He never 
condemned theorists for their use of theory, but he did criticize them sharply for failing to 
“intellectually disrobe” and “examine” their prejudices and influences.  He would not 
have faulted these “neoclassicists” for having prejudices, but he would have faulted them 
for failing to acknowledge them or for failing to attempt to identify them.  A pragmatic 
economist, like a pragmatic philosopher, will endeavor to remember at all times that he or 
she has a biological foundation (which entails certain needs and behavior), a history 
(which entails certain education and prejudices), and an obligation to incorporate the 
results of all intellectual study into “ordinary experience.”
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CHAPTER III 
 
BEHAVIOR 
 
Economics, Pragmatism, and Behavior 
If, as Lionel Robbins claims, the study of behavior provides the key to an 
understanding of economics, Dewey would surely have applauded this assessment and 
remarked on its similarity to philosophy.  Dewey began his graduate work in philosophy 
by immersing himself in the study of psychology.  At Johns Hopkins, he did “laboratory 
work” of “observation and experiment” with G. Stanley Hall,  31 the first American to 
receive a doctorate in psychology.  Not surprisingly, then, Dewey’s pragmatism rests on a 
foundation of behavioral observation, and his work in logic relies on “knowing” as a 
form of behavior.  For Dewey, behavior and rationality are importantly linked, and, 
although his work abounds with attention to both, the most concentrated discussions 
appear in Human Nature and Conduct, Experience and Nature and Logic:  The Theory of 
Inquiry. 
As Dewey’s late criticism of “scientific economists”32 demonstrates, the subject 
matter of philosophy, as well as economics, has to be the “ordinary experience” of human 
beings.  This experience includes their behavior, and it must include the “part played by 
need, purpose and an unceasing valuing”33 in constituting behavior.  If economics is the 
study of a particular type of human behavior, then economics must certainly be an 
important aspect of Dewey’s pragmatism.  If, as Marshall and Mill both claimed, 
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economics is the study of human behavior particularly as it relates to the material well 
being of individuals, Dewey’s pragmatism is undoubtedly economic, too.  The 
philosopher, according to Dewey, cannot afford to ignore the economic circumstances of 
the individuals he hopes to understand.  Philosophy can be valuable to us insofar as it 
helps us derive more meaning from our “ordinary life-experiences and their 
predicaments,” and matters of material well being and economic considerations are a 
significant part of our “ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments.” 
The economist and the pragmatic philosopher are engaged in a similar endeavor:  
they attempt to use the “data” of human behavior to make predictions and draw 
conclusions that will improve “ordinary experience.”  Dewey cites the influence of that 
which is “economic” on the moral behavior of individuals:  “It [“the economic”] has 
worked out certain important moral necessities of its own.  Honesty, the keeping of 
contracts, the steadiness and continuity of character fostered by economic relations are 
important contributions.”34  Human behavior, economics, and Dewey’s pragmatism are 
all connected by virtue of the data that this behavior provides in order for the shared goals 
of economics and Dewey’s pragmatism to be furthered. 
Finally, if further evidence is necessary to support the thesis that Dewey’s 
pragmatism is closely related to economics, recent work in economic methodology 
provides this.  In particular, a recent symposium about behavioral economics and 
decision theory used Dewey’s work to explain “empirical anomalies” cited by behavioral 
economists.35  Behavioral economists have long focused on incentives and context as the 
determining factors in individual choices about action.  Recently, however, behavioral 
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economics has demonstrated that many long-held assumptions about human behavior as a 
response to incentives and environment do not hold up to empirical observation.  Several 
of the authors at this symposium boldly claimed that Dewey’s work provides answers to 
questions which economists have been struggling with for years.  Since Dewey called for 
the application of the experimental method in disciplines other than the natural and 
physical sciences and since he advocated an “empirical” philosophy, it is especially 
interesting that these authors believe Dewey’s work will be most helpful in explaining 
“empirical anomalies.” 
 
Dewey on Behavior 
 Although Dewey does not always speak specifically about “behavior,” he 
consistently focuses on the matter of “conduct.”  In particular, he believes that attempts 
by philosophers to distinguish between human behavior as the result of either biological 
predispositions or environment are misguided.  Throughout his work, Dewey argues 
against this dichotomy and claims instead that all human “conduct is interaction between 
elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social.”36  This environment 
may more simply be referred to as “culture”: 
The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the chief of 
which are law and politics, industry and commerce, science and 
technology, the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, or 
the values men prize and the ways in which they evaluate them; and 
finally, though indirectly, the system of general ideas used by men to 
justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live, 
their social philosophy.37 
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Thus, human behavior cannot be understood in isolation from the environment in which it 
occurs.  At the very least, it is not solely determined by biology but significantly 
influenced by the society in which it occurs.  It is worth noting, too, that “industry and 
commerce” are integral parts of the interaction which comprises culture.  Understanding 
human behavior requires, in part, an understanding of the nature and details of industry 
and commerce.  If the role of philosophy is to be, as Dewey describes it in Experience 
and Nature, a criticism of culture, it must also be a criticism (and study) of industry and 
commerce, among other things.  Again, the details of economic life are an important 
concern of the pragmatic philosopher. 
As Kenneth Stikkers describes it, Dewey (unlike contemporary rational choice 
theorists in economics) believed that preferences were not “given” by nature but instead 
reflect the influence of the organism’s environment: 
[Preferences] are defined as the organism gropes its way through and 
transacts with its environment, thus undergoing development and growth.  
So the preferences of the organism are always somewhat vague, 
provisional, and in the process of becoming increasingly concrete, in light 
of particular encounters with the environment.38 
 
If economists consider the preferences of individuals as “given” and unworthy of further 
investigation, Dewey would argue that economics is not, in fact, a study of behavior.  
True observation of behavior will demonstrate that preferences, like so many other 
aspects of human life, change as individuals develop and as they interact with culture. 
Dewey avoided the sort of “chicken or egg” problem of determining which 
(biology or culture) is of primary importance by arguing that it would be impossible to 
discover the answer.  By the time we have observed human behavior or conduct, it has 
already long been embedded in a culture, and there is little hope (or point) in trying to 
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peel away the layers of culture to discover some pure human nature.  Further, men and 
women do not live in pre-cultural worlds and Dewey’s pragmatism demands that we, as 
philosophers, do not concern ourselves with such worlds.  Perhaps if we lived alone and 
our habits were formed in a vacuum, the question of pure or untutored human nature 
would be important.  We do not live alone, however, and, according to Dewey, “since 
habits involve the support of environing conditions, a society or some specific group of 
fellow-men, is always accessory before and after the fact.”39 
Human behavior, then, is a function of the “interplay” of several things:  
environment or culture, instinct, habits, and education.  Though preferences may help us 
predict human behavior and, accordingly, create hypotheses about economic behavior 
and action, preferences are themselves affected by these various influences.  Economists 
might observe human behavior and draw conclusions about economic activity based on 
these observations, but, in order to be “pragmatic,” economists would then have to test 
these conclusions in “ordinary experience.”  Neither economics nor philosophy can 
satisfy itself with theorizing, according to Dewey.  Instead, the “test” of economics and 
philosophy must be their ability to employ this theorizing in order to draw meaning from 
and give meaning to“ordinary experience.”  Economists’ view of human behavior (as the 
product of certain “given” attributes) cannot pass Dewey’s “test” for philosophy without 
being aided by “experimentation.”  The simplified or reductive view of human behavior 
as the product of a “fixed and final” character is far too similar to “non-empirical” 
philosophy to be endorsed by Dewey. 
As Dewey describes philosophy, “Its ultimate value for life-experience is that it 
continuously provides instruments for the criticism of those values—whether of beliefs, 
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institutions, actions or products—that are found in all aspects of experience.”40  
According to Dewey, then, philosophy takes human beings as they are, engaged in a 
culture but partially determined by their biological foundations, and it enables them to act 
intelligently through criticism of that culture.  There is thus an important continuity 
between the individual and the environment. 
 
Habit 
 Fundamental to understanding human behavior from Dewey’s perspective is the 
notion of habit.41  In “higher organisms” such as human beings, behavior or “what is 
done” is largely the result of habit.42  Human beings generally act according to the ways 
they have acted in the past.  Habits thereby demonstrate the continuity of the past and the 
present, according to Dewey.  The way we behave now is “conditioned by consequences 
of prior activities”43 and thus connected to the past.  In fact, apart from communication 
with others, Dewey claims that “behavior is confined to channels established by prior 
behavior.  In so far the tendency is toward monotonous regularity.”44  Left alone, our 
behavior tends to be repetitive and lacks anything novel - it “wears grooves.”45  Until our 
habits face challenges or obstacles, they will continue in the same manner that they have 
in the past. 
 Yet habits continually face challenges and obstacles in the form of a human 
being’s surrounding environment.  Habits “manifest themselves” by virtue of the “social 
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environment,”46 and they change according to that environment.  Though Dewey notes 
the “tendency…toward monotonous regularity” in habits, he quickly follows this with an 
explanation for the corresponding lack of such monotony in the average human being’s 
life: 
Each habit demands appropriate conditions for its exercise and when 
habits are numerous and complex, as with the human organism; the 
organism is compelled to make variations, and exposed to error and 
disappointment. By a seeming paradox, increased power of forming habits 
means increased susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness.  Thus even 
if we think of habits as so many grooves, the power to acquire many and 
varied grooves denotes high sensitivity, explosiveness.  Thereby an old 
habit, a fixed groove if one wishes to exaggerate, gets in the way of the 
process of forming a new habit while the tendency to form a new one cuts 
across some old habit.  Hence the instability, novelty, emergence of 
unexpected and unpredictable combinations.47 
 
Habits can only be said to be fixed when they exist in isolation from the surrounding 
environment.  Dewey describes the human condition as one of equilibrium which is 
constantly being disturbed by the surrounding environment:  “living may be regarded as a 
continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium.”48  Habits are the 
hallmark of this equilibrium, but a fixed set of habits will prove insufficient in the face of 
the novelty and variation that are characteristics of human life.  Thus, an economist might 
assume that human beings have a fixed set of habits or a fixed sort of behavior (i.e., faced 
with x, the individual will do y), but, unless the individual lives in an unchanging 
environment, this assumption will prove inadequate for making predictions about actual 
human behavior.  A pragmatic economics would acknowledge the fact that human 
behavior varies as the environment varies, and a pragmatic economics would also have to 
acknowledge that predictions about human behavior will have to adapt as that behavior 
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adapts.  The usefulness of predictions about behavior, then, may be somewhat limited if 
they are presented as “truths about human nature” or predictions that will hold true in all 
cases. 
 Human beings live in a world that is complicated and therefore requires the 
development of a myriad of habits.  The paradox Dewey describes takes the form of 
responsiveness:  though our biological tendencies incline us to try to restore equilibrium 
through fixed habits (the “worn grooves”) and to find the means to eradicate novelty in 
our lives, this very action also makes us much more responsive to changes in our 
environment and we subsequently develop a sensitivity to opportunities to develop new 
and better-adapted habits.  In short, by virtue of our attempts to stifle change in our lives, 
we unwittingly become adept at adapting and we begin to seek occasions upon which to 
exercise these new “habits.” 
 For Dewey, the word “habit,” like many of the words he uses in his work, does 
not have a conventional meaning.  In Dewey’s philosophy, “habit” does not simply mean 
something done repetitively.  In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey denotes “habit” as 
that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in 
that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic 
in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some 
subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity.49 
 
Although this may not be what we typically think of when we refer to “habits,” Dewey 
believed that his meaning was better summarized by this word than words like “attitude” 
and “disposition.” These terms did not reflect the “operativeness” and “actuality” of the 
idea he intended.50  Even though our habits may not be readily apparent to those around 
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us, they are all always operating and working together.  This continuous operation of 
habits or, as Dewey calls it, “the interpenetration of habits,”51 is what forms our 
character.  This interpenetration is described by Dewey as an “interplay” of sorts:  “each 
habit operates all the time of waking life; though like a member of a crew taking his turn 
at the wheel, its operation becomes the dominantly characteristic trait of an act only 
occasionally or rarely.”52  Any account of behavior that is pragmatic on Dewey’s terms 
will pay careful attention to the role of habits as constitutive of human character. 
 
Environment 
 Human behavior, like that of all life forms, entails interaction between the human 
being and the surrounding environment.  In fact, according to Dewey, an “environment” 
is defined as the means a being employs in order to live:  “The processes of living are 
enacted by the environment as truly as by the organism; for they are an integration.”53  
This environment expands through the organism’s activities. As human beings deal with 
the disequilibrations that occur in their lives, they also increase the extent of their 
environment by utilizing new means to resolve these disturbances.  These “new means” 
provide “a new way of interacting,”54 and thereby expand the organism’s environment.  
Again, therefore, if an economist treats an individual’s environment as “fixed” in order to 
draw conclusions about his or her behavior, the conclusions are doomed to fail when 
tested against “ordinary experience” or the facts of every-day existence. 
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 As our environment expands, so too do the opportunities for disturbances to 
occur, and this is particularly true for higher organisms as their abilities to adapt exceed 
those of lower organisms.  The higher the organism, the more likely that attempts to 
restore equilibrium will result in improved meaning or stability of goods.  Accordingly: 
The “higher” the organism, the more serious become the disturbances and 
the more energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts necessary 
for its reestablishment.  The state of disturbed equilibration constitutes 
need.  The movement towards its restoration is search and exploration.  
The recovery is fulfillment or satisfaction.55 
 
Human behavior can only be understood, according to Dewey, if we trace it to its roots in 
biological need.  First, human beings, like other organisms, must fulfill certain basic 
needs in order to survive.  As these needs are fulfilled, other needs arise and the organism 
must find means to fulfill these as well.  Human beings constitute “higher” order 
organisms and their needs are consequently many and varied.  Fortunately, human beings 
tend to be endowed with the creativity necessary to develop new means of meeting these 
needs. 
Finding food for basic survival is an interaction between a human being and its 
environment.  In the same way, attempts to resolve the mind-body problem are also 
interactions between human beings and their environment.  Both involve initial 
disturbances to the human being’s equilibrium and are followed by efforts to resolve 
these disturbances.  Undoubtedly, when viewed from the perspective of simple survival, 
the need created by hunger will be judged more urgent than the need created by problems 
of metaphysics, but both demonstrate the pattern Dewey describes.  The continuity 
between acts of simple survival and philosophical thinking is central to Dewey’s 
pragmatism.  This continuity demonstrates the connection between nature and reason, 
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and this connection provides the basis for Dewey’s Experience and Nature.  Human 
behavior must always be understood, for Dewey, as the product of interplay between 
nature and culture (though, of course, our knowledge of “nature” is mediated by culture). 
In addition to the fact that sophisticated behavior (reasoning, critical analysis) 
seems to be continuous with less sophisticated behavior (breathing, eating), behavior 
between individuals also appears to be connected.  Human conduct, Dewey claims, is 
always social: 
Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reactions in the 
surroundings.  Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and 
resist.  Even letting a man alone is a definite response.  Envy, admiration 
and imitation are complicities.  Conduct is always shared; this is the 
difference between it and a physiological process.56 
 
If human behavior is to be understood as the interaction between an individual and the 
surrounding environment, we must remember that that surrounding environment includes 
other individuals.  Thus, in addition to being characterized by habit, behavior, on 
Dewey’s account, always involves a social context. 
 Tastes and desires also influence behavior, but, as noted above, Dewey does not 
believe that these are inborn and unalterable.  As with other elements of human behavior, 
these are the largely the product of “objective conditions.”57  Although Dewey does not 
rule out the influence of “personal exhortation, advice and instruction,” he does claim 
that they are “feeble” when compared to “that which steadily proceeds from the 
impersonal forces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment….”58  Individuals 
may be born with tendencies toward certain preferences, but attempting to determine 
what these preferences are would require the absence of the “habitudes of the 
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environment” that Dewey mentions.  We never live in such a world, however, and it is 
therefore futile to try to discern “inborn” preferences. 
 Dewey does not mean to suggest that these “objective conditions” produce taste 
and desire in a way that is wholly deterministic.  The surrounding environment which 
influences taste and desire is full of uncertainty and precariousness:  “Man finds himself 
living in an aleatory world; his existence involves, to put it baldly, a gamble.  The world 
is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable.”59  Accordingly, 
preferences are subject to instability and chance, and even individuals that live together in 
similar circumstances will have some unique preferences.  The fact that “objective 
conditions” lead to the development of tastes and desires, however, makes attention to the 
surrounding environment essential to any scheme intended to alter behavior.  It also 
suggests that, without changes in objective conditions, tastes and desires would be likely 
to remain fixed.  A pragmatic economics, then, would have to interest itself in individual 
behavior, social behavior, and, finally, the context and culture in which these occur. 
 Again, the role of habits in behavior must be noted.  Dewey claims that habits are 
constantly under revision, and the presence of uncertainty in “objective conditions” 
explains this fact.  We will never be done with the work of “revising and readjusting 
habits, even the best of good habits” since “Consequences reveal unexpected 
potentialities in our habits whenever these habits are exercised in a different environment 
from that in which they were formed.”60  Behavior and character, since they are the 
product of our habits, will be influenced by changes in the surrounding environment and 
the “precariousness” of existence.  Some of the revisions we must make to habits will 
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entail adapting current habits, but because of the “unexpected potentialities” revealed by 
changing circumstances, we will also develop new habits that might not otherwise have 
seemed related to the immediate change in our environment. 
 If it can be said that, as individuals, we have tendencies, it is only in the sense that 
both the accumulation and constant revision of habits suggest that we will tend to behave 
in a certain manner.  These tendencies, however, cannot be said to be fixed, either by 
nature or by repetition.  As noted above, if natural tendencies are those which are inborn 
and exist apart from environment, we will never be able to identify them because we are 
never entirely apart from the influence of our surroundings.  In fact, far from habits 
reinventing the world, Dewey believes that the influence of the world plays an important 
part in the reinvention of our habits and our selves.  Customs, according to Dewey, are 
not the collective product of individual habits.  Instead, “individuals form their personal 
habits under conditions set by prior customs.”61  The habits individuals form come to 
them in the same way that speech does: 
Each person is born an infant, and every infant is subject from the first 
breath he draws and the first cry he utters to the attentions and demands of 
others.  These others are not just persons in general with minds in general.  
They are beings with habits, and beings who upon the whole esteem the 
habits they have, if for no other reason than that, having them, their 
imagination is thereby limited.  The nature of habit is to be assertive, 
insistent, self-perpetuating.62 
 
Behavior is a response or explication of the stimuli caused by habits, and habits both 
result from and perpetuate customs.  The surrounding environment includes physical 
elements, but it also includes social elements, like customs. 
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As Dewey uses it, the term “tendency” is meant to highlight the contingent 
connection between intentions and consequences.  The connection between “disposition” 
and “deed” or intention and consequence is, for Dewey, generally a direct one.  He is 
critical of attempts to separate intentions and consequences in moral theory, and he 
argues for a continuum between motives and consequences.  He does, however, 
acknowledge the role that accident and contingency play in the world (indeed, this is one 
of the most significant characteristics of human existence, according to Dewey).  
However, he still claims that, “other things being equal, the right disposition will produce 
the right deed.”63 
 
Uncertainty, Moral Theory, and Behavior 
According to Dewey, one of the most significant mistakes made in the history of 
philosophy (and moral theory in particular) has been reliance on theories which see 
reality as fixed and final.  Human behavior is conditioned as a response to the nature of 
existence.  The habits and conduct of human beings tacitly recognize the facts of a 
precarious existence even though philosophers and moralists have largely failed to do so 
for thousands of years.  While philosophers have attempted to “deny…to the universe the 
character of contingency which it possesses so integrally”64 through metaphysical 
doctrines of stability and fixedness, non-philosophers have had to go about the business 
of obtaining stable goods and ideals through effort, risk-taking, and various attempts “to 
safeguard the excellent objects and to deflect and reduce the obnoxious ones.”65  Those 
engaged in scientific inquiry tend to be most successful in their attempts to “control” 
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objects and thereby add “greater control to life itself,”66 but Dewey’s pragmatism 
demonstrated his conviction that these successes could be replicated in fields outside of 
the natural sciences.  Economic activity was one such area, and Dewey’s pragmatic 
philosophy held the hope that individuals’ material well being would be improved by the 
“intelligent action” he described. 
Using a method similar to that of metaphysicians, moralists have often posited a 
“transcendental” or an ideal morality which lacks any hint of the hazard and instability 
inherent in day-to-day life.  Moral theorists have established rules that are “foreign to 
human nature,” and Dewey describes conventional morality as “drab” and “colorless 
conformity.”67  Morals should be the product of human nature (such as it is), according to 
Dewey, and this “colorless” conventional morality does not reflect the nature of 
existence, human or otherwise.  Dewey argues that morality, like philosophy itself, 
requires reconstruction, and “drab” conventional morality should be replaced with a 
morality that respects the facts of the human condition and a morality that understands 
that the physical sciences are an important tool in understanding moral theory.  The 
precariousness of existence would not be eliminated by this theory nor would moral 
problems disappear, but there would be other advantages to the moral theory Dewey 
advocates: 
It would destroy fixed distinction between the human and the physical, as 
well as that between the moral and the industrial and political.  A morals 
based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would find 
the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would 
thereby ally ethics with physics and biology.  It would find the nature and 
activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings, 
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and therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law and 
economics.68 
 
By virtue of their shared biological foundations, the behavior of individual human beings, 
though varied in some respects, is generally “coterminous with those of other human 
beings.”  Moreover, any observation or study of human behavior by philosophers must be 
approached in the same way a biologist approaches her subject matter:  that is, the 
successes and the methods of the natural sciences must be brought to bear on both 
metaphysics and moral theory. 
I noted above (in Chapter II) that one of the debates that has long occupied 
economists has been the question of whether economics is a positive or normative 
endeavor.  Some of the greatest economic theorists in history have disagreed on this 
subject, but Dewey’s pragmatism suggests a solution.  If we approach moral theory in a 
manner similar to the manner in which we approach the natural and physical sciences, we 
will see that the moral and the “industrial” are not distinct.  That is, both the daily 
economic activity of individuals and the theories of economists can be demonstrated to 
be continuous with ethical activity and theory.  The economic life of individuals is laden 
with moral concerns and considerations.  Since the “activities of one person [are] 
coterminous with those of other human beings,” and since the economic life of 
individuals is a part of ordinary experience and requires the activity of individuals, it is 
clear that activity which is a part of the “economic life” of human beings is thereby 
activity that affects other individuals.  Thus, it is moral in its content. 
Any economist who suggests that his or her work is “neutral” or “value free” has 
simply failed to observe human behavior as it is.  A reconstructed economics, like a 
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reconstructed moral theory, will acknowledge the shared nature of human conduct.  In 
short, this means that, as far as possible, the empirical method must be employed in 
questions of ethics and economics, as well as history, sociology, and law. 
 
The Experimental Method, Economics, and Human Behavior 
 Any study of behavior, whether by economists or philosophers, must indeed (as 
Marshall put it) “take man as he is.”  For Dewey, that means that we must attend to the 
complex organism that is “man”:  he is, first, a biological being with certain needs and 
desires, but he is also a being that is born into a “culture” and thereafter influenced by 
that culture.  His means of living in his environment involve adapting to his surroundings 
and using his surroundings in order to draw meaning from them.  His means of living in 
his environment require him to restore “equilibrium” when the uncertain conditions of 
existence surprise him.  His preferences are in almost constant flux and always in the 
process of development and adaptation.  No single theory can, in short, reduce the 
behavior of human beings to a few “fixed” principles and still accurately portray the 
conditions of ordinary human existence.  Does this mean that the study of economics (or 
philosophy, for that matter) is doomed if it is, in fact, a study of human behavior and 
human behavior cannot be (or cannot accurately be) generalized?  What can be gained by 
observations which are incapable of leading to useful generalizations about the nature of 
human behavior? 
 The fact that a generalization will not hold true forever, for Dewey, does not mean 
that it is useless.  In fact, generalizations, like theories, are meant to be tested and only 
have relevance to “ordinary experience” so long as they are testable.  Thus, pragmatic 
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philosophy must take the facts of “man as he is” and “ordinary experience” and subject 
them to intellectual reflection or “secondary experience.”  Once this has been done, the 
products of that reflection can be re-instituted in “ordinary experience” and tested to see 
if they work.  “Work,” in this context, means that they will make our “ordinary 
experience” more meaningful and help us to procure more stable goods.  There is thus a 
“real world” test for the value of pragmatic philosophy.  A “pragmatic economics” must 
do the same.  Though it might step away, momentarily, from the demands and 
disturbances of the “uncertain” world in order to reflect and engage in “secondary 
experience,” it must ultimately return to the uncertain “real world” in order to determine 
whether its predictions, assumptions, and conclusions can improve the meaning of 
ordinary experience. 
 If Dewey is right to claim that this “empirical” philosophy is superior to the “non-
empirical” philosophy that has traditionally been practiced, he can only be proven so by 
concrete examples which demonstrate the advantages of this experimental method.  
Similarly, if an empirical economics is superior to a “non-empirical” economics, this can 
only be demonstrated by concrete examples which show that “experimental” economics 
can produce improved meaning and stability for the “ordinary” man.  What sort of 
philosophy and what sort of economics can pass the “test” that Dewey has set?  What sort 
of study of behavior will “render” the ordinary experiences of life “more significant, 
more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?”69   
I believe that the success of Dewey’s philosophy ultimately depends on his being 
able to demonstrate that it can pass this “test.”  There are, I believe, examples in 
contemporary economic theory that will show that some studies in economics will pass 
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this test.  Whether or not the same can be said for Dewey’s version of pragmatism is 
dependent on an examination of his use of the “experimental method.”  But an important 
part of behavior and human action in both economics and philosophy is the issue of 
rationality, and it is to this issue that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RATIONALITY, AND MEANS AND ENDS 
 
John Dewey constantly used common words in uncommon contexts.  He often 
took terms that had been used in a relatively consistent manner by philosophers for 
thousands of years, and he re-defined them to fit his own projects.  Sometimes this 
method was not successful, as Dewey himself recognized when he regretted his use of the 
term “experience” in the title of Experience and Nature.70  In other cases, Dewey did not 
even attempt such a revision:  he understood that the term had been associated with a 
particular meaning or meanings for so long that it would be useless to try to employ it in 
a different context than that which was customary.  “Rationality” was just such a term, 
and Dewey jettisoned it in favor of “social intelligence” or “intelligence.”71  In the same 
way that Dewey’s account of “intelligence” differed markedly from that of other 
philosophers, it also bore no resemblance to economists’ views of rationality.  At the 
heart of this contrast is Dewey’s understanding of means and ends. 
Ken Stikkers highlights this difference in his article “Transaction, Development, 
and Capacity:  Commentary on ‘Toward a Transactional Theory of Decision Making:’” 
While “rationality” has been generally conceived, at least since the 
modern period during which classical and neoclassical economics 
emerged, as the possession and instrument of a presumably already 
individualized agent, with a set of given desires and preferences, “social 
intelligence” helps to describe the constitution of individual agents, and 
transformation of their preferences through their social transactions, and 
how such socially constituted individuals appropriate social notions of 
“rationality” and “logic” to experimentally satisfy those preferences.  In 
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short, we are not “by nature” homo economicus, although we might be 
socially constituted as such, through the habituation of prevailing values 
and norms of rationality.  Rather, we can reflect critically upon and 
transform our habits into more satisfying ones.72 
Thus, “rationality” (as Dewey understands it) is not a fixed capacity.  It is not “the 
possession and instrument of a presumably already individualized agent” and he does not 
believe that the individual has “a set of given desires and preferences.” 
This chapter attempts to demonstrate the distinction between Dewey’s 
understanding of “rationality” (intelligence) and the account historically provided by 
economists.  Human nature and “homo economicus” will be taken up in the next chapter, 
but the current discussion will lay the foundation for this by exploring Dewey’s use of 
“means” and “ends” and his contention that they are inseparable and continuous.  The 
significance of “habits” will also be addressed in this chapter, and questions of the role of 
empiricism in philosophy will be raised (though these questions will be treated more fully 
in subsequent chapters). 
 
Dewey’s “Rationality” in Contrast to More Traditional Philosophical Accounts 
“Rationality” is a term that is used by philosophers and economists alike, yet there 
is a world of difference in the way each field treats the concept.  Economists have only 
recently begun to challenge traditional assumptions about rationality; for many years, 
they have simply defined “rational” in terms of “utility maximization.”  Thus, 
“rationality” is indeed a characteristic of human beings, but whether it is the distinctive 
characteristic or just one among many is of little interest to the economist.  Rationality is 
one more assumption that is made in order to facilitate the use of economic models, and, 
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while economists acknowledge that these assumptions do not always hold true in the 
“real world,” they maintain that they are nonetheless useful in predicting and theorizing. 
This assumption and the use made of it in constructing models will be discussed 
further in Chapter VI, but it is important to note that economists’ understanding of 
“rationality” also demonstrates the tendency of theorists (like non-empirical 
philosophers) to reduce human behavior and nature to a set of simple assumptions.  
Dewey argues that this tendency is not, in itself, dangerous, but, depending on the use to 
which it is put, it may have disastrous consequences politically, economically, and 
philosophically.  The only way to avoid these sorts of consequences is to employ 
empiricism, though it remains to be seen whether economists or pragmatists have been 
successful in accomplishing this.  
To return to “rationality,” however, it is a concept that, for Dewey, vividly 
demonstrates the difference between pragmatic epistemology and metaphysics and more 
traditional theories.  Historically, philosophers have used the term “rationality” to 
describe the process by which an individual comes to her beliefs.  To be considered 
“rational,” the individual’s beliefs or commitments must be the product of one or more 
reasons.  Ideally, of course, these reasons would have appropriate connections to the 
beliefs they produce.  Further, a “rational” individual is thought to be one who follows a 
“rational” set of rules.  These rules were derived from some transcendent truths, the sorts 
of truths that “non-empirical” philosophers have struggled to find for thousands of years.  
These are, coincidentally, the “fixed and final” and “certain” truths that have fueled 
philosophers’ denigration of “ordinary experience,” according to Dewey.   
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Traditionally, “rationality” has been based on an ontology that Dewey believes 
has been shown to be outdated by advances in the natural and physical sciences.  Though 
it would be misleading to suggest that there has been widespread agreement about the 
nature of rationality among philosophers, it does seem fair to claim that Dewey’s 
understanding of “rationality” departs from the tradition that preceded him.  Dewey’s 
account of “rationality” relies, in turn, on his account of means and ends.  For Dewey, 
unlike for economists, means and ends are part of a continuum and cannot be 
disconnected from one another.  An important aspect of Dewey’s overall project is his 
desire to remove (from the language of philosophy) distinctions that he considers to be 
meaningless.  Among those distinctions or “divisions” are the separations between 
“nature and experience…practice and theory, art and science…art [which is] useful and 
fine, menial and free.”73 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey devotes a chapter to “Experience, Nature and 
Art.”  In this chapter, he contrasts the “modern” view of art to that of the Greeks, and he 
employs this contrast to support his claim that “intelligence” or “rationality” for the post-
Darwinian philosopher cannot mean the same thing that it did to the ancient philosopher.  
Here, Dewey explains that distinctions of the sort made by ancient thinkers—i.e., 
distinctions between knowledge and art—betrayed a social bias that was carried over into 
later philosophy.  Despite the fact that the modern social context is in no way similar to 
the social landscape of the Greeks, the denigration of “need, labor, and matter” persist in 
modern philosophy.  The success of the physical and natural sciences, however, 
demonstrates that the same antipathy does not currently exist against “scientists.”  
Further, modern man has inverted the Greek view of art:  “creation” is thought to be 
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superior to enjoyment or contemplation.  In short, while modern men and women revere 
the “need, labor, and matter” employed by scientists and artists in the production of 
“knowledge,” modern philosophy maintains the ancient Greek biases against these very 
things.  We live, therefore, with a philosophy that does not match the way we live. 
In order to determine the distinction between Dewey’s conception of “rationality” 
and that of other philosophers, we must look briefly at the tradition.  Rationality, for the 
philosopher, has often been divided into “theoretical rationality” and “practical 
rationality.”  Theoretical rationality, according to this distinction, provides reasons to 
believe one proposition over another, while practical rationality offers reasons to take one 
action instead of another.74 
In his book, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that 
the cause of modern disagreement about the nature of justice can be traced to underlying 
discrepancies about the nature of rationality.75  There is plenty of evidence in the history 
of philosophy to support MacIntyre’s claim, yet a quick survey of some of the examples 
he cites from the history of philosophy will suffice to demonstrate that Dewey’s 
understanding of rationality departs still further from these earlier, competing 
conceptions. 
MacIntyre considers Plato and Aristotle, among others, and their views of 
rationality.  For Plato, an individual can be said to behave rationally when he gives 
“rational allegiance to that statement or set of statements, that logos, about a given 
subject matter which has best withstood refutation so far.”76  This, according to 
MacIntyre, is the lesson of the Gorgias, and the continuation of this lesson appears in 
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Plato’s Republic where Plato sets dialectic as “the science of the intelligible” and, 
thereby, “a new resource of rationality.”77  For Plato, the test of rationality ultimately 
turns on a proposition’s irrefutability.  Dialectic enables those engaged in it to move 
“toward a kind of logos which will disclose how things are, not relative to some point of 
view, but as such.”78  Thus, Plato’s account of rationality entails that propositions and 
theses are subjected to dialectic in the hopes of gaining knowledge of the forms or, as 
MacIntyre puts it, “how things are.”  For Plato, theoretical and practical rationality are 
not separable, however.  Having knowledge of the good entails that one could not behave 
in a manner inconsistent with the good. 
Aristotle’s account of rationality builds on Plato’s, and, while Aristotle recognizes 
a distinction between practical and theoretical rationality, he (unlike Hume after him) 
does not believe that this distinction entails a separation between practical and 
theoretical rationality.  Aristotle’s understanding of rationality, like Plato’s, is in large 
part dependent on his teleology, and a rational individual will be one who undertakes the 
sorts of activities necessary to reach the highest end which can be achieved by human 
beings.  Aristotle gives plenty of attention to the nature and operation of practical 
rationality, including the conditions necessary to be able to act rationally (maturity, “good 
habits,” etc.).  Practical reasoning, however, relies on a theoretical foundation which 
enables the rational man to give assent to only those “rational principles” which deserve 
his assent.79  Without some theoretical rationality which identifies the good for human 
beings, the practical rationality which determines which acts will achieve that good is 
impossible. 
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In Theory of Valuation, which appeared in Otto Neurath’s Foundations of the 
Unity of Science in 1939, Dewey described his criteria for assessing rationality.  In prose 
that, even for Dewey, seems awkward, he writes: 
One would suppose it to be peculiarly true of the ideal of rationality that it 
is to be judged as to its reasonableness (versus its arbitrariness) on the 
ground of its function, of what it does, not on the ground of its origin.  If 
rationality as an ideal or generalized end-in-view serves to direct conduct 
so that things experienced in consequence of conduct so directed are more 
reasonable in the concrete, nothing more can be asked of it.80 
 
I take this to mean that Dewey understands “rationality” to be something which can be 
assessed only by virtue of its consequences, and that which is “rational” is synonymous 
with that which achieves certain desired results.  Although this last may not be explicit in 
Theory of Valuation, consider the way Dewey describes “reasonableness” in Human 
Nature and Conduct:  “The genuine heart of reasonableness (and of goodness in conduct) 
lies in effective mastery of the conditions which now enter into action.”81 
 Described in this manner, “rationality” also appears to be synonymous with 
Dewey’s use of the term “intelligence.”  If rationality, for Dewey, is the ability to adapt 
means to ends, this sounds very much like the “intelligent method” he describes 
throughout his work.  The closing words of Experience and Nature constitute one of the 
most profound and clear statements Dewey makes with respect to “intelligence.”  There, 
he describes “intelligence” as “critical method applied to goods of belief, appreciation 
and conduct so as to construct freer and more secure goods, turning assent and assertion 
into free communication of shareable meanings, turning feeling into ordered and liberal 
sense, turning reaction into response….”82  If rationality and intelligence are synonymous 
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on Dewey’s terms, it seems fair to say that Dewey’s understanding of rationality differs 
significantly from “rationality” as it has generally been used by philosophers. 
 Philosophers have long focused on the justification of individual beliefs as 
constitutive of rationality and have thus placed questions of rationality squarely in 
epistemology and metaphysics.  Dewey, like Aristotle in part, locates rationality in the 
realm of moral theory, and, as the citation from Experience and Nature demonstrates, 
intelligence has less to do with discovering the justifications of belief than it does with 
criticizing beliefs with the intent to “secure goods” and turn “feeling into ordered and 
liberal sense.”  Intelligence and rationality are, for Dewey, transformative.  Undoubtedly, 
Aristotle understands reason to be a part of activity, but the proper activity of man is to 
abide by rational principles.  For Dewey, intelligence operates as the result of activity 
which is prompted by habit.  The function of rationality is to enable human beings to 
mitigate83 the precarious and unstable nature of existence and to “secure goods,” and the 
“intelligent method” employed in response to a “breakdown” in habit will, in turn, 
provide updates and additions to habits in advance of future activity.  Though Dewey and 
economists may approach rationality differently, it seems that they end at the same spot:  
“rationality” is, at least in part, a means to “securing goods.”  Whether those goods are 
material or intangible, both the traditional economic understanding of “rationality” and 
Dewey’s measure its success by its consequences. 
 Aristotle believes that rationality is peculiar to man.84  Compare this to Dewey’s 
words at the beginning of Experience and Nature:  “Ability to respond to meanings and 
to employ them, instead of reacting merely to physical contacts, makes the difference 
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between man and other animals….”85  Aristotle would identify the rational man as one 
who gives his assent to beliefs for appropriate reasons.  Dewey describes the rational man 
as one who considers his beliefs, his “appreciation,” and his “conduct” and subsequently 
subjects them all to criticism.  The purpose of this criticism is to determine value, and this 
criticism, “the intelligent method,” is therefore a moral method: 
…every intelligent appreciation is also criticism, judgment, of the things 
having immediate value.  Any theory of values is perforce entrance into 
the field of criticism.  Value as such, even things having value, cannot in 
their immediate existence be reflected upon; they either are or are not; are 
or are not enjoyed.86 
 
In Dewey’s pragmatism, rationality is not something which can be judged by 
introspection or by inquiries into human nature.  Rationality cannot be understood, for 
Dewey, without reference to means and ends. 
 
Means and Ends 
 On Dewey’s terms, the rational man is one who adapts means to the ends he has 
in view.  There is nothing more to rationality and intelligence than this:  the ability to 
employ means in such a way as to achieve the consequences one desires.  This process is 
not, however, as simple as it may sound from the preceding description.  To truly 
understand the process as Dewey describes it requires an understanding of the sort of 
processes human beings engage in when they undertake the “method of intelligence.”  
Second, we must also understand what Dewey means when he speaks of “means” and 
“ends.”  We will see that his use of these terms differs fundamentally from the way 
economists have used them, and, as is true of many of the elements of his pragmatism, 
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his account of “means” and “ends” differs from that of other philosophers.  Moreover, it 
is imperative to understand that Dewey’s account of “means” and “ends” is one which 
does not distinguish the two as separate:  means and ends belong to a continuum. 
 
Experience 
Few concepts in Dewey’s work can be said to be as significant to an 
understanding of the whole as that of experience.  The role of experience in human life is, 
of course, the focus of Experience and Nature, but all of Dewey’s work assumes a 
distinct conception of the term “experience.”  Dewey claims that experience can be 
considered as being of two (integrated) types:  primary and secondary, or crude and 
reflective.  Primary or crude experience constitutes the majority of our experience.  
Dewey describes the subject matter of primary experience as “gross” and “macroscopic,” 
and the products of this experience are characterized as “the result of a minimum of 
incidental reflection….”87   
Primary experience is that which we experience in the course of our day-to-day 
lives.  Our habits are largely responsible for the actions we take and the choices we make, 
and the experiences we have in the course of this activity are those which Dewey calls 
“crude.”  These experiences center on our contact with things “in their immediacy” and it 
is the “ineffability” of things “in their immediacy” which has led philosophers either to 
ignore or denigrate them.88  Yet Dewey argues that the ineffability of the immediate 
should not be used as evidence that the materials of crude experience are obstacles to 
knowledge.  Knowledge simply has “no concern with” “things in their immediacy,” but 
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primary experience still “grasps things.” Dewey criticizes those “modern thinkers” that 
would have us believe that “knowledge is the only mode of experience that grasps 
things.” 89  In fact, without “immediate qualities,” “thought would have nothing beyond 
itself to chew upon or dig into.”90 
In fact, Dewey believes that the function of intelligence or rationality is to 
transform the “objects of experience” as we encounter them in nature into something 
which is “immediately possessed.”  In this sense, intelligence, particularly as it operates 
in the realm of the natural and physical sciences, resembles the creative work of the artist.  
Artists create “meanings capable of immediately enjoyed possession,” and the scientist, 
an artist of a particular sort, “conducts natural events to this happy issue.”91  Intelligence 
performs the function of uniting “the precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured 
and uniform….”92  There is thus a continuity between the crude objects we encounter in 
nature and the sophisticated products of science and art.  Intelligence is the tool that 
highlights that continuity. 
When our habits break down, though we must still act, we are often led to 
secondary experience.  Dewey describes the subject matter of secondary experience as 
“refined” and the product of this experience as “what is experienced in consequence of 
continued and regulated reflective experience.”93  The products of secondary or reflective 
experience “explain the primary objects, they enable us to grasp them with 
understanding, instead of just having sense-contact with them.”94  On Dewey’s terms, 
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therefore, a “rational” individual is not one who behaves according to a set of rules 
derived from a transcendent truth, nor is a “rational” individual one who conscientiously 
links his or her beliefs to a particular action.  For Dewey, an individual would not become 
“more rational” by attempting to revise his or her beliefs in such a way as to connect 
them to a set of reasons.  This is simply not the way human beings behave in fact, 
according to Dewey, and “rationality” (as it has traditionally been understood by 
philosophers) can thereby have little meaning for us. 
Dewey believed that the value of the empirical method as it is employed in 
science has to do with the integration of primary and secondary experience.  Although 
“objects of both science and philosophy obviously belong chiefly to the secondary and 
refined system,” the natural sciences begin with “material” drawn from primary 
experience.95  Scientists use this material as the basis for reflection and secondary 
experience, but they return to primary experience to test the products of their reflection:  
they use “hypotheses as directive ideas for making new observations and experiments 
among the things of raw experience….”96  Philosophy, to its discredit, has increasingly 
failed to return the products of reflection to primary experience, though I will later 
question whether science is not also subject to this same criticism in a way that Dewey 
failed to acknowledge.  But for now, when Dewey calls for empiricism in philosophy, he 
hopes to encourage philosophers to adopt the methods of the natural sciences:  their 
conclusions must be employed in raw experience and tested. 
 The intelligent method involves recognizing the connection between primary 
experience and secondary experience.  Secondary experience, for Dewey, is valuable 
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insofar as it has the potential to enhance the quality of primary experience.  Dewey 
describes the “method of intelligence” as “the use of science in criticizing and re-creating 
casual goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art, the union of 
knowledge and values in production.”97  This description alludes to the connection and 
continuity that exist between means and ends.  The rational man is one who, armed with 
the products of reflection (which have in turn been constructed from the material of 
primary experience), goes about adapting means to ends.  He employs reflections on 
crude experience in an attempt to enlarge “use and enjoyment of ordinary things.”98 
 
Means 
 Dewey’s understanding of the word “means,” like so many other words he 
employs in his writing, may not bear much resemblance to the way the word has been 
used throughout the history of philosophy.  In his introduction to the Collected Works 
volume of the 1908 edition of Dewey and Tufts’ Ethics, Charles L. Stevenson99 makes 
this very point.  When Dewey tackled the subject of “means and ends,” he did so largely 
in response to what he took to be his earlier counterparts’ mistaken account of the terms.  
As noted below, “ends” for Dewey are never “fixed and final,” yet they have generally 
been understood this way in the history of philosophy.  The “end” has been understood as 
the good (which is good in and of itself), and “means” have taken a subservient position 
in relation to ends.  To put it crudely, the only interest “means” have for philosophers has 
been how well they effect the end which has been previously posited as the highest good. 
 One might view means, then, in the following way: 
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1. There is an end or “fixed and final” highest good.  Let us call it E. 
2. There are many “means” to achieve E:  M1, M2, M3, M4, etc. 
3. M1, M2, M3, M4 are interchangeable.  That is, each is insignificant in its 
own right (not intrinsically valuable) and can only be judged to be “good 
or right”100 insofar as it will produce E.  M1 could not be said to be “more 
good” or “more right” than M2, for instance, unless it is more likely to 
produce E. 
 
In short, the only value that any particular mean or means can have is in its ability or 
likelihood to contribute to producing the end or the sort of end which is “fixed and final.”  
Dewey objected to this characterization of “means” which he believed had been shared 
by philosophers from Plato’s time forward.  He objected to the notion that means were 
separable from ends at all.  Instead, Dewey believed that nature and empirical 
observation belied the claim that means might be interchangeable or valuable only 
instrumentally.  This is, in fact, rather ironic since Dewey’s detractors often criticize him 
for being overly instrumental,101 yet Dewey made the same charge against the history of 
philosophy with respect to means. 
 In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey describes habits as “active means,”102 and 
he rejects the notion that ideals or ends can be envisioned as distinct from means.  Habits, 
as means, color every thing that we do, and that includes the ends or ideals at which we 
aim.  Thus, among the mistakes which previous philosophers have made with respect to 
means and ends is the assertion that there can be a separate or distinct end which is 
intrinsically valuable and which determines the “rightness” or “wrongness” of a 
particular mean or habit.  Dewey objected to the above characterization, saying, “Ideas, 
thoughts of ends, are not spontaneously generated.  There is no immaculate conception of 
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meanings or purposes.  Reason pure of all influence from prior habit is a fiction.”103  To 
suggest, somehow, that the ends of human activity are first set or conceived of and then 
means are adapted to them is, for Dewey, a perversion of the facts of observed human 
behavior.  And this perversion is one that economists, no less than philosophers, are 
guilty of perpetuating.  As Stikkers details above, “rationality,” for economists, has meant 
agents who possess a “set of given desires and preferences.”104  There is, upon empirical 
examination of human behavior, nothing “set” about desires and preferences. 
 In Dewey’s account of human behavior, a person would first have to know what 
the good is in order to attempt to achieve it.  That is to say, a person would first have had 
to experience the desired end before he could order his actions in such a way that the end 
could be achieved.  In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey illustrates this seemingly 
paradoxical claim with the example of a man who has bad posture.105  In this case, “the 
assumption is that if a man is told to stand up straight, all that is further needed is the 
wish and effort on his part, and the deed is done.”106  In terms of traditional accounts of 
means and ends in the history of philosophy, this is tantamount to saying that, if a person 
recognizes and envisions a certain end (good posture), all she must do in order to achieve 
that end is have the proper disposition (wish) towards achieving it and she must 
henceforward make “an effort” to achieve it. 
 But Dewey believed that neither the disposition nor the effort could possibly 
matter or even exist without first having had some experience of the end.  The man with 
bad posture, for example, cannot achieve good posture unless he has first had some 
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experience of it.  He cannot be a man with good posture simply by wishing he had it and 
putting forth effort to achieve it.  Belief to the contrary, according to Dewey, “leaves out 
the importance of intelligently controlled habit.”107  In order to actually achieve good 
posture, “objective conditions” must be changed.108  One cannot simply rely on the 
“ordering of his mind” or the wish or will to gain good posture: 
A man who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly, 
a positive, forceful habit.  The common implication that his mistake is 
merely negative, that he is simply failing to do the right thing, and that the 
failure can be made good by an order of will is absurd.  One might as well 
suppose that the man who is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one 
who fails to drink water.  Conditions have been formed for producing a 
bad result, and the bad result will occur as long as those conditions exist.  
They can be no more dismissed by a direct effort of will than the 
conditions which create drought can be dispelled by whistling for wind.  It 
is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out when it is ordered to stop 
burning as to suppose that a man can stand straight in consequence of a 
direct action of thought and desire.109 
 
A man who has bad posture will continue to have bad posture until the objective 
conditions around him have changed.  He might meet another man who has good posture 
or he might be told by someone else what good posture is and that he should aim to 
achieve it, but he cannot obtain good posture without first somehow experiencing good 
posture:  “Only when a man can already perform an act of standing straight does he know 
what it is like to have a right posture and only then can he summon the idea required for 
proper execution.”110  In order to say that a man has the means to achieve good posture, 
we must first understand the habits he possesses, and we must first recognize that these 
habits are “things which independently accomplish definite results.”111  Means are, 
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therefore, a part of the end, and the end cannot exist without the means necessary for 
achieving it. 
 Dewey further objects to the notion that our will or our wishes are somehow 
independent of habits.  This suggestion, like so many of those common to the history of 
philosophy, misunderstands the nature of human behavior and activity.  We would like to 
think that we should not become something we do not will, i.e. a drug-addict or an 
alcoholic.  To think that “will” is sufficient to prevent such a thing, however, is to believe 
that will is something that is unrelated to habits and can be imposed upon an individual’s 
habits from without.  This is to underestimate the power and effect of habit, and Dewey 
claims that the self is not, in fact, constituted by will or by the ends one believes one’s 
self to have.  Rather, the self is constituted by habits, which are our “demands for certain 
kinds of activity….”112 
 Good posture is one with the habits that produce good posture.  There is no 
separation between the two and, in fact, they are part of a continuum.  Thus, to return to 
the history of philosophy and the more traditional accounts of means and ends, Dewey 
revises these accounts such that means are one with ends.  Means cannot be separated 
from ends, and means and ends exist on the same continuum.  Dewey describes that 
continuity in Human Nature and Conduct: 
Means are means; they are intermediates, middle terms.  To grasp this fact 
is to have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends.  The “end” 
is merely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and a mean is merely 
the series viewed at an earlier one.  The distinction of means and end 
arises in surveying the course of a proposed line of action, a connected 
series in time.  The “end” is the last act thought of; the means are the acts 
to be performed prior to it in time.113 
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Means and ends, then, can only be viewed as separate retrospectively, not during the 
course of action itself.  We do not, as individuals, set for ourselves ends which have not 
previously been experienced in some manner or another or which are not suggested or 
determined by objective conditions around us, and we cannot simply wish or will 
ourselves to examine which actions would most likely result in the accomplishment of 
those ends.  Rather, we behave according to our habits, most of which have been 
determined by surrounding conditions and our dependence from birth on others, and, 
when those habits break down or come up against resistance, they will slowly be altered.  
The products of reflection can inform this process, but they certainly do not direct it.  
Thus, ends do not direct our employment of means, and they are susceptible to criticism 
(as a part of the “intelligent method”).  This distinguishes Dewey from economists who 
have traditionally believed that ends, as the preferences or desires of individuals, are not 
subject to evaluation:  they simply are what they are.  If, as Dewey asserts, means and 
ends are not separable, neither are ends exempt from criticism as economists have taken 
them to be. 
 
Ends 
 When Dewey speaks of “ends,” he clearly intends to distinguish them from the 
“ends” of ancient and modern philosophy.  Though some might accuse Dewey of 
redefining the term “ends” for his own purposes, his account of the history of “ends” in 
philosophy suggests that it was the Greeks who redefined the meaning of “ends,” thereby 
perpetrating one of the “Great Bads of philosophy.”114  The Greeks (and later the 
rationalists) converted the idea of “ends” as naturally occurring into a metaphysics of 
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fixedness which holds in highest esteem the products of contemplation.  The products of 
contemplation are subsequently defined in contrast to nature:  that is, philosophers would 
have us believe that primary or crude experience is actually an obstacle to our 
understanding the world and achieving the most morally praiseworthy “ends.” 
In order to understand the nature of “ends,” Dewey believes it is first important to 
recognize the significance of man’s preoccupation with “direct enjoyment.”  Philosophers 
have long ignored the preoccupation humans have with “immediate enjoyment,” and, as 
the example of utilitarianism demonstrates, when they have paid attention to it, they have 
“given a curiously sober, drab, account of the working of pleasure and the search for 
happiness.”115  In contrast, Dewey claims that “The history of man shows…that man 
takes his enjoyment neat, and at as short range as possible.”116 
 “Direct” or “immediate” enjoyment and philosophers’ treatment of it has much to 
do with the matter of “ends,” on Dewey’s understanding of that term.  It is only when 
men experience “direct satisfaction” that they recognize the desirability of repeating such 
experiences.  The word “ends” derives its meaning from the fact that an individual must 
first ”spontaneously and accidentally” “hit upon” these “consummations”117 and only 
later reflect upon and plan the means to repeat this experience.  In this sense, an “end” is 
quite literally that which finally eradicates the desire to perpetuate the immediate 
enjoyment already experienced. 
 In the above example of the man with bad posture, “ends” become the 
intermediate steps necessary to improve posture.  Certainly, the desired result of all the 
intermediate steps is good posture, but, as Dewey notes, “To reach an end we must take 
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our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be performed.”118  Far from 
letting the end direct our habits or means, we must let each individual step become an 
end-in-itself.  Habits, as opposed to a will imposed from the “mind” onto the “body,” 
“form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities.”119 
 In the absence of reflection and planning (or the leisure to reflect and plan), 
“ends” constitute those things that provide a finality: 
A passion of anger, a dream, relaxation of the limbs after effort, swapping 
of jokes, horse-play, beating of drums, blowing of tin whistles, explosion 
of firecrackers and walking on stilts, have the same quality of immediate 
and absorbing finality that is possessed by things and acts dignified by the 
title esthetic.120 
 
Historically, philosophers have argued that these sorts of “ends” are inferior to those 
provided by “fancy or reflective inquiry.”121  In fact, Dewey argues that philosophers’ 
hostility to such “ends” ultimately resulted in an entire metaphysics based on the belief 
that the fixed “ends” derived from “contemplative appreciation”122 have moral 
superiority.  This metaphysics in turn led to the discrediting of primary experience, and, 
for the Greeks, this took the form of denigrating artisans in favor of philosophers. 
 Philosophers, however, did not accomplish this conversion alone.  Dewey 
attributes to humankind a desire to escape the contingency and instability of existence.  
Thus, there is a “joy in what is finished, when it is found amid a world of unrest, struggle, 
and uncertainty”123 and men and women are inclined to accede to the belief that the fixed 
and final is superior to that which is incomplete and fleeting.  Even if there is no explicit 
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acknowledgement by most people that the fixed and final is “superior,” it is, from the 
point of view of those living amidst the precariousness and perils of the everyday world, 
certainly preferable.  That which is fixed and final suggests that the contingency of 
existence might be subject to control.  In the seventeenth century, the Greek mistake was 
perpetuated by those who took the advances of science to be indicative of a design in 
nature.  Dewey argues repeatedly that this delusion has led to a great many mistakes in 
philosophy, but he is clearly aware that, delusion or not, these notions provide the basis 
for many of the decisions and actions human beings undertake. 
 “Fixed and final” are not essential parts of Dewey’s conception of “ends,” 
however.  An empirical account of ends will, in fact, support the claim “that nature is 
characterized by ends,” but it will not do so by asserting that the only legitimate end is 
the “life of the mind.”124  Instead, Dewey’s understanding of the term “ends” borrows 
much from the colloquial usage of the term, and attributions about the significance of 
ends in any manner other than, literally, as endings, will be made only upon reflection: 
We constantly talk about things coming or drawing to a close; getting 
ended, finished, done with, over with.  It is a commonplace that no thing 
lasts forever.  We may be glad or we may be sorry but that is wholly a 
matter of the kind of history which is being ended.  We may conceive the 
end, the close, as due to fulfillment, perfect attainment, to satiety, or to 
exhaustion, to dissolution, to something having run down or given out.  
Being an end may be indifferently an ecstatic culmination, a matter-of-fact 
consummation, or a deplorable tragedy.  Which of these things a closing 
or terminal object is, has nothing to do with the property of being an 
end.125 
 
Ends, for Dewey, are precisely this:  “getting ended, finished, done with, over with.”  To 
speak of an “end” does not entail that one necessarily speak about a telos.  An “end” may 
                                                
124 Ibid., 82. 
125 Ibid., 83.  The emphasis is Dewey’s. 
 96 
become an “end-in-view” in the sense that, having experienced a true closing or finishing 
of one experience, a person may wish to repeat the experience. 
“Ends-in-view” are “projections of possible consequences,”126 and, in that sense, 
similar to ends conceived as goals.  But Dewey is quick to note that even these “ends-in-
view” are “conditioned by antecedent natural conditions” and that they are “intellectual 
regulative means,” not “objects of contemplative possession.”127  When speaking of ends 
as “ends-in-view,” we mean “objects once having occurred as endings, but which are not 
now in existence and which are not likely to come into existence save by an action which 
modifies surrounding.”128  Ends-in-view help us to achieve those “endings” or “closings” 
which are inherent to the nature of existence and are experienced accidentally but can 
later become the object of our efforts and planning.  Whether we speak of “ends” or 
“ends-in-view” specifically, however, we are always speaking about something that is 
based in nature and remains continuous with nature.  Ends-in-view may require reflection 
and planning, but they are not disconnected from nature, and Dewey’s conception and 
discussion of ends is meant to highlight this fact. 
In a very important sense, then, Dewey has turned the history of philosophy (as he 
understands it) on its head.  Instead of positing that men can achieve a good or an end by 
first understanding it and then adapting the way they live to this end, and, instead of 
arguing that secondary experience or reflection is the most virtuous or laudable aspect of 
human life, Dewey claims that men can only understand goods or ends in their relation to 
means or habits.  Secondly, Dewey believes that secondary experience or reflection can 
only be meaningful insofar as it improves primary (or, as philosophers prior to Dewey 
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might have described it, non-intellectual or crude) experience.  Ends, for Dewey, cannot 
be separated from means because means are a part of ends, and ends can, therefore, only 
be evaluated in light of their ultimate effect on means. 
 
Means and Ends in Economics 
If habits are the means used to achieve ends, and if ends are understood as ideas 
that give an image of the possible consequences of our action, as Dewey understands 
human behavior, it is impossible that the two should be separate.   To speak of means and 
ends as distinct is merely a convenience we may use in the course of reflection, but no 
such distinction actually exists.  Means and ends, according to Dewey, are continuous 
with one another, and both have their origin in habits, which in turn have their origin in 
the organism’s surrounding environment.  
Social scientists have long described human behavior as if means and ends were 
separate, and moral philosophers have used this distinction to support prescriptive claims 
about the most virtuous way for human beings to live.  In order to live a moral life, 
according to these arguments, one must first fix on the appropriate end.  Once this is 
done, philosophers would have us believe that the hardest part has been accomplished.  
All that is left is to align our day-to-day behavior with that end, and, since this requires 
nothing more than that the mind discipline the body, there is little left with which 
philosophers need bother. 
Since the body and the details of primary experience are subordinate to the mind 
and the products of reflection, the most difficult part of living the best life is to train the 
mind or focus it on the proper ends.  Once there is, as marketing professionals might say, 
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“buy-in” on the part of the will or mind, the rest is quite straightforward since the body 
can hardly resist the mind once it has fixed on a target.  Of course, this will only be true if 
the mind and body have been properly understood and balanced in relation to one 
another, but the solution to this problem (according to such philosophers) is further 
reflection and analysis, not attention to the facts of primary experience. 
John Dewey disagreed with this characterization of means and ends, and he had 
little use for the supporting account of mind and body and their relative significance.  
Like so much of the history of philosophy, this characterization ignores the facts of 
observable behavior and, once again, demonstrates the need for empiricism in 
philosophy.  In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey’s target is “conventional morality” 
which sets itself in opposition to human nature.  This morality asks us to ignore our 
“natural traits” and to do the things that will make us more like “everyone else.”  Though 
there are some who will understand this and will either use others’ docile acceptance of 
this morality to their advantage or will distinguish themselves by their willingness to 
flout conventional morality, by and large this philosophy will require that most people 
attempt “to live in two worlds, one the actual, the other the ideal.”129 
But such a life is, ultimately, impossible, and, perhaps worst of all, it relegates 
moral concerns to “a private, immaterial realm,”130 since none of the facts of primary 
experience can support a moral philosophy that is, in almost every respect, in complete 
opposition to these facts.  Hence, no one can be surprised when accounts of means and 
ends also correspond to this morality.  “Fixed and final” ends or ideals belong to this 
private, immaterial realm, and they are set up as the things on which we should focus our 
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efforts, while means are the stuff of ordinary, primary experience and warrant far less 
interest or examination.  This kind of moral philosophy has taught us that, despite our 
natural inclination to oppose them, we must concern ourselves with ends that seem 
somehow disconnected from what we know to be true of our day-to-day lives. 
Dewey rebels against this account, and he reminds us of the important role of 
habit in our behavior: 
But in fact, formation of ideas as well as their execution depends upon 
habit.  If we could form a correct idea without a correct habit, then 
possibly we could carry it out irrespective of habit.  But a wish gets 
definite form only in connection with an idea, and an idea gets shape and 
consistency only when it has a habit back of it….  The act must come 
before the thought, and a habit before an ability to evoke the thought at 
will.131 
 Both moral philosophy and “ordinary psychology” reverse “the actual state of affairs,” 
according to Dewey.132  They focus on desired ends and results at the cost of attention to 
the things which make them possible:  habits.  They ignore the power of habits and the 
difficulty of changing habits, and, in so doing, misunderstand one of the most basic facts 
of human existence.  Will is no match for the power of habit, and the philosopher and the 
social scientist’s emphasis on will at the expense of habit demonstrates that they have 
forgotten one of the fundamental aspects of human beings:  “Man must act; and he must 
act well or ill, rightly or wrongly.”133  The necessity of action in the contingent and 
precarious world of human beings will always trump the relative decadence of reflection 
and analysis, though Dewey certainly believes that the intelligent method will combine 
aspects of both. 
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 Attention to economic concerns will, according to Dewey, help us identify the 
practical consequences of conventional moral philosophy.  What the facts of everyday 
existence and modern economic life will show us is that the Greeks’ “belief in fixed 
values” has perpetuated itself for thousands of years, and it has resulted in a “division of 
ends into intrinsic and instrumental….”134 Thus, we understand that there are some goods 
which are “merely instrumental” and others which are “really worth while in 
themselves.”135  Conventionally, according to Dewey, that distinction has been 
demonstrated in the classification of material goods as the first sort and “ideal goods” or 
“religious or esthetic” goods as the latter.136  This would be troublesome enough because 
such a distinction cannot be made if one accepts Dewey’s assertions that the instrumental 
and the “final” are of one kind.  But the mistake does not end there:  instead, this 
hierarchy where material goods are “merely” instrumental and only “intrinsic” goods are 
ultimately desirable has resulted in “the obnoxious materialism and brutality of our 
economic life….”137   
The word “merely,” in Dewey’s depiction, is meant to capture the lack of respect 
that philosophers (and others) have shown for the things which “form the preoccupation 
of the great mass.”138  Dewey claims that philosophers and others who have perpetuated 
this distinction describe material goods and the activities which produce and secure them 
as “drudgery” and as things that “cannot command either intellectual, artistic or moral 
attention and respect.”139  The “great mass” of people, then, will lead lives which are 
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insignificant or characterized by “drudgery” since most people do not have the luxury to 
distance themselves from the activities which produce and secure material goods.  In his 
introduction to Reconstruction in Philosophy, Ralph Ross notes that Dewey is sharper in 
his attacks on other philosophies in this work than in many others.  He describes Dewey’s 
approach here as “pugnacious,” “vituperative,” and angry.140  That is nowhere more 
apparent than in Dewey’s account of those who hold themselves above the “merely” 
instrumental activities: 
The vanity and irresponsibility of values that are merely final and not also 
in turn means to the enrichment of other occupations of life ought to be 
obvious.  But now the doctrine of “higher” ends gives aid, comfort and 
support to every socially isolated and socially irresponsible scholar, 
specialist, esthete and religionist.  It protects the vanity and irresponsibility 
of his calling from observation by others and by himself.  The moral 
deficiency of the calling is transformed into a cause of admiration and 
gratulation.141 
 
This sort of life cannot be a morally worthy life, according to Dewey.  It is a rejection of 
the things that make one human and the things that demonstrate the continuity between 
human experience and nature. 
 Despite Dewey’s scathing assessment of this “higher life” and those who pursue 
it, there is no question that he believes traditional philosophy matters.  At the very least, it 
matters because it has been responsible for a dangerous conversion of values.  Instead of 
aligning moral theory with the facts of human existence, philosophy has set itself in 
opposition to human nature.  In doing so, it has convinced those who undertook its study 
that they had the right and, perhaps, the obligation to “escape” from and “neglect” those 
who could not take up this study.142  Efforts to obtain material security were seen as mean 
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and low and, at the extreme, slavishness.  This, in turn, helped to justify the alienation of 
those preoccupied with “merely” instrumental goods from political life. 
 To some extent, though interesting, this may move us away from the matter at 
hand.  The point which is germane to our current study is that Dewey believed that the 
role of means and ends in human activity had been perverted by philosophy and 
continued to suffer the same fate in the social sciences.  This perversion would only be 
resolved by an understanding that the “instrumental” is itself ideal and intrinsically 
valuable and, moreover, that it is not separated from “ends.”  Philosophers, social 
scientists, and the “great mass” must all see that there is continuity between these 
“higher” ends and those ends which contribute to the material security of individuals.  
Not only might the study of economics be an important part of this resolution, but such a 
restoration of the connection between natural human behavior and the interests of daily 
life might also help to alleviate what Dewey calls the “brutality of our economic life.”143  
As far as philosophy is concerned, however, Dewey believes that the “reconstruction” for 
which he calls will help correct this understanding of means and ends:  “Making a living 
economically speaking, will be at one with making a life that is worth living.”144 
 In Experience and Nature, Dewey uses art to further detail the problems of 
separating means and ends.  If the traditional philosophical understanding of rationality 
has entailed that means and ends are viewed as separate entities, the same can be said of 
the modern understanding of art.  Art has often been divided into the “useful” and the 
“fine.”  But experience, no less than art, belies this separation.  It is a perversion of 
philosophical thinking to promote the “idea that work, productive activity, signifies 
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action carried on for merely extraneous ends….”145  While it may be the case that much 
of productive activity is understood by those who undertake it and those who observe it 
as “action carried on for merely extraneous ends,” this should not be taken as a 
description of one of the necessities of human life.  In fact, Dewey claims that “Our 
classificatory use of the conception of some arts as merely instrumental so as to dispose 
of a large part of human activity is no solving definition; it rather conveys an immense 
and urgent problem.”146 
 There are indeed activities “that have no immediate enjoyed intrinsic meaning,” 
and, unfortunately, these activities “include much of our labors in home, factory, 
laboratory and study.”147  Yet the fact that such activities exist in this form does not mean 
that the labors of home, factory, laboratory and study must always be meaningless.  It is 
not a necessary characteristic of the “labors in home, factory, laboratory and study” that 
they be meaningless.  Their meaninglessness (which Dewey does not deny as a 
characteristic of modern life) is the result of the way such activities have been treated, 
both by philosophers and social scientists (and certainly, therefore, by those who are 
required to undertake these activities on a daily basis).  If we are convinced that the 
highest ends are those achieved by intellectual pursuit and contemplation, it is not 
surprising that we denigrate any activities which fail to obviously support these ends. 
 In what sense, then, are the “labors in home, factory, laboratory and study” 
actually “useful”?  Such activities may be “useful to make shoes, houses, motor cars, 
money, and other things which may then be put to use;”148 but they have other 
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consequences which we tend to ignore.  Chief among those consequences is the effect 
such activity (understood as meaningless) will have on our lives:  they will make a 
“narrowed, embittered, and crippled life, [a] congested, hurried, confused and 
extravagant life….”149  This notion of “useful,” according to Dewey, “ignores the only 
thing that is essential to the idea of utility, inherent place and bearing in experience.”150  
Unless the labors of the home, factory, laboratory and study provide meaning to 
experience, they are not, in fact, useful.  They may produce commodities as described 
above, but this cannot, on Dewey’s terms, be said to be “utility.” 
 As noted above in the second chapter of this thesis, economists have traditionally 
prided themselves on their neutrality between ends.  They tend to assume that 
individuals’ ends are given and that little effort should be expended in criticizing or 
analyzing them.  In this sense, economics would at least seem open to Dewey’s broad 
account of various types of ends and their relative value.  On the other hand, economists 
certainly do distinguish between means and ends and seem to share the attitude of 
traditional moral philosophers that means are interchangeable and of little (if any) interest 
intrinsically.  An economists’ interest between M1 and M2 is not whether the former is 
more virtuous, more “right,” or tends to make experience more meaningful than the latter.  
Instead, the economist wishes to know which of the two means is more likely to achieve 
the desired end and what the opportunity costs are of employing M1 instead of M2.  While 
economists would not, like conventional moral philosophers, argue that ends are fixed, 
final, or morally more significant than means, they certainly do consider means to be 
“merely” instrumental.  They will show more interest in means than the philosophers that 
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Dewey criticizes, but this is primarily because they wish to determine which means are 
most efficient.  They do not consider means (or ends, for that matter) as intrinsically 
valuable.  Recall Lionel Robbins’ words:  “The economist is not concerned with ends as 
such.  He is concerned with the way in which the attainment of ends is limited.”151  Thus, 
economists are, like Dewey, immune to the fixation on ends, their nature, and their 
origins in the “higher” functions of human beings which has plagued the history of 
philosophy.  Unlike Dewey, however, economists have little interest in the criticism or 
evaluation of ends, and this will, once again, lead us to question whether economists (and 
perhaps all social scientists) are not subject to the same mistakes as “non-empirical” 
philosophers. 
 Economists, apart from the separation they make between means and ends, also 
fail, largely, to see that ends, like means, are instrumental.  Like a “genuinely esthetic 
object,” the labors of the home, factory, laboratory, and study should not lead to that 
which is “exclusively consummatory.”  The ends of these labors should be “causally 
productive as well.”  For, as Dewey notes, “A consummatory object that is not also 
instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom.”152  A pragmatic 
reconstruction of economics would require that economists understand 1) that ends and 
means are not, in fact, separable and 2) that ends are not simply given to the individual or 
solely the function of natural disposition.  Ends are modifiable, they are not 
metaphysically or ethically superior to means, and they are, themselves, instrumental. 
 Thus, for Dewey, the economist’s notion of rationality (no less than the 
philosopher’s) requires a significant overhaul.  Dewey jettisons the term “rationality” 
                                                
151 Robbins (1946), 25. 
152 LW1, 274. 
 106 
altogether in favor of “intelligence” or “social intelligence,” but, at the very least, the 
pragmatic economist would have to redefine “rationality” in order to include this revised 
notion of the relationship of means and ends.  If “rationality” is a tool, it is not, as it has 
been traditionally understood in economics, “the possession and instrument of a 
presumably already individualized agent, with a set of given desires and preferences.”153  
Instead, economics (like philosophy) must recognize that “human nature” is such that 
preferences (or ends) are constantly subject to adaptation and revision.  In fact, human 
nature itself is adaptable, according to Dewey.  If that is so, it suggests that the 
foundation upon which economists base their assumptions (and thereby construct 
predictions) is open to further question.  Not only must the pragmatic economist revise 
her conception of rationality, but she must also look carefully at her own understanding 
of human nature and ensure that it truly represents “man as he is.”  If Dewey is to be 
believed, this is a test that philosophers have been failing for more than a thousand years. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
HUMAN NATURE AND “ECONOMIC MAN” 
 
 John Dewey was critical of the way philosophers, as well as economists and other 
social scientists, had reduced “human nature” to a simple set of assumptions or 
principles.  Further, he worried about the way in which the idea of “human nature” as 
“fixed” or “unchangeable” had been used in public policy discussions in order to reject 
important economic reforms.  In the same way that the philosophical distinction between 
“practice” and “theory” and “instrumentalism” and “higher ends” had produced social 
and economic consequences, this view of human nature as “fixed” had social and 
economic ramifications as well.  At every turn, Dewey shows himself to be a pragmatist 
by his attention to the “consequences” and the results of “reflection” upon “ordinary 
experience.” 
But it is this same attention to social and economic consequences that reminds us 
of the obligation Dewey has set for himself:  the test of philosophy is whether it can 
“render” the “things of ordinary experience” “more significant, more luminous to us, and 
make our dealings with them more fruitful.”154  Dewey’s interest in the social and 
economic consequences of philosophical theorizing is laudable, but for it to also be 
“pragmatic,” it must allow us to “make our dealings” with the social and economic 
aspects of “ordinary” experience more fruitful.  Will references to economic 
consequences alone do that, or is it also necessary for Dewey to provide concrete 
examples and explanations of how this might be achieved?  As an “experimentalist,” 
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what obligations does Dewey have in order to succeed in making ordinary experience 
more meaningful with respect to economic life? 
This chapter looks specifically at Dewey’s criticisms of traditional accounts of 
human nature, and it also details some of his specific references to the relationship 
between philosophical accounts of human nature and economic activity.  The following 
chapter begins to formulate an answer to the question raised above regarding the need for 
Dewey to be more systematic in his explanation of how experimentalism will improve 
our economic activity, and thereby, our ordinary experience. 
 
The Paradox of “Human Nature” 
 Like so much of Dewey’s work, his writing on human nature was complicated by 
his uncommon use of common terms.  As late as 1938, Dewey acknowledged that 
discussion of “human nature” was made more difficult by the fact that, when people 
speak of it, they “are talking about different things.”155  In his essay “Does Human Nature 
Change?” he identified (though he may not have distinguished) two conceptions 
associated with the term.  Dewey seems to associate the common usage of “human 
nature” with “innate needs.”156  In fact, after giving a list of such needs, he remarks that 
“there are some tendencies so integral a part of human nature that the latter would not be 
human nature if they changed.”157  Thus, one would think that, if human nature is a 
function of innate needs or inborn tendencies, it is stable or unchanging.  Yet at the very 
outset of the essay, Dewey answers the question posed in his title—“Does Human Nature 
Change?”—in what would appear to be the opposite tone:  “…so far as the question is a 
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practical one instead of an academic one, I think the proper answer is that human nature 
does change.”158 
 How can these two seemingly different answers be reconciled?  The task is not a 
simple one:  one would think that, logically, either human nature does change or it does 
not.  Dewey, however, seems to use “human nature” to refer to inborn tendencies in some 
places in his writing and, in others, he appears to include both inborn tendencies and the 
products of custom and tradition in his definition of “human nature.”  Part of the 
difficulty of trying to understand Dewey’s account of “human nature” lies in attempting 
to distinguish the two instances and in determining whether such a distinction is 
important.  While Dewey may have thought such distinctions pedantic or too academic, 
we may subsequently determine that his own account can only be made consistent when 
we understand the relationship between the two things:  inborn tendencies and custom or 
tradition. 
 Clarifying Dewey’s own conception of “human nature” remains, however, an 
important task for this thesis.  As noted above in Chapter II, “human nature” has 
relevance to economic theories and economists’ assumptions about behavior.  More 
important than this, though, is the fact that some of Dewey’s most detailed discussions 
about the business and activity of economics and economists appear in his writing on 
human nature.  For Dewey, human nature and moral philosophy were intimately 
connected, and proposals for the reform of political and economic institutions had, 
historically, been rejected based on the mistaken claims of  “moralists” that human nature 
was fixed and not subject to modification.  The rejected proposals were seen as failing to 
recognize the fixedness of human nature, and, therefore, doomed to failure because they 
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expected too much adaptation on the part of the individuals affected by the policies.  
Dewey explicitly rejected this claim and the conservatism which it engendered. 
Though Human Nature and Conduct may be Dewey’s most well-known work on 
the subject of human nature, his 1932 essay “Human Nature”159 from the Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences provides a very useful survey of various conceptions of human 
nature throughout the history of philosophical thought.  Given the location of the essay’s 
publication, it is not surprising that the essay itself has implications for the current thesis.  
In the first words of the entry, Dewey connects human nature to the study of economics 
and other social sciences: 
Are contemporary political and economic institutions necessary products 
of human nature?  Or, more generally, does the very constitution of human 
nature show that certain social arrangements are likely to be successful 
while others are doomed to failure?  Is war, for example, inevitable 
because of facts of human nature?  Is self-interest so ingrained in human 
nature that the attempt to base industry on anything except a competitive 
struggle for private gain is sure to fail?160 
 
These may be questions that are not usually raised in discussions among philosophers 
about human nature, but they are important to Dewey’s account of it. 
 First, Dewey outlines four different accounts of what “human nature” might 
mean:   
1. “an alleged original and native constitution; that which is instinctive 
instead of acquired” 
 
2. “alleged psychological powers or faculties” 
 
3. human nature as a “blank slate” or “empty and formless and…therefore 
capable of being molded by external influence”161 
 
                                                
159 LW6, 29-39. 
160 Ibid., 29. 
161 Ibid., 30. 
 111 
4. as something which can only be known “through its great institutional 
products—language, religion, law and the state, the arts.”162 
 
In this last case, “human nature” is a sort of potential and can only be fully understood in 
its exercise.  Although these conceptions of “human nature” may have very different 
implications, Dewey believes that most conceptions of human nature have historically 
had one thing in common; that is, conceptions of human nature have often been nothing 
more than rationalizations of existing social and economic institutions.163 
 In a later article entitled “Contrary to Human Nature,”164 Dewey’s charge is made 
quite explicitly: 
Opponents of projects for bringing about social change have a number of 
defense devices they resort to almost automatically.  One of the 
commonest, and laziest, of these devices is the assertion that the proposal 
goes contrary to human nature.  More sweepingly still, it is often said that 
human nature is so unalterable by its very constitution that the proposal is 
bound to fail and therefore shouldn’t even be tried.165 
 
Dewey continues, arguing that there is “danger” in attempting to oppose such practical 
projects as “political and economic change” on the basis of a “purely abstract idea.”166  I 
take this to mean that, as it is used in such cases, Dewey felt that “human nature” was just 
such an abstract idea. 
 In “Human Nature,” Dewey calls for “experimental observation”167 by social 
scientists in order to advance debates about human nature.  In words that echo his earlier 
work, Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey claims that arguments which support the 
notion of a fixed human nature have historically been perpetuated by those who have an 
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interest in keeping existing social and economic institutions unchanged.  But he appeals 
to “anthropology and history” for evidence that human nature can be modified by virtue 
of these same institutions. 
 Dewey clearly rejects the first account of human nature detailed in the 
Encyclopaedia (“an alleged original and native constitution; that which is instinctive 
instead of acquired”) if it is meant to be exhaustive.  He argues that, if there is “native 
constitution,” we should be hard-pressed to discover it.  One of the most consistent 
themes that occurs throughout Dewey’s work is the conviction that an organism’s 
surrounding environment shapes the organism from birth.  In “Human Nature,” he goes 
even further, noting that looking at a “snapshot of man” at birth would ignore “past 
history in the uterus” as well as “future history when the supposedly fixed and ready 
made structures will change as they interact with the surroundings.”168  If there is an 
original human nature we shall never know of it, and, for Dewey, this is sufficient cause 
to consider other conceptions of human nature.  However, given Dewey’s own words in 
the later piece, I take it that he acknowledges the existence of certain “native elements” 
yet he is unwilling to grant that these are wholly constitutive of human nature.  Instead, 
he claims that these “native elements” will later be complemented by the products of 
custom, tradition, and habit. 
 The second account of human nature, that “psychological powers or faculties” 
constitute human nature, seems to be equally unappealing to Dewey.  These “powers” 
exist prior to the influence of the physical and social environment which surround the 
individual.  While such powers may, in fact, exist in the individual initially, the attempt 
                                                
168 Ibid., 31. 
 113 
to distinguish between “human nature and other nature”169 forms a dualism that Dewey 
rejects.  The discovery of these powers would fall prey to the same objection made 
against the “original and native constitution” conception above; that is, if such powers 
exist, they would be almost impossible to isolate because, from the first instant of life, an 
organism is subject to the influence of its environment in ways that might not be 
immediately obvious.  Moreover, this account specifically relies on a distinction between 
human nature and all other nature, and Dewey repeatedly characterizes his own 
“reconstruction” of philosophy, aesthetics, ethics, and logic as a movement which aims to 
restore the continuity between nature and human experience. 
 The “empty slate” view of human nature represents the extreme opposite of the 
“fixed human nature” account.  If human nature is “in itself empty and formless,” outside 
influences and external forces will be wholly responsible for the development of the 
human being.  On this account, there is nothing which can be said to be native to the 
human being and everything about a human being, good or evil, will have to be attributed 
to the institutions and influences in the individual’s surrounding environment.  Though he 
does not do so explicitly in “Human Nature,” one suspects that Dewey must believe this 
account is also subject to some of the same criticisms as the first two.  If untutored human 
nature is a blank slate, we should never know it because there would never be any time 
during the life of the organism when this claim could be verified by observation.  Further, 
as noted above, he explicitly appeals to the existence of some “native elements” and 
“instincts.”170 
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 As he so often does in regard to other philosophical issues, Dewey eschews 
extreme accounts in favor of the more moderate explanation.  In so doing, he seeks to 
bring the methods and successes of the natural and physical sciences to bear on the study 
of human nature.   He argues that human nature can be modified and that it is largely the 
work of institutions to effect this change, but he also acknowledges that there will likely 
be a limit to the extent of such change.  Philosophers, however, should not be the ones to 
posit these limits.  Instead, these limits will “have to be arrived at by experimental 
observation.”171  This imperative hints at more than Dewey’s respect for the experimental 
method of the physical and natural sciences and his conception of human nature; it also 
gives us significant insight into Dewey’s understanding of the limits of speculative 
philosophy and his conclusions regarding the appropriate application of the same in 
questions of practical import. 
 
Human Nature and Empiricism 
Dewey warns us that it “is always dangerous from an intellectual point of view to 
try to oppose practical movement with an argument drawn from a purely abstract 
idea.”172  A generous reading of this manner of “proceeding” is that it inadvertently 
draws attention away from “the proposal in question.”  Determinations about whether or 
not to proceed with a particular proposal require “critical examination” of the details of 
the proposal.173  But a less generous account of using “abstract ideas” in order to oppose 
“practical movements” would be that “this device is only an expression of a strong 
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prejudice clothed in the garb of an idea in order to appear respectable.”174  This is a 
serious charge indeed:  Dewey here means to suggest that philosophers have employed 
“abstract” concepts like “human nature” to further their own prejudices and to squelch 
proposals for political and economic change which they oppose.  The philosopher’s use 
of the concept of human nature for these purposes may or may not be intentional, but it is 
most often unacknowledged. 
 Dewey’s account of philosophy demands that such prejudices, “clothed in the 
garb of an idea,” must be subjected to an “intellectual disrobing.”175  In Experience and 
Nature, he describes his notion of an “empirical philosophy,” and such a philosophy is 
certainly not the sort of activity that would allow one to use the guise of “ideas” in order 
to subvert political or economic causes: 
An empirical philosophy is in any case a kind of intellectual disrobing.  
We cannot permanently divest ourselves of the intellectual habits we take 
on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time and place.  
But intelligent furthering of culture demands that we take some of them 
off, that we inspect them critically to see what they are made of and what 
wearing them does to us.  We cannot achieve recovery of primitive 
naïveté.  But there is attainable a cultivated naïveté of eye, ear and 
thought, one that can be acquired only through the discipline of severe 
thought.176 
 
Though these words appear at the outset of Experience and Nature in a chapter called 
“Experience and Philosophic Method,” there can be no doubt that Dewey has their 
meaning in mind when he speaks, fifteen years later, about appeals to the fixedness of 
human nature as a means of stifling political and economic change.  Philosophers must 
subject themselves to the same sort of discipline that scientists do.   
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Again, it is worth noting the gravity of this claim.  Although philosophers have 
long believed themselves to be in search of truth and objectivity (or “pure” reason), 
Dewey argues that this is (as traditionally envisioned by philosophers) a search which is 
doomed to failure.  Moreover, he does not claim that he is the first philosopher to have 
understood this, but he does suggest that philosophers have hidden behind abstract 
notions like “human nature” and, by doing so, have often furthered their personal 
interests through social and political policy recommendations.  He does not condemn 
philosophers for having biases; rather, he condemns them for failing to recognize, 
acknowledge, or consider these biases. 
I doubt seriously that Dewey means to suggest that, like experimental scientists, 
philosophers should record the details of the environmental conditions under which they 
engage in philosophizing (e.g., the temperature of the room, the minutiae regarding the 
sort of ink one uses in writing, or the specifications of the paper on which one composes).  
I do think, however, that Dewey believed there were analogous considerations that 
philosophers had to address.  How might their political views influence the ways in 
which they view human nature?  Are the facts of a philosopher’s economic situation 
relevant to his or her understanding of human nature?  Why does the philosopher choose 
to focus on one subject instead of another? 
 Dewey reminds us that “No scientific report would get a hearing if it did not 
describe the apparatus by means of which experiments were carried on and the results 
obtained….”177  He appears to be suggesting that the same should hold true for 
“philosophic” reports; that is, no “philosophic report” should be given a hearing if the 
author is not willing to divulge the means by which the conclusions were derived.  This is 
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not, he maintains, because scientists “worship” their own methods.  Instead, the 
description of “the apparatus by means of which experiments were carried on” will 
provide other scientists the opportunity to confirm the results of these experiments.  In 
the same way, philosophers should be willing to examine and report on their own means 
so that other philosophers can confirm their conclusions.  According to Dewey, the 
neglect of this sort of “intellectual disrobing” throws the theories and conclusions of 
philosophers into doubt because they are little more than assertions made by thinkers who 
are unaware of their own prejudices.  There is no way for others to replicate these 
theories and conclusions except by accepting the same prejudices.  
 In fact, if forced to choose just one idea that has been subject to mistreatment at 
the hands of philosophers and their prejudices, Dewey might well have chosen the 
concept of human nature.  Human Nature and Conduct was published just three years 
prior to the publication of Experience and Nature, and its influence is seen throughout the 
later book as well as the remainder of Dewey’s work.  Dewey’s concern with human 
nature seems to begin to develop fully in the latter part of the middle works and to 
continue consistently throughout many of the later works, regardless of their topic.  
But it is Human Nature and Conduct that most forcefully and explicitly addresses 
the question of human nature and its shabby handling by philosophers in general and 
moral philosophers in particular.  The very first words of the book constitute a rallying 
call against those who have misunderstood human nature for so long: 
“Give a dog a bad name and hang him.”  Human nature has been the dog 
of professional moralists, and consequences accord with the proverb.  
Man’s nature has been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks, 
sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities but only when these were 
placed in contrast with its actualities.  It has appeared to be so evilly 
disposed that the business of morality was to prune and curb it; it would be 
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thought better of if it could be replaced by something else.  It has been 
supposed that morality would be quite superfluous were it not for the 
inherent weakness, bordering on depravity, of human nature.178 
 
Though Dewey certainly believed that this view of human nature was wrong (if not 
downright laughable), his objection to it had less to do with the content than the means by 
which it had been constructed.  This view of human nature had no basis in fact, and 
Dewey’s hope, in Human Nature and Conduct, was to correct this.  That correction was 
to be aided and accomplished by the resources of “scientific knowledge” and Dewey 
aimed to contribute to the “science of human nature.”179 
 The science of human nature has to begin with an observation of the facts of 
human existence and behavior.  As noted above in Chapters III and IV above, the role of 
habit is significant in Dewey’s account of human existence and behavior.  Human nature 
cannot be understood apart from the habits which account for the bulk of human 
behavior.  Between the four different conceptions of human nature Dewey sets out in his 
entry to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, there is little agreement as to the 
“fixity” of human nature.  The first three accounts, however, do seem to agree that human 
nature can be known by that which is (or is not) initially present in the individual.  These 
accounts differ as to whether that native condition can be changed, but it is not unfair to 
say that there have been many who have argued that, while addition may be possible, 
little or nothing can be changed about these native faculties or predispositions.  These are 
the arguments which most concern Dewey as he feels that they have had the greatest 
negative impact on moral philosophy and therefore require the greatest correction. 
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 That which might be called “human nature” in the first three accounts above is, 
for Dewey, synonymous with “natural instincts.”  He does not deny that human beings 
are born with “natural instincts” or tendencies.  As noted above, however, it would be 
difficult if not impossible to isolate these instincts because they have been powerfully 
affected by the organism’s environment, even, perhaps, before birth.  If human nature is 
taken to be the “inborn” qualities, faculties, tendencies, and “powers” an individual 
possesses, for Dewey there is no question about whether human nature is fixed or not.  
He writes that “instincts are most readily modifiable through use, most subject to 
educative direction.”180  To believe otherwise is to accept an “outgrown” psychology and 
a “popular zoology of the bird, bee, and beaver, which was largely framed to the greater 
glory of God.”181  Like so many other antiquities of philosophy and psychology, this is 
one that Dewey believes science has authoritatively dispelled. 
 Only the fourth account of human nature from the Encyclopaedia article comes 
close to capturing the sense of human nature as Dewey conceives of it: 
Human nature cannot be properly conceived or defined in terms of the 
constitution of individuals either native or acquired.  Human nature can be 
known only through its great institutional products—language, religion, 
law and the state, the arts.  As displayed in individuals it is merely 
potential; it develops into reality under the influence of cultural 
institutions, which form the content of objective mind and will.182 
 
The difficult question is not whether natural instincts can be modified or altered.  Clearly, 
such instincts are subject to the influence of educational and social institutions.  For 
Dewey, human nature is not a matter of native instinct but, instead, is the result of the 
influence such institutions exert over individuals and their native instincts.  The key 
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question about human nature is whether, as the product of these institutions, it is 
thereafter subject to modification, and this is a question which needs to be understood in 
greater detail before it can be answered, according to Dewey. 
 
Aristotle, Capitalism, and “Economic” Man 
There have been plenty of responses in the history of philosophy to the question 
Dewey poses to social scientists in his Encyclopaedia article:  “Are contemporary 
political and economic institutions necessary products of human nature?”183  
Unfortunately, those responses have too often confused instinct with necessity, and the 
result is that existing political and economic institutions are justified by appeals to 
arguments about the fixedness of human nature.  Dewey uses numerous examples of this 
confusion throughout his work, but he cites two repeatedly and they are not unrelated:  
Aristotle’s references to “natural slavery,” and the “capitalistic system” or modern 
commercial life. 
Aristotle’s account of “natural slavery” was, according to Dewey, “a 
systematically thought out interpretation of human nature.”184  This discussion appears in 
the Encyclopaedia entry.  In the same way that later moral theory squared itself against 
“human nature” (understood as natural instincts) by trying to subdue passions and urge 
compliance, Dewey argues that Aristotle and others perpetuated this interpretation in 
order to avoid “social and moral chaos.”185  Dewey did not confine his criticism of 
Aristotle to academic journals or texts, however. 
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In an article published in Rotarian in 1938, Dewey refers once again to this 
account:  “Aristotle spoke for an entire social order as well as for himself when he said 
that slavery existed by nature.”186  In another article “Mediocrity and Individuality” 
published in the New Republic sixteen years earlier, Dewey asked his audience to recall 
that “Aristotle rationalized slavery by showing how natural it was for those superior by 
nature to constitute the ends for others who were only tools….”187 
In that same year, Human Nature and Conduct was published, and Dewey re-
raised Aristotle’s interpretation as evidence of the dangerous consequences associated 
with justifying political and economic institutions by reference to “natural instincts.”  
There, he notes that, “To Aristotle slavery was rooted in aboriginal human nature.  Native 
distinctions of quality exist such that some persons are by nature gifted with power to 
plan, command and supervise, and others possess merely capacity to obey and 
execute.”188  Though Dewey goes on in a number of these references to acknowledge the 
later improvements in societal attitudes towards class (which occurred as early as the 
Stoic school),189 his citations of Aristotle are often associated with their relevance to 
contemporary economic life as Dewey perceived it. 
First, Dewey believed that the economic institutions of his own time still accepted 
Aristotle’s account of natural slavery, albeit only implicitly.  He worried about the 
millions of people who were forced to earn their living through menial, repetitive, and 
mindless labor.  Though these people might enjoy greater political liberty than the slaves 
in ancient Greece, Dewey worried that they did not enjoy greater economic freedom and 
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that, without it, improved political freedoms meant little.  Secondly, Dewey fought 
against the notion that natural instincts (which produced wants and needs) were any 
justification for a capitalistic economy which, as he saw it, was characterized primarily 
by selfishness.   
In order to rationalize “the new industry and commerce” of the nineteenth 
century, Dewey believed that economists had exaggerated the importance of natural 
instincts.  In his concern about this exaggeration, Dewey alludes to the version of the 
“economic man” mentioned above in Chapter II:  the human being who is characterized 
by having a “natural and complete preoccupation with ‘acquiring and consuming 
wealth’:”190 
The economists who set out to give intellectual expression to the rising 
industrialism started from the affective side of human nature in accordance 
with prevailing English doctrine.  They developed, however, a much more 
systematic theory than had ever been developed of the nature and 
operation of wants, out of which came a new conception of natural law.  
Economic activity, on this view, is basic; from it are derived the natural, in 
the sense of non-artificial, laws of human conduct.  Society is the product 
of the efforts of human beings to satisfy their wants, since division of 
labor, exchange and permanent property are involved in this satisfaction.  
Government and political action exist in a secondary way in order to give 
security to the free play of economic forces.191 
 
In the 1908 Ethics, Dewey cites Mill’s Principles of Political Economy in reference to 
private property, so it seems reasonable to assume that he was familiar with that work.  
The above excerpt from “Human Nature” does not explicitly identify Mill, but it is likely 
that Mill was one of the “economists” Dewey has in mind.  There is, however, no 
question that Dewey was quite familiar with the corpus of Mill’s work.192  He began his 
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teaching career at the University of Michigan lecturing on Mill, and, at the age of eighty, 
he published Freedom and Culture.  In that work, he uses Mill as the “classic expression 
of the point of view which would explain social phenomena by means of psychological 
phenomena,”193 and, for Dewey, that translated into an accounting of extant social 
conditions by virtue of an appeal to native instincts.  
Recall, from “On the Definition of Political Economy,” Mill’s own words:  the 
science of political economy is one which sees man “solely as a being who desires to 
possess wealth, and who is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for 
obtaining that end….”194  This description is consistent with Dewey’s account from 
“Human Nature” above:  “Economic activity, on this view, is basic….Society is the 
product of the efforts of human beings to satisfy their wants….”  Dewey does not deny 
that economic activity has its basis in human instinct.  He agrees with the description of 
“economic man” thus far, but he does deny that this completes the story of human nature. 
As noted, in the Rotarian article mentioned above (“Does Human Nature 
Change?”) Dewey identified different meanings of the term “human nature.”  If, by 
“human nature,” one means “the innate needs of men,” Dewey claims that there has been 
no convincing evidence to suggest that these have changed over time or that they will 
change in the future.195  What does Dewey mean when he speaks of these “innate needs 
of men”?  He gives a rather detailed list: 
By “needs” I mean the inherent demands that men make because of their 
constitution.  Needs for food and drink and for moving about, for example, 
are so much a part of our being that we cannot imagine any condition 
under which they would cease to be.  There are other things not so directly 
physical that seem to me equally engrained in human nature.  I would 
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mention as examples the need for some kind of companionship; the need 
for exhibiting energy, for bringing one’s powers to bear upon surrounding 
conditions; the need for both cooperation with and emulation of one’s 
fellows for mutual aid and combat alike; the need for some sort of 
aesthetic expression and satisfaction; the need to lead and to follow; etc.196 
 
Thus, there are wants and needs that human beings possess which are both natural and 
immutable.  In that sense, Dewey can agree with the description of an “economic man” 
who has, instinctively, certain wants and needs and desires to satisfy the same. 
 What Dewey cannot agree to, however, is the claim that these inborn tendencies 
will dictate a particular sort of political or economic order.  The fact that human beings in 
general may instinctively share “acquisitive or competitive impulses”197 does not imply 
that a particular economic system is therefore necessary.  Dewey argues that, “Like 
Greek slavery or feudal serfdom, war and the existing economic regime are social 
patterns woven out of the stuff of instinctive activities.”198  Though these instinctive 
activities play a role in the development of political and economic structures, they do not 
play the only role in this development.  The space between natural instinct and existing 
political and economic institutions—the actual weaving, as it were—is filled with the 
influence of custom.  Custom, according to Dewey, “furnishes the machinery and the 
designs.”199 
 While the native “needs” of human beings may not change, the way these needs 
are evidenced certainly can change.  Dewey locates another mistake of philosophy in its 
assessment of these “manifestations.”  Philosophers have likened the “manifestations” of 
these needs to the needs themselves:  “We suppose that the manifestations we have got 
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used to are as natural and as unalterable as are the needs from which they spring.”200  
Dewey is rather measured in his description of this mistake, however, and he seems to 
suggest that it is not an unreasonable one.  While it may be very obvious with respect to 
things such as food that the expression of our needs can be altered, it was not always 
quite so obvious that institutions such as slavery could be altered.   
The ways in which human beings fulfill their need for food seems constantly to be 
subject to alteration, and there are numerous examples to support this (Dewey cites 
attitudes toward cannibalism201 as one such example).  The ways in which we fulfill our 
need “for bringing one’s powers to bear upon surrounding conditions” might seem less 
open to alteration, however.  Aristotle, for example, “would have regarded efforts to 
abolish slavery from society as an idle and utopian effort to change human nature where 
it was unchangeable.”202  Dewey at once argues that the “manifestations” of need 
fulfillment which constitute tradition and custom are alterable, but the inertia against any 
alteration is formidable and not to be underestimated.  He admits that he would be far 
more sympathetic to those who oppose reform if they were to base their opposition on the 
fixedness of habit and custom instead of  “human nature” and that there is some wisdom 
in such opposition.203   
Dewey warns that revolutionaries (as well as reformers) will be unpleasantly 
surprised if they operate under the assumption that radical and wholesale reform happens 
quickly.  Even if political and economic structures are dismantled in one stroke, the 
habits, which have grown up in conjunction with them, are not so easily razed: 
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Any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate to 
propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social changes.  A social 
revolution may effect abrupt and deep alterations in external customs, in 
legal and political institutions.  But the habits that are behind these 
institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective conditions, 
the habits of thought and feeling, are not so easily modified….  The force 
of lag in human life is enormous.204 
   
The reformer must recognize this:  reasonable reform will require a great deal of time and 
the acknowledgement of a dogged opposition that will exist in the form of individual and 
customary habits. 
Ultimately, however, it is true that “affairs of tradition, custom, and institutional 
organizations” are “factors [which] belong among the changeable manifestations of 
human nature, not among the unchangeable elements.”205  Thus, “manifestations” or 
“expressions” of human nature are alterable, while the native “elements” are not.  The 
“economic man” may, by native instinct, have a desire to accumulate wealth or 
possessions, but Dewey would reject any economic theory which, on this basis, asserted 
that a particular institutional arrangement was necessary or that it represented the only 
possible expression of that desire. 
 
Human Nature and Economic Theory 
Dewey’s account of human nature, as the interplay between native instincts and 
the customs and institutions which shape them, presents an important challenge to 
economic theory.  First, if the economist’s account of human nature is one of the first 
three Dewey describes in his Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences entry, we would 
presume that he, on that basis, would reject any theory based on such assumptions.  This 
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does not seem an unreasonable presumption:  Dewey was comfortable rejecting the 
accounts his predecessors in philosophy had offered for thousands of years, so it is 
unlikely that he would have felt much reluctance to follow the same path with economics.  
But we must establish this without conjecture, and to do so we must return to the idea of 
the “economic man.” 
In Freedom and Culture,206 Dewey turns specifically to questions of social and 
economic institutions and how they may or may not relate to human nature.  He criticizes 
the theories which “have been marked by serious attempts to make some one constituent 
of human nature the source of motivation of action; or at least to reduce all conduct to the 
action of a small number of alleged native ‘forces.’”207  As noted in Chapter II above, 
Mill explicitly rejected the notion that “economic man” was meant to be an exhaustive 
description of human nature, but, as was also noted earlier, there have been many in the 
history of economics who have taken his description to be exhaustive.  Dewey would 
have leveled the same criticisms at such theorists that he did at moral philosophers:  if 
economists believe that human activity and existing political and economic institutions 
can be explained wholly by reference to a defining native instinct, they are grossly 
mistaken.  He cites the “comparatively recent example” of “the adoption by the classic 
school of economic theory of self-interest as the main motivating force of human 
behavior….”208 
He takes Marx to have been a proponent of the third account of human nature 
described in his Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences; that is, human nature as a blank 
slate which is wholly developed by the influence of culture and tradition external to it.  In 
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the same way that the “classic school of economic theory” has an overly simplistic view 
of human nature, Marx also engaged in a sort of “systematic neglect” of the many aspects 
of human nature.209  Marxism, according to Dewey, takes the view that “all the factors of 
human nature are shaped from without by ‘materialistic,’ that is economic, forces.”210  
Marxism and classic economic theory, however, are two very different animals, and for 
Dewey to make a similar charge against each (that they oversimplify human nature) 
causes one to wonder whether Dewey might not also have had general criticisms of the 
methodology of economic theory itself. 
And, in fact, Dewey confirms this in Human Nature and Conduct.  In a chapter 
entitled “Changing Human Nature,” Dewey analyzes the significance of “incentives” in 
economic theory.  He worries that economists understand “incentives” to be the only 
means of moving human beings to action.  Worse yet, these same economists understand 
that the only incentives that will effect action are those that promise personal gain (and, 
as noted above in the description of “behavioral economics,” this is, in fact, true of the 
assumptions of behavioral economists`211).  This, of course, would imply that, without 
some self-interested motivation or incentive, a human being would remain “inert” or 
“absolutely passive,” and this simply does not make sense in Dewey’s biologically based 
philosophy.  Whether incentives for action exist or not, human beings will act:  “In truth, 
man acts anyway, he can’t help acting.”212   
In an attempt to explain the “economic psychology” behind this account of 
incentives, Dewey acknowledges a problem that exists with all sciences, and it is a 
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concern that implies a call for increased attention to empiricism in the social sciences 
generally, but in economics particularly: 
How then does it come about that current economic psychology has so 
tremendously oversimplified the situation?  Why does it recognize but one 
type of motive, that which concerns personal gain?  Of course part of the 
answer is to be found in the natural tendency in all sciences toward a 
substitution of artificial conceptual simplifications for the tangles of 
concrete empirical facts.213 
 
Does the science of economics pay sufficient attention to empirical facts?  Is economics a 
discipline which has benefited from the application of the experimental method?   Dewey 
is highly critical of philosophy and philosophers for ignoring the successes and the 
methods of the natural sciences.  Was he any less critical of the study of economics and, 
if so, was his confidence in the science of economics well-placed? 
 In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to look more carefully at 
Dewey’s praise of the experimental method and empiricism as it did operate in the 
sciences and as it might operate in philosophy after appropriate reconstruction.  In 
particular, we must look at this in conjunction with the use of models and theory in the 
study of economics.  I believe that Dewey’s effort to introduce the use of the 
experimental method in philosophy (as well as in the social sciences) was both Dewey’s 
most original contribution to pragmatism (and the history of philosophy) and one of the 
aspects of his philosophy that remained, despite more than seventy years and thousands 
of pages of writing, the most underdeveloped.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND MODELS 
 
 If the experimental method is one of the defining characteristics of Dewey’s 
pragmatism and if, as I have suggested, it is also one of the most underdeveloped themes 
in his philosophy, the potential success of Dewey’s work is thrown into question.  I 
believe that Dewey saw the experimental method as a key to the type philosophy which 
would “render” the things of “ordinary experience” more “fruitful” and “luminous.”  
Without the methodology of experimentalism, philosophy has not traditionally felt 
obligated to concern itself with the details of ordinary experience.  Thus, the 
experimental method, as Dewey conceives of it, must carry the burden of the 
reconstruction of philosophy which he envisions. 
 Though I think it is fair to say that neither philosophers nor economists have been 
particularly anxious to adopt the “laboratory habit of mind” that Dewey described, this 
chapter is nonetheless an important part of my thesis.  First, it will provide an account of 
Dewey’s experimental method as I understand it.  Second, it will act as background for 
the next chapter which attempts to demonstrate how the experimental method might 
actually be applied in philosophy and economics.  Dewey was right to place the 
experimental method at the center of his philosophy, but I believe he failed to detail the 
way that even scientists (as well as social scientists and philosophers), would be reluctant 
to re-enter the world of “ordinary experience” once they had engaged in reflection and 
“secondary experience.”  I think experimentalism is the key to that “return from 
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reflection,” and I think that Dewey might have done a better job of convincing others of 
this had he used concrete examples from “ordinary experience.”  The 1908 Ethics might 
well be one such example, and Dewey’s own explanation of that text in his understanding 
of the scientific method is considered briefly. 
 
The “Laboratory Habit of Mind” 
 Pragmatism, for Dewey, was characterized by a number of things, but none was 
more important than the influence of experimental science and the use of the 
experimental method.  Throughout his work, Dewey referred to the need for empiricism, 
observation, and experimentalism in philosophy.  Experience and Nature may provide 
the clearest statement of Dewey’s philosophy and the role experimentalism should play in 
that philosophy.  But there are also significant discussions in the early middle works 
about the importance that an understanding of the methods and the successes of the 
natural and physical sciences will have for philosophers. 
 In 1908, Dewey published a review entitled “What Does Pragmatism Mean by 
Practical?” in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods.  The article 
was largely an analysis of William James’ Pragmatism, a series of lectures that had been 
published the previous year.  Dewey describes pragmatism as a “method,” and he focuses 
especially on those parts of the method that seem to resemble the natural and physical 
sciences.  He cites C.S. Peirce and says, “Pragmatism as attitude represents what Mr. 
Peirce has happily termed the ‘laboratory habit of mind’ extended into every area where 
inquiry may fruitfully be carried on.”214  Elsewhere, he wonders, “Who can foresee what 
will happen when the experimental outlook has once become thoroughly acclimatized in 
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a common culture?”215  Thus, Dewey believed that Peirce, James’ and his own 
understanding of pragmatism, whatever their differences, shared a reliance on the 
“scientific” or “experimental” method.  The pragmatic philosopher will be one who takes 
the same attitude and approaches that the scientist in the laboratory does.  “Conceptions” 
and “theories” should not be taken as fact simply because the philosopher has provided 
an argument to support them.  Rather, the pragmatic philosopher, with the “laboratory 
habit of mind,” will treat these conceptions and theories as “working hypotheses, as 
directors for certain experiments and experimental observations.”216 
 Here, as elsewhere, Dewey wonders at the possibility of “sincerely and 
unreservedly” “carrying the method” of the laboratory to philosophy.  His prose hints that 
he may consider this unlikely to happen soon in philosophy or elsewhere. In Democracy 
and Education, he is explicit on this point: 
It will doubtless take a long time to secure the perception that [the 
experimental method] holds equally as to the forming and testing of ideas 
in social and moral matters.  Men still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs 
fixed by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the 
responsibility of directing their activity by thought.  They tend to confine 
their own thinking to a consideration of which one among the rival 
systems of dogma they will accept.217 
 
Dewey has shown that most people are at once both reluctant to engage in 
experimentalism and also inclined to seek the comfort of the “crutch of dogma, of beliefs 
fixed by authority.”  He does suggest, in these earlier papers, that there are fields which 
might be more likely than his own to take the notion seriously and would see dramatic 
progress if they did:  “Leaving philosophy out of account, what a change would be 
wrought in the historical and social sciences—in the conceptions of politics and law and 
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political economy!”218  It as if he has anticipated an objection from those who would say 
that the methods of the laboratory sciences have no place in philosophy, and he is willing, 
at least for the sake of argument, to concede this point, but he cannot help but appeal to 
their value for the social sciences. 
 If this interpretation of Dewey’s words is accurate, it also shows Dewey to be 
prescient.  Certainly, political science and political economy (or economics) adopted 
some of these methods within Dewey’s lifetime.  The “mathematization” of economics 
and the use of modeling in political science had already begun by 1908, and such tools 
would only become more vital to these disciplines as the twentieth century progressed.  
Perhaps one might object that there has been little success in the field of philosophy, but 
it is also worth mentioning that the “experimental method” (as Dewey characterizes it) 
has not been readily adopted in either political science or economics despite the increased 
empirical work done by scholars in these fields.  What is surprising here, though, is the 
fact that Dewey did not follow this line of thinking more systematically in his own work.  
He clearly understood the value of the experimental method to philosophy, political 
science, and economics, yet he did not provide much direction as to how that method 
might actually be applied in practice.  He did not provide examples that demonstrated 
how economists, let alone philosophers, might bring the “laboratory habit of mind” to 
their own work.   
Dewey was prescient, however, in his understanding of the progress that might 
follow from the application of the experimental method in fields beyond the natural and 
physical sciences.  In 2002, one of the two Nobel Prize winners in economics, Vernon 
Smith, was cited for his research and his use of laboratory experiments in the study of 
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economics. Smith’s laboratory work has shown that “the incentives to which people 
respond are sometimes not those one would expect on the canons of economic/game 
theory.”219  This work has provided empirical evidence to dispute the claims of traditional 
economic principles, and, among other things, it has been used to improve the regulation 
of electricity, evaluate policy proposals, and compare institutions.220  It is fair to say, 
then, that there has been professional recognition of the field of “experimental 
economics.”  But despite the fact that “experimental economics” has existed for more 
than forty years, there are still many economists who are skeptical both of its methods 
and its products, and there are some who are also skeptical as to whether the field 
deserves to be called a part of economics at all.  In fact, it is precisely the things Dewey 
praises about experimentation that cause many economists to question the legitimacy of 
experimental economics:  “the method of treating conceptions, theories, etc., as working 
hypotheses, as directors for certain experiments and experimental observations.”221  
Indeed, these are the methods and tools that make a physicist or a chemist legitimate in 
the eyes of his profession.  But it is the very willingness to bring “subjects” to a 
“laboratory” and conduct “experiments” regarding their preferences in controlled 
situations that has caused the work of experimental economists to be questioned by their 
peers in the profession. 
What does Dewey have in mind when he speaks of the “experimental method”?  
How, exactly, does Dewey believe that the experimental method might operate in 
philosophy and the social sciences?  What sorts of things will be derived from this 
method that would not otherwise have been produced through more conventional 
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philosophical analysis?  These are all questions that must be addressed in order to draw 
any further conclusions about the relationship of Dewey’s philosophy and the field of 
economic science. 
 
The History of Dewey’s “Experimental Method” 
We can begin to understand Dewey’s account of the “experimental method” by 
tracing its appearance throughout his written work.  In 1902, Dewey was nearing the end 
of his tenure as the head of the philosophy department at the University of Chicago. 
Though he could not have known with certainty that he would be leaving for Columbia in 
two years, he was increasingly disappointed with his treatment at the hands of Chicago’s 
president, William Rainey Harper.  By 1902, Dewey had made a name for himself among 
philosophers.  His work at Michigan had enabled him to gain the position at Chicago, and 
his reputation grew while he was in Chicago.222  Despite this impressive reputation in the 
young field of professional philosophy and Dewey’s record of publication, his written 
work was just beginning to focus on the “experimental method” and its importance for 
thinkers outside the physical and natural sciences.  This method would, of course, later 
hold a central place in Dewey’s mature philosophy. 
In 1902, Dewey published a series of papers in Philosophical Review entitled 
“The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality.”223  These papers demonstrate, in its 
infancy, Dewey’s appeal to the “experimental method” and the “scientific method.”  
Several years later, Dewey published an article entitled “Logical Conditions of a 
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Scientific Treatment of Morality.”224  Both pieces illustrate that Dewey, despite later calls 
for the wholesale reconstruction of philosophy, first developed the idea of applying the 
experimental method to philosophy in the areas of logic and moral theory.  In addition, 
Dewey is explicit in the later piece that, though he thinks moral theory will benefit from 
the influence of science and the “laboratory habit of mind,” he understands the analogy 
between science and moral theory to be one of process, not product. 
 
Experimentalism in Moral Theory 
Both the notion that moral theory develops, at least in part, historically from 
social customs and conventions and the idea that an understanding of contemporary 
morality requires attention to the past are ideas which are obviously quite well-developed 
by the 1908 Ethics.  Ostensibly, this is Dewey’s subject matter in the 1902 papers and the 
1903 article, but there is much to be learned about Dewey’s regard for the experimental 
method in these papers as well.  In both pieces, he describes the “transition from an 
ordinary to a scientific attitude of mind” and notes that this transition “coincides with 
ceasing to take certain things for granted and assuming a critical or inquiring and testing 
attitude.”225  In moral theory, Dewey argues, the “scientific attitude of mind” is 
characterized by a study of history. 
Dewey’s attempt to introduce “the laboratory habit of mind” in the 1902 papers 
entails the “evolutionary method.”   As he understands it, the “evolutionary method” as 
applied to morality is a method that requires attention to the origins of moral theory.  He 
anticipates, throughout these papers, one major objection to this method:  that there is no 
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place in moral theory for “genetic” accounts of morality.  He acknowledges that there are 
many who believe morality is a matter of “a spiritual nature,”226 and historical accounts 
or descriptions of morality do not belong in moral theory generally.  These historical 
accounts may be interesting as “data,” but they certainly will not shed any light on the 
nature of morality itself.  Morality is something that does not change and is therefore no 
more or no less understandable because of attention to historical matters, or so the 
argument goes.  Dewey appears to have been prepared to argue against those who would 
claim that philosophy had no business considering history.  In fact, Dewey himself used 
the “evolutionary method” in philosophy in his series of lectures published as 
Reconstruction in Philosophy.227  When speaking of the “classic type” of philosophy 
which had divorced itself from the “world of everyday experience,” Dewey said, “It 
seems to me that this genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining 
this type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be.”228  In 
attempting to “undermine” the philosophy he is criticizing, Dewey refuses to employ the 
accepted methods of that very philosophy and instead uses the “empirical method” he is 
defending. 
Another objection, alluded to above, is the worry that, by introducing 
experimentalism or the “scientific method” into philosophy, one would aim to produce 
results similar to experimentalism in the natural and physical sciences.  In the 1903 
article, Dewey anticipates this objection as well, and he acknowledges that some might 
take him to be seeking a “reduction” in “matters of conduct to [the] similarly physical or 
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even quasi-mathematical form”229 akin to those found in the conclusions of biological or 
chemical experiments.  Instead, Dewey reassures his audience that he “disclaims any 
effort to reduce the statement of matters of conduct to forms comparable with those of 
physical science.”230 
From the distance of more than one hundred years, Dewey’s concerns may seem 
foreign us.  Many (if not most) philosophers in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century are willing to entertain the possibility that historical context might have relevance 
for moral theory. This is not, of course, to say that most philosophers have accepted 
morality as relative to culture or circumstances, but it does seem fair to say that most 
would admit the possibility that something might be learned about morality from an 
examination of historical accounts of the same.  If anything, professional philosophy has 
been over-eager to embrace other fields and disciplines like history in the latter part of 
the twentieth century,231 and the products of these engagements seem to fill the pages of 
philosophy journals.  The later development of analytic philosophy also seems to contrast 
strangely with Dewey’s worry that his audience would interpret his efforts as attempts to 
“reduce matters of conduct” to “quasi-mathematical form.”  Dewey might have eschewed 
such efforts, but there were many professional philosophers who succeeded him that did 
not.  
To judge by Dewey’s papers, however, we can assume that his peers in 1902 and 
1903 had raised these objections in conversation as well as print.  Despite the subject 
matter evinced by his title, Dewey did not simply argue in favor of the “evolutionary 
method” in questions of morality.  He apparently felt it was first necessary to undertake a 
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lengthy digression into the nature of scientific methodology and the significance of 
experimentalism within science.  The digression, it seems, would support his overall 
project of using historical circumstances to better understand moral development and 
theory.  Interestingly, these papers seem to be more than what they were intended to be:  
that is, they provide for us an insight into the difficulties Dewey faced in the early part of 
the twentieth century as he sought to marry the exciting progress of the natural and 
physical sciences to the conservative (and, Dewey might say, reactionary) methods of 
philosophical investigation. 
 
The “Experimental Method” Explained 
In the digression mentioned above, Dewey argues that, without an understanding 
of the “nature of the experimental method in science,” one might never be convinced that 
there is a place for the “evolutionary method” in the study of morality.  Since the 
“experimental method” is, as he conceives of it, also a “genetic” or “evolutionary” 
method, its explanatory powers should be clear.232  He provides a first step toward 
understanding his conception of the experimental method: 
The essence of the experimental method I take to be control of the analysis 
or interpretation of any phenomenon by bringing to light the exact 
conditions, and the only conditions, which are involved in its coming into 
being.233 
 
This brief description provides a quick look into the seed containing some of the themes 
and terms which would later germinate and figure prominently in Dewey’s mature 
philosophy. 
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Control 
The experimental method enables the scientist to wrest control of a phenomenon 
from its natural occurrence and to direct the manner in which further analysis and 
interpretation takes place.  Later, in Experience and Nature, Dewey described the same 
process, and he claimed that the very control of experience is what defines the scientist’s 
activity:  “The [scientific] investigator assumes as a matter of course that experience, 
controlled in specifiable ways, is the avenue that leads to the facts and laws of nature.”234  
The experimenter or scientist will begin his or her work by attempting to control the 
environment in which the experiment occurs.  In particular, this control will allow the 
“experimenter” to determine the genesis of the phenomenon.  Are there parallels for 
philosophy?  That is, does it follow that the advantages of the experimental method will 
translate into examinations of morality?  Dewey believes that, if progress is to be made in 
moral philosophy, philosophers must acknowledge such parallels and seek out the same 
advantages through different methodology than has conventionally been employed. 
He is well aware of the inertia he faces, and he realizes that much of this is 
territorial.  These 1902 and 1903 writings provide ample evidence that he knows many 
will reject, out of hand, the introduction of the “scientific method” in any philosophical 
endeavor.  This objection will be difficult to meet, too, because of its nature:  there is 
little behind it save the simple assertion that moral theory and experimental science differ 
not just in method but also in kind.  Dewey put the objection succinctly: “ethical 
judgment is ethical just because it is not scientific; because it deals with norms, values, 
ideals, not with given facts; with what ought to be, estimated through pure spiritual 
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aspiration, not with what is, decided after investigation.”235  Recall that, as noted in the 
second chapter of this thesis, economists have struggled with the same tension in their 
own field.  Some economists (most notably, Lionel Robbins) have rejected the suggestion 
that economics can deal with both the positive and the normative. 
Dewey acknowledges that there may be differences between moral theory and 
chemistry or physics, but he maintains that there remains an “identity of logical 
procedure in the two cases.”236  The experimental method “is concerned with the manner 
or process by which anything comes into experienced existence.”237  As an 
experimentalist repeats his experiments, he begins to understand how a particular 
phenomenon comes to be, and he is able to replicate the necessary conditions in the 
laboratory.  In order to understand the phenomenon, Dewey argues that the scientist 
cannot take the “direct approach” of simple observation.  We might experience the same 
phenomenon a thousand times, but these experiences would not necessarily give us any 
insight into the origins or causes of the phenomenon.  The experimental method seeks 
understanding, at least in part, by efforts to determine origins and causes of phenomenon:  
“It takes an unanalyzed total fact which in its totality must simply be accepted at its face 
value, and shows the exact and exclusive conditions of its origin.”238   
Similarly, Dewey wanted to demonstrate that our understanding of morality could 
only be improved by gaining insight into its origins and causes.  We might observe 
“moral” conduct for years and years, but if we do not attempt to isolate the conduct (or 
phenomenon) and study its genesis, we will have to seek other means of understanding it.  
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I can see a man tell another the truth hundreds of times, but if I do nothing more than 
observe this act in the course of daily life, I may never have any insight into its origin and 
I certainly will be unable to replicate its advantages in my own life in any meaningful 
way.  Instead, I may only be able to parrot this behavior.   
Experimentalism accomplishes more than simply the ability to mimic a 
phenomenon, and, indeed, a pragmatic moral philosophy should be able to do more as 
well.  The experimentalist, in addition to understanding how a particular phenomenon is 
generated, works toward and eventually hopes to achieve “intellectual and practical 
control.”239  The physical and natural sciences, as Dewey understands them, do not seek 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge.  Knowledge is not desirable because it is “the 
highest good” for man, nor is it desirable because it fulfills a distinctively human need.  
Knowledge may be and do both, but, as far as Dewey is concerned, these are coincident 
to the desire for knowledge. Instead, in philosophy as in science, knowledge is desirable 
in order to generate the “intellectual and practical control” mentioned above.  The 
experimenter seeks “controlled interpretation”240 of a phenomenon, and, as Dewey would 
argue in print for the next fifty years, philosophy will only have relevance so long as it 
provides the same sort of “controlled interpretation” of the uncertainty and instability of 
primary experience (insofar as that is possible) as that accomplished by the physical and 
natural sciences.  This, of course, obligates Dewey to the same standard:  his own 
philosophical method must lead to improved control and stability in the goods of 
“ordinary experience.” 
                                                
239 Ibid., 5. 
240 Ibid., 7. 
  143 
In short, the experimental method redefines what we mean by “knowledge” in 
philosophy: “we have no right to call anything knowledge except where our activity has 
actually produced certain physical changes in things….”241  In this sense, the 
experimental method will often produce more than just a “controlled interpretation” of 
the phenomenon in question.  Experimentation may actually produce control of the 
phenomenon itself, and, failing that, it may well produce control of the origins or 
consequences of the phenomenon.  Dewey has here provided a physical test for 
knowledge:  we can say that we know something if we can observe “physical changes in 
things” that result from our own examination. 
 
Isolation and Abstraction 
Another value of the experimental method in philosophical endeavors (such as 
moral theory) is the same as in the physical and natural sciences:  isolation.  That is, 
instead of considering an idea or theory (or, in the case of these other sciences, a 
“phenomenon”) as it occurs in day-to-day experience, entangled with other ideas and 
theories (phenomena), the “laboratory habit of mind” enables us to consider that idea 
(phenomenon) by itself and to focus our efforts on it alone.  Experimentation provides 
“the artificial isolation of a physical fact from its usual context.”242  Many years after 
these initial writings on the “experimental method,” Dewey would (in The Quest for 
Certainty) return to this characteristic of scientific inquiry and remind his readers that 
“abstraction” was part and parcel of that inquiry:  “Abstraction is simply an instance of 
the economy and efficiency involved in all intelligent practice:—Deal first with matters 
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that can be effectively handled, and then use the results to go on to copy with more 
complex affairs.”243  Dewey’s account of the value of abstraction or isolation is, 
ironically, the reverse of what his pragmatism demands overall. 
In Experience and Nature, one of his more mature works, he would remind us that 
turning away from our crude or primary experience of a subject in order to focus our 
analytical efforts on the subject in isolation always presents a danger.  The danger (and, 
according to Dewey, it is one that philosophy has succumbed to for thousands of years) is 
that we will fail to turn back from this artificial isolation and restore the subject and the 
products of our reflection to our primary experience.244 In short, we may become 
enamored with the act of reflection and fail to remember why we first engaged in the act 
(i.e., to solve a problem or to improve our primary experiences in the future). 
 Of course, the act of reflection in the physical and natural sciences is, from 
beginning to end, predicated on the desire to understand more about the details of what 
Dewey calls “primary” experience.  The scientist might “detach” “the operations of the 
lungs” from “air” for the purpose of study, but the scientist also recognizes that 
“breathing is in fact a function that includes both air and the operations of the lungs.”245  
There is no danger that the scientist will forget this vital connection or that a 
disconnection can be effected in practice, even though he may make a theoretical 
detachment in order to better understand the phenomenon of breathing.  Philosophy, on 
the other hand, often seems to turn to reflection as an escape from such experience.  But 
experimentation demands that we return to the phenomenon that prompted our analyses.  
The experiment is undertaken because of an effort to secure “controlled interpretation” 
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and it can only be concluded when that has been achieved with respect to the 
phenomenon in question.  In the physical and natural sciences, as Dewey explains in 
“Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality,” the experimenter need not 
fear the danger Dewey had described in Experience and Nature, of philosophy as 
“escapist intellectual gymnastic”: 
The boast and pride of modern science is its distinctly empirical and 
experimental character.  The term “empirical” refers to origin and 
development of scientific statements out of concrete experiences; the term 
“experimental” refers to the testing and checking of the so-called laws and 
universals by reference to their application in further concrete experience.  
If this notion of science be correct, it shows, without further argument, 
that generic propositions occupy a purely intermediate position.  They are 
neither initial nor final.  They are the bridges by which we pass over from 
one particular experience to another; they are individual experiences put 
into such shape as to be available in regulating other experiences.246 
 
Unlike the philosopher, the experimentalist has an obligation to restore the products of 
her reflection to primary experience, and her peers also expect her to provide an account 
of her experiment so that they can attempt to replicate her findings and reflections.  No 
such obligation exists among philosophers, and Dewey believes this is to the detriment of 
the field. 
 
“Bridges” and “Recombination” 
 Dewey’s pragmatism does not disdain reflection or the “isolation” of subject 
matter from everyday experience.  But it does object to the claim that such reflection and 
isolation should predominate philosophical thinking and that this activity should come at 
the expense of primary experience or “experience” as it is conventionally understood.  
Dewey vehemently criticized those forms of philosophy that both warned of trusting the 
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experience of our senses and argued that our day-to-day experience actually stands in the 
way of our knowing anything about “reality.”  Though philosophers might never actually 
work in laboratories, Dewey believed that they would gain invaluable lessons from 
studying the methodology of the natural and physical sciences and engaging in 
experimentation wherever possible.  In the description of “modern science” above, we 
see what Dewey hopes for in a “science” of morals:  the possibility of “generic 
propositions” that provide “bridges by which we pass over from one particular experience 
to another” and the “recombination” of individual experiences “into such shape as to be 
available in regulating other experiences.”  When Dewey speaks of the “identity of 
logical procedure” between science and the study of morals, this is what he means. 
 Thus, in his papers on the “Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality,” Dewey 
demonstrates that history provides for the moral theorist what experimentation does for 
the physicist: 
We cannot apply artificial isolation and artificial recombination to those 
facts with which ethical science is concerned.  We cannot take a present 
case of parental care, or of a child’s untruthfulness, and cut it into sections, 
or tear it into physical pieces, or subject it to chemical analysis.  Only 
through history, through a consideration of how it came to be what it is, 
can we unravel it and trace the interweaving of its constituent parts.  
History offers to us the only available substitute for the isolation and for 
the cumulative recombination of experiment.  The early periods present us 
in their relative crudeness and simplicity with a substitute for the artificial 
operation of an experiment:  following the phenomenon into the more 
complicated and refined form which it assumes later, is a substitute for the 
synthesis of the experiment.247  
 
There are several important points within this excerpt.  First, this account of how history 
might stand in for experiment in moral theory is one of the few explicit, concrete 
examples Dewey provides for how philosophers might actually engage in 
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“experimentation.”  Second, it is clear from these words that Dewey does not, at least 
with respect to moral philosophy, expect philosophers to literally “experiment.”  As it is 
described here, the use of history in moral theory will serve the purpose that “cutting into 
sections” or “tearing into physical pieces” or “chemical analysis” would in the physical 
and natural sciences. 
 Employing history in moral theory will, however, provide the sort of isolation and 
“recombination” that these more scientific modes of experimentation would in other 
fields.  We can gain knowledge about morality through an examination of its history, and 
we can understand how some of the things we see in the modern world have antecedents 
in the ancient and medieval world.  We should endeavor to remember that “knowledge” 
for Dewey does not mean that we have some insight into Being or Existence.  Rather, to 
have knowledge of morality from a pragmatic standpoint is to have an understanding of 
how the products of our reflection on moral theory will enable us to produce a 
“controlled interpretation” of our primary experience. 
 Moreover, Dewey argues that there is not nearly as much difference between the 
aims of the scientist and the moral theorist as some would have us believe.  Their goals 
are similar, as both hope to settle questions of validity.  He describes moral philosophers 
as being “primarily concerned with problems of validity” in the sense of “superior 
objective value,” and, while scientists do not concern themselves with “ultimate 
validity,”248 they do share an important desire.  The moral theorist hopes to be able to 
settle questions of competing moral claims, and there is nothing so practical as that.  In a 
similar fashion, the “fundamental and interesting problem” faced by the scientist “is that 
of ways of passing upon questions of specific validity; ways of determining the 
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respective values of this or that particular judgment.”249  In fact, apart from historical 
consideration, Dewey wonders how differences between competing moral claims or 
judgments can be settled.  Different moral systems or principles cannot be evaluated as to 
their relative strength unless some criterion is employed.  For Dewey, the criterion must 
be whether or not the principle affords the control and improved meaning that he has 
described throughout his work.  The “scientific method” is not only useful to moral 
theory, but, according to Dewey, no progress has or can be made in moral theory without 
the means to assess validity.  The “historical” or “evolutionary” method can provide that 
means. 
 
Continuity 
 All of the advantages of the experimental method heretofore described, however, 
are inferior to that which Dewey calls the “supreme value of the genetic statement arrived 
at by experimental science.”250  The “supreme value” to be had from experimentalism is 
that it “reveals to us a process which is operating continuously.”251  Identifying such a 
process is a key step in achieving the “intellectual and practical control of great bodies of 
fact”252 which is, of course, the aim of philosophy as well as science, according to 
Dewey.  When we have identified and understood this process, “we can analyze, we can 
understand, the phenomena…whenever and however they present themselves.”253  Once 
the experimenter has isolated and analyzed a phenomenon, she will find that, whenever 
the phenomenon is encountered in the future, she will be at a great advantage: 
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But when the secondary objects, the refined objects, are employed as a 
method or road for coming at them [the immediate qualities of 
experienced things] these qualities cease to be isolated details; they get the 
meaning contained in a whole system of related objects; they are rendered 
continuous with the rest of nature and take on the import of the things they 
are now seen to be continuous with.254 
 
Instead of having to wonder anew at the phenomenon, the experimenter can use what she 
has learned from previous experimentation to make decisions based on her understanding 
of the phenomenon.  In short, experimentation allows the experimenter to “update” her 
understanding of the circumstances and phenomena which she encounters in primary 
experiences.  The successful conclusion of her experiment will be the ability to restore 
the isolated and “artificial” products of her experiment to the “continuous processes” 
which actually occur in her everyday experience. 
 In the same manner, the pragmatic moral philosopher will use what he has learned 
about moral theory and development from history.  He will have understood morality as a 
part of a continuous process, the “moralizing process,”255 and he will be able to “analyze” 
and “understand” that process as it occurs in his day-to-day experience.  One of Dewey’s 
most frequent criticisms about philosophers’ understanding of human behavior was that 
they repeatedly misunderstood the office of deliberation.  Instead of deliberating in 
advance of action, human beings act according to habit and custom.  Even in the face of 
resistance, habit and custom will impel an individual to act.  Though the individual, if he 
behaves intelligently, will reflect on his responses to unexpected circumstances, he will 
not do so at every new experience.  Rather, he will “update” his habits, though slowly, by 
employing the products of his reflection in his action, and he will rely on those habits 
until they too require modification. 
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The use of the evolutionary method in morality will also serve to reinforce what 
we have said about human nature above.  “Experimentation” in morality will demonstrate 
that human nature is neither wholly a matter of native instinct nor wholly a matter of 
habituation or imperatives opposed to those instincts.  This, too, is analogous to the use of 
experiment in the natural and physical sciences:  “Just as experiment transforms a brute 
physical fact into a relatively luminous series of changes, so evolutionary method applied 
to a moral fact does not leave us either with a mere animal instinct on one side, or with 
the spiritual categoric imperative on the other.”256  The use of experiment in the sciences 
will allow us to look behind the “brute physical fact” of a phenomenon, and it will help 
us to see it as one part of a more complicated set of processes, including antecedent 
causes and subsequent consequences. 
The use of experiment in science helps us make those phenomena which surprise 
or intrigue us into a part of the integrated whole of our experience.  In the same way, the 
use of the “historical method” in moral theory will allow us to look behind the “brute 
physical fact” of moral conduct, and it will enable us to see what part that conduct plays 
in who we are.  The “historical method” helps us to understand morality as a part of a 
more complicated process, and it demonstrates that we are not simply the victims of our 
native instincts nor are we determined entirely by the forces which surround us.  Our 
nature is more complicated, and the use of “experimentation” in moral theory will help us 
to appreciate this.  It will provide the “bridges” from “one particular experience to 
another.”257 
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A Concrete Example of the Experimental Method Applied to Morality 
In “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality,” Dewey makes a case for 
the use of the “evolutionary method” in the study of moral theory.  By 1908 and the 
publication of the Ethics, he has moved from the justification of the project to the project 
itself.  Consider his words in the preface to that book:  “To follow the moral life through 
typical epochs of its development enables students to realize what is involved in their 
own habitual standpoints; it also presents a concrete body of subject-matter which serves 
as material of analysis and discussion.”258  The “experiment” of approaching moral 
philosophy by means of the history of moral development will enable the “experimenter” 
(or, in this case, the philosopher) to place his own habits and behavior in the “continuous 
process” of morality.  The “experiment” begins in primary experience with the study of 
history, it continues with the “artificial isolation” of various “epochs,” and it ends with a 
return to primary experience such that the student has an improved understanding of his 
own habits.  If the analogy to science holds, the use of the “experimental” method in 
moral theory will help us gain a “more thorough adequate experience”259 of the subject 
under investigation. 
Unlike the earlier papers cited above, the Ethics was intended for classroom use.  
Dewey and Tufts wrote (and later re-wrote) it with the intention of using it for teaching, 
and the book was, in fact, “widely used as a classroom text.”260 Thus, we would expect 
that the text was written in order to facilitate discussion and instruction.  We should not 
necessarily expect to see any explicit appeal for the application of the “scientific method” 
to moral philosophy, yet Dewey and Tufts’ preface is filled with such appeals: 
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Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be 
accepted or rejected en bloc, but as more or less adequate methods of 
surveying the problems of conduct.  This mode of approach facilitates the 
scientific estimation and determination of the part played by various 
factors in the complexity of moral life.  The student is put in a position to 
judge the problems of conduct for himself.  This emancipation and 
enlightenment of individual judgment is the chief aim of the theoretical 
portion [of the text].261 
 
We need look no further for concrete examples of Dewey’s “experimental method” in 
practice.  The “theoretical portion” of the Ethics is designed to provide students with 
“ways of passing judgment upon questions of specific validity; ways of determining the 
respective values of this or that particular judgment.”262  The text compels the student to 
“experiment” in the sense that it isolates the problem of moral conduct and allows for 
careful reflection.  Once that reflection has been completed, the student will return to 
primary experience and will use the products of that reflection as a “bridge” between one 
experience and another.  The student will be capable of providing a “controlled 
interpretation” of his or her primary experience. 
 In this preface, Dewey speaks of the “hope for a larger application of the 
scientific method to the problems of human welfare and progress,”263 and it seems 
reasonable to assume that the text is meant as a step toward realizing that hope.  From 
this text, the student will learn to see his or her own habits as part of a continuous 
process, and such practicality, according to Dewey, defines education as well as science.  
The “science” of morals will only be “vital” so long as the student can engage “the 
questions which are occupying the minds of his contemporaries.”264  And it will satisfy 
one of the criteria that Dewey sets out for science:  it will provide “intellectual tools for 
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the express purpose of facilitating our individual experiences….”265  As a “science,” 
moral theory demands of its students that it be used to solve problems or shed light on 
those things which resist the habits and customs of individuals.  Perhaps more 
importantly, students will begin to understand moral theory as a “vital” practice, not 
merely as a subject for study. 
 But the references to ethics as a science are not confined to the preface to the text.  
On the first page of the introduction to both the 1908 and 1932 version of the Ethics, 
Dewey defines the field under consideration: “ethics is the science that deals with 
conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad.”266  Though the 
1932 version of the text, according to Dewey and Tufts, might rightly have been called a 
“new book” and “two-thirds” of the edition was new, the introduction to the later version 
is almost identical to the first.  The specifics of Dewey and Tufts’ approach to the science 
of morals might have changed in the space of the intervening twenty four years, but their 
justification and their understanding of the “science of morals” had not. 
 According to Dewey’s understanding of the “scientific method” and his remarks 
at the beginning of both editions of the Ethics, he claims to have undertaken an 
application of that method in moral theory.  Apart from the claim, however, how does the 
text specifically employ the “experimental method” as Dewey understands it? 
First, it may be worth a brief summary of the elements of the experimental method 
already identified: 
1. The experimental method will help us to understand a phenomenon “by 
bringing to light the exact conditions, and the only conditions, which are 
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involved in its coming into being.”267 
 
2. The experimental method provides the opportunity for others to repeat the 
experiment and confirm (or reject) the results. 
 
3. The experimental method affords us the opportunity to isolate and control the 
phenomenon we are studying or to provide a “controlled interpretation” of the 
phenomenon. 
 
4. The experimental method provides a “bridge” between universal statements 
and particular experiences and it obligates us to return the products of our 
reflection to primary experience.  It thereby improves this experience. 
 
5. The experimental method demonstrates that particulars are part of a longer, 
continuous process and have antecedents as well as consequences. 
 
Though there is some overlap between these elements, this accounts for the advantages 
and characteristics of the experimental method as Dewey describes it in the 1902 and 
1903 papers. 
Recall that, in those same papers, Dewey refers to the “evolutionary” or 
“historical” method in morality as analogous to the scientific or experimental method in 
the natural and physical sciences.  In the 1908 Ethics, the first third of the text is devoted 
to a historical survey of moral conduct from “Early Group Life” to “The Modern 
Period.”268  Through the historical account of moral conduct from primitive people 
forward, Dewey wanted to demonstrate the continuity of various aspects of moral 
conduct.  With respect to “group life,” for instance, he noted that “It is beyond question 
that the ancestors of modern civilized races lived under the general type of group life 
which will be outlined, and that these types or their survivals are found among the great 
mass of peoples to-day.”269  In a chapter on “The Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies 
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in Early Society,” Dewey and Tufts describe three levels of conduct and trace their 
development from “savage life” to “present morality.”270 
 Thus, the plan of the Ethics and Dewey’s account of that plan appear to fulfill his 
own criteria for the “experimental method.”  The historical approach of the book attempts 
to provide (1) the conditions under which moral conduct has come into being.  As a 
textbook, it (2) affords the opportunity for others to repeat the “experiment” and confirm 
or reject the results.  The textbook (3) isolates, chapter by chapter, various aspects of 
moral conduct, and Dewey’s preface and introduction encourage students to use the text 
to begin to develop their understanding of moral theory “with…simpler material” than 
that of complex, present moral life.271  The discovery of “ethical principles” as a result of 
the use of the textbook should, according to Dewey, “give some guidance for the 
unsolved problems of life which continually present themselves for decision.”272  The 
text thereby (4) provides a bridge between the products of reflection drawn from the 
study of ethics and the decisions a student must make on a daily basis.  In giving 
“guidance” for solving problems, it improves primary experience.  Finally, the history 
which demonstrates the conditions under which moral conduct has come into being also 
(5) provides insight into the continuous nature of moral conduct, from the “savage life” 
(antecedents) to the decisions (consequents) we will be forced to make as a result of our 
new, primary experiences. 
 
Models 
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 There can be no question that Dewey wanted to bring the methods and the 
successes of the natural and physical sciences to philosophy through the use of the 
“experimental” or “scientific” method.  As noted above, of course, the application of this 
method had more to do with a certain “logic” shared by experimentalism and 
philosophical inquiry than it did with hopes of achieving “quasi-mathematical” formulas 
in moral theory or reducing moral conduct to physical forms.  An important part of the 
scientific method, however, is the use of models, and this is particularly true for the study 
of economics and other social sciences.  Does Dewey’s account of the scientific method 
make use of anything similar? 
 As noted above in Chapter II, economists hardly agree about the definition of the 
word “model,” though there seems to be some consistency between the things to which 
the term is applied.  The description offered above is worth repeating here:  “good” 
models abstract from the world as it is and make numerous assumptions that may not 
apply in individual circumstances, but they do so in such a way as to demonstrate 
accuracy in prediction, understanding, and explanation of real world phenomena.273  
According to this understanding of “model,” in the “scientific method,” the experiment 
may itself be said to serve as a model.  Experiments isolate and abstract phenomena from 
the “world as it is” and they are used in order to generate information about universal or 
general conditions (i.e., assumptions that may not apply in individual circumstances), 
and, if done well, experiments should “demonstrate accuracy in prediction, understanding 
and explanation of real world phenomena.”  Or, to put it in Dewey’s own terms, 
experimentalism in science and philosophy ought to provide us with improved 
experiences or, at the very least, the tools necessary to improve experience. 
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 Near the end of the previous chapter, Dewey’s words on the “natural tendency in 
all sciences” were cited:  that tendency is one “toward a substitution of artificial 
conceptual simplifications for the tangles of concrete empirical facts.”274  Again, this 
description sounds quite like the characteristics that have already been identified in 
experimentalism:  “artificial conceptual simplifications” are preferred over the “tangles of 
concrete empirical facts.”  As described above in the current chapter, this preference is 
one of the strengths of the experimental method.  But the criticism leveled at economists 
for their use of models ought to apply to Dewey’s “experimental method” as well.  If the 
experiment (or model) begins by abstracting from “the world as it is” or from “concrete 
empirical facts” in order to simplify and if it is acknowledged that the method will make 
assumptions that may not apply in individual circumstances and may only hold true at a 
more general level, how can it be the case that the experiment (or model) will 
“demonstrate accuracy in prediction, understanding and explanation of real world 
phenomena”? 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD APPLIED 
 
 My claim that the experimental method is one of the most underdeveloped themes 
in Dewey’s work is largely based on the paucity of examples provided by Dewey of the 
application of this method in any field other than the natural and physical sciences.  I do 
not dispute that Dewey provides evidence of the work of experimentalism in these 
sciences, but I have claimed that there are few examples of this method applied to 
philosophy or any other traditionally non-empirical field.  Though the example of 
Dewey’s Ethics discussed near the end of Chapter VI above serves as an important 
counter to that claim, Dewey’s subsequent works should have provided further examples. 
 After attempting to identify several possible examples of the experimental method 
as it might be applied in philosophy and other instances where such examples should 
occur but do not, I have included a brief account of current work in experimental 
economics.  This work bears an uncanny resemblance to Dewey’s account of the 
experimental method, and I will argue that this is the sort of thing that would qualify as a 
“pragmatic economics.”  Dewey himself might easily have anticipated the growth of this 
field, as the self-descriptions of experimental economists will show by their striking 
similarity to Dewey’s own words.  Yet Dewey seemed, for whatever reason, to shy away 
from specific, concrete examples of the experimental method in practice.  That is a 
tendency that is troubling for an author who argues that, for a philosophy to be 
worthwhile, it must pass the test of “ordinary experience” and practice. 
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From Abstraction to “Ordinary Experience” 
 
 The question, in short, that needs to be addressed by Dewey (as well as 
economists) is how to bridge the gap between the abstraction necessary for 
experimentalism (and modeling) and the facts of “concrete” or “real world” experience.  
If experiments or models are to have any hope of improving human experience (by 
accuracy in predicting, understanding and explaining phenomena), there must be some 
connection between them.  And it is hardly unfair to raise these sorts of questions with 
respect to Dewey’s account of the “experimental method.”  He himself sets the standard 
in Experience and Nature when he criticizes his philosophical predecessors and their 
unwillingness to employ empirical methodology in their study: 
But the problems to which non-empirical method gives rise in philosophy 
are blocks to inquiry, blind alleys; they are puzzles rather than problems, 
solved only by calling the original material of primary experience, 
“phenomenal,” mere appearance, mere impressions, or by some other 
disparaging name.¶  Thus there is here supplied, I think, a first-rate test of 
the value of any philosophy which is offered to us:  Does it end in 
conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-
experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more 
luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?….Or does 
it become a mystery that these ordinary things should be what they are; 
and are philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical 
realm of their own?275 
 
From as early as 1902 until the end of his life more than fifty years later, Dewey 
continued to argue that the use of the experimental method and empiricism in philosophy 
would cure the ills of non-empirical philosophy.  But what evidence does he provide in 
support of this argument? 
 This is not an insignificant question.  If Dewey cannot support his claim, that 
philosophy as it has been previously practiced is inferior to that which he champions, we 
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have good cause for concern.  If the experimental, scientific, or empirical method is at the 
heart of Dewey’s philosophy, yet he cannot demonstrate that this method avoids 
“rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before,”276 his 
philosophy will be subject to the same criticisms he makes of his predecessors.  How, 
precisely, will the experimental method (or the use of models) make “the things of 
ordinary experience” less “opaque than they were before” if this method turns away from 
“ordinary experience” in order to understand it?  Further, exactly how are the products of 
this reflection or experimentation later employed in ordinary experience?  In what sense 
is it the case that empiricism in philosophy demands a return to ordinary experience?  
Why is the empiricist any more likely than the non-empiricist to “refer back to ordinary 
life-experiences” when it is acknowledged that one of the significant aspects of 
experimentation is an “isolation” from such experience? 
 It would seem that, for a pragmatist, the obvious answer to these questions would 
lie in the use of concrete examples similar to Dewey’s account of the use of the 
“historical” or “evolutionary” method in morality.  If the test of a philosophy is whether it 
“renders” our “ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments…more luminous to us” 
and whether it “makes our dealings” with these experiences “more fruitful,” what could 
better recommend Dewey’s empirical philosophy than a demonstration that it passes this 
test?  In order to show that his philosophy passes such a test, would it not seem 
reasonable that Dewey should have provided numerous examples of how empiricism 
improves “ordinary” experience?  The best test of an experiment or model would be an 
example from “ordinary” experience that shows the experiment/model’s “accuracy in 
prediction, understanding and explanation of real world phenomena.”  Sandra Rosenthal 
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makes this point in her article, “John Dewey:  Scientific Methodology and Lived 
Immediacy:” 
As Dewey stresses, ‘The trouble then, with the conclusions of philosophy 
is not in the least that they are results of reflection and theorizing,’ and 
Dewey in developing a ‘philosophy framed upon the pattern of 
experimental inquiry,’ must himself go beyond description.  In turn, the 
test of the adequacy of any philosophic theorizing must be found in its 
continual verification in lived experience.277 
 
Yet examples of this verification are rare in the thirty-seven volumes of Dewey’s 
collected works.  The following is a sampling of such examples as well as reflections on 
places where these examples do not appear (though one might expect them to).  It should 
be noted that this is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of examples from Dewey’s 
work of the application of the experimental method. 
 
Liberalism and Social Action278 
 Liberalism and Social Action was a series of lectures that Dewey published in 
1935.  In a chapter entitled “Renascent Liberalism,” Dewey spoke of the disparity 
between politics and the physical and natural sciences.  As he had previously done with 
respect to moral theory, Dewey argued that progress in politics has been dwarfed by 
progress in the sciences.  One imagines that Dewey believed every person in his audience 
easily grasped the evidence for this argument.  In 1935, Dewey thought it quite evident 
that the “contrast between the state of intelligence in politics and in the physical control 
of nature”279 demonstrated that the field of politics had fallen far behind the physical 
sciences.  This certainly matches his earlier accounts of success; that is, success was to be 
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measured by a practice or discipline’s ability to exercise control (or a “controlled 
interpretation”) over the phenomena which it studied.  If one were asked to judge the 
political stability of most of the world in 1935 in contrast to the extent to which science 
had successfully solved problems that had plagued men for thousands of years, it is hard 
to imagine that any reasonable person would have had more confidence in the potential of 
politics to improve his life than he would have in science. 
 Not surprisingly, Dewey goes on to argue that the study and practice of politics 
would be greatly aided by appeals to the “experimental method” and treating “social 
problems” in terms of “means and consequences.”280 In other instances from Dewey’s 
work, that alone would have had to have served as sufficient proof of his argument in 
favor of the “experimental method,” or this might simply have been complemented by 
some of the characteristics of the method as listed above.  In this instance, however, he 
discusses experimentalism and its application specifically.  After acknowledging 
problems of “class conflict,” Dewey identifies the problem to be solved:  “precisely how 
conflicting claims are to be settled in the interest of the widest possible contribution to 
the interest of all—or at least of the great majority.”281  According to Dewey’s argument, 
democracy itself is the means of applying the scientific method to this problem. 
 Democracy can solve the problem of conflicting claims among citizens by virtue 
of its ability to draw out these claims into an open forum for discussion.  Democracy 
seems, on this account, to serve as a laboratory for testing these conflicting claims against 
one another with a wide audience.  In the same way that the scientist takes note of the 
conditions and details of his experiment in order that others might confirm or reject it by 
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repeating his experiment, the “method of democracy…is to bring these conflicts out into 
the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be 
discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either 
of them separately.”282   
Dewey is unusually specific in the examples he provides: 
There is, for example, a clash of interests between munition manufacturers 
and most of the rest of the population.  The more the respective claims of 
the two are publicly and scientifically weighed, the more likely it is that 
the public interest will be disclosed and made effective.  There is an 
undoubted objective clash of interests between finance-capitalism that 
controls the means of production and whose profit is served by 
maintaining relative scarcity, and idle workers and hungry consumers.  
But what generates violent strife is failure to bring the conflict into the 
light of intelligence where the conflicting interests can be adjudicated in 
behalf of the interest of the great majority….The “experimentalist” is one 
who would see to it that the method depended upon by all in some degree 
in every democratic community be followed through to completion.283 
 
There is much to be learned about Dewey’s philosophy from these examples.  First, the 
nature of the conflict in both cases is that a small group (munition manufacturers or 
finance-capitalists who control production and receive profit) has interests which are 
opposed to the interests (safety or financial stability) of a large group (the public or “idle 
workers and hungry consumers”).  In a democracy, such conflicts must be resolved in a 
manner other than they would be in a non-democracy.  In an undemocratic society, the 
ruling party or individual would be able to resolve such conflicts to their (or his/her) 
satisfaction without any appeal to either group’s interests. 
 The resolution to such conflicts in a democracy will involve the “laboratory habit 
of mind,” but this is not a feature of democracy that occurs automatically.  The resolution 
in every case in a democratic society, it would appear, is to identify the public interest 
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and make it “effective.”  In the first case (that of the munition manufacturer and the 
public), Dewey claims that the resolution will be had by a “public and scientific” 
weighing of the claims.  In the second case (that of the finance-capitalist and the idle 
worker/hungry consumer), “violent strife” can be avoided by a public “adjudication” of 
the conflicting interests that will, in turn, make the public’s interest more effective. 
If this process were automatic or inherent in a democratic society, there would be 
no need for the “experimentalist” Dewey champions.  The public airing and adjudication 
of competing claims would occur as a part of the inherent machinery of democracy.  
Since the democracy with which Dewey was concerned had survived more than a 
hundred years,284 it is true that there must have been some sense in which this had been 
happening.  If nothing else, popular elections and majority rule would have resolved such 
conflicts.  But Dewey must have believed that a more intelligent means of resolution 
existed and that the democratic process could be improved.  If that was not his 
conclusion, one must wonder what advantage there could be to talk of 
“experimentalism.”  In short, if Dewey thought that the status quo was sufficient or that 
conflict resolution was ideal in democracies, why should his philosophy have had any 
political examples or goals?  Why, in fact, should it even have been worth teaching, 
publishing, or pursuing?   
Recall that Dewey’s proposed test of philosophy is whether it “end[s] in 
conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their 
predicaments, render[s] them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our 
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dealings with them more fruitful.”285  In order for his philosophy to pass this test with 
respect to these examples of conflict and resolution, we must assume that Dewey 
believed the means of conflict resolution in democracy could be aided and made “more 
significant, more luminous” by virtue of his own empirical philosophy. 
As Dewey aged, his writings became more and more political, and it seems clear 
that he thought his own empirical philosophy could help improve society at large, as well 
as (or, perhaps, by means of improved) moral philosophy, aesthetics, and logic.  The 
“experimentalist,” then, adds something new to democracy when he “see[s] to it that the 
method depended upon by all in some degree in every democratic community be 
followed through to completion.”286  The implication seems to be that “the method” (and 
I must presume it is the “experimental” or “scientific” method to which he refers) may 
have its beginnings in the nature of democracy, but that it will not be followed through to 
its completion without the efforts of the “experimentalist” or the adoption of the 
laboratory habit of mind.   
These are, indeed, specific examples of conflicts that could be better resolved by 
the use of the “experimental” or “scientific” method, but how, exactly, does this method 
work?  Or, in other words, what precisely does the “experimentalist” do?  One part of the 
experimentalist’s work might be “bringing the conflict into the light of intelligence,” and, 
in fact, that fits very nicely with Dewey’s words near the end of Experience and Nature 
where he describes his own philosophy as the method of “intelligence.”287  This would 
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also explain Dewey’s own actions and his work outside of the academy in popular 
magazines and in political causes.  Yet there must be more to this method than simply 
“bringing” such conflicts “to light.”  Once the conflict has been exposed to a larger 
audience, what is the experimentalist’s next step? 
In the first example, Dewey speaks of “scientifically” weighing the “respective 
claims” of those engaged in the conflict.  What does it mean, precisely, for the 
experimentalist to weigh, “scientifically,” the claims of the munitions manufacturers and 
the public?  The answer to this question is not clear, yet it is crucial if Dewey’s 
philosophy is to be successful. 
 
Art as Experience 
We might expect one of the most interesting applications of the scientific or 
experimental method to a traditionally “non-scientific” field to appear in one of Dewey’s 
best-known works, Art as Experience.  Dewey envisions his own philosophy as 
revolutionary in the sense that it will change the way philosophers look at their own 
subject matter, and aesthetics would thus reasonably be an area of philosophy where the 
innovative nature of his pragmatism could be demonstrated.  An explanation of how the 
scientific method might operate in art should provide valuable insight into Dewey’s 
conception of philosophical thinking. 
Though Dewey acknowledges that the growth of science as a part of the modern 
world has had detrimental effects on art, he noted that there were also “favorable” effects 
of science that could be seen through art.  Given that Dewey hoped, in Art as Experience, 
to restore the connection between art and primary experience, it is not surprising that he 
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thought science would play some role in this restoration.  Indeed, that is the first 
“favorable” fact he references with respect to science and art:  “science tends to show that 
man is a part of nature….”288  Thus, science can provide a useful model for aestheticians 
and artists, and Dewey argues that the relationship between man and nature has “always 
been the actuating spirit of art.”289  Be that as it may, however, this tells us little about 
how the experimental method might be applied to art and how that application will be 
particularly valuable. 
Dewey continues, identifying other parallels between art and science.  Science 
grows from the need to solve problems, and, according to Dewey’s aesthetic theory, so 
does art.  Science also shows us the way our surroundings resist us, and this resistance, 
once experienced, “will furnish new materials for fine art.”290  Dewey also credits science 
with “liberating the human spirit” and drawing attention to experience, and both of these 
things are beneficial to art.291  Again, this tells us that science and its products have been 
“favorable” to art, but this does not tell us how the “experimentalist” will approach art 
and how he might bring the scientific or experimental method to art itself. 
This is an important distinction, too:  if Dewey’s work does no more than 
demonstrate that science has had positive effects on culture and academic disciplines and 
fields of study, he might well fall prey to Richard Rorty’s suggestion that he was little 
more than a “kibitzer” or “an intellectual historian.”292  Modern science has undoubtedly 
been very influential in many respects, but relating this fact hardly makes one 
philosophically interesting or original.  There must be more to Dewey’s discussion of the 
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relation of art and science than the fact that one has had a positive or negative influence 
on the other.  Instead, he must make good on his word and provide some evidence for the 
claims he makes throughout his work, that the methods of the natural and physical 
sciences should be brought to bear on ethics, art, economics, politics, and other fields.  If 
this claim is true, there should be explicit examples of how this should be done (given 
that it is a new way of philosophizing) and the consequences for doing so.  If it is true 
that art can benefit from the “laboratory habit of mind,” Dewey should be prepared to 
defend this claim and one would expect him to make this defense in his most significant 
work on art. 
Though he does appeal hopefully to the notion that “the experimental outlook” 
will “become thoroughly acclimatized” in “common culture” and that “the experimental 
attitude” will become “thoroughly naturalized,”293 Dewey hardly gives us any insight as 
to the specific activities of the experimentalist in the reconstructed aesthetics he 
envisions.  The one possible clue he provides is this:  “But to judge justly, we have to see 
science as things will be when the experimental attitude is thoroughly naturalized.  And 
art in particular will always be distracted or else soft and overrefined when it lacks 
familiar things for its material.”294  The suggestion is that, once the experimental attitude 
has been “thoroughly naturalized,” art will have “familiar things for its material” and will 
thereby avoid the danger of becoming “distracted or else soft and overrefined.”  The 
experimentalist, then, will effect the introduction (or re-introduction) of “familiar things” 
as the material for art. 
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Of course, this conclusion is the product of implication, not an explicit statement 
made by Dewey.  A reconstruction of aesthetic theory and of art, as Dewey sees it, will 
bring about the end of the bifurcation of the “useful” and “fine” arts which he laments 
throughout his work.  It will end the subjugation of those who are seen to be merely 
“means” or “instruments,” existing to support those who seek “higher” ends such as 
contemplation.  According to Dewey, art that has been the beneficiary of the “laboratory 
habit of mind” will make the world a better place for the “mass of men and women who 
do the useful work of the world.”295  Undoubtedly, Dewey’s vision of a world where the 
activities of the “common” man and woman are seen as part of a continuum with the 
work of the greatest painters and sculptors is one that is both hopeful and appealing.  But 
it is not at all clear, at least not in Art as Experience, how his own philosophy or the 
activities of the “experimentalist” can effect that change. 
Dewey does describe the artist as an “experimenter,” but this is something that is 
apparently true of artists by their nature, not by design: 
There is…a tendency among lay critics to confine experimentation to 
scientists in the laboratory.  Yet one of the essential traits of the artist is 
that he is born an experimenter.  Without this trait he becomes a poor or a 
good academician.  The artist is compelled to be an experimenter because 
he has to express an intensely individualized experience through means 
and materials that belong to the common and public world.  This problem 
cannot be solved once for all.  It is met in every new work undertaken.  
Otherwise an artist repeats himself and becomes esthetically dead.  Only 
because the artist operates experimentally does he open new fields of 
experience and disclose new aspects and qualities in familiar scenes and 
objects.296 
 
This is, unquestionably, an engaging description of the artist as “experimenter,” and it 
certainly qualifies as an example of the experimental method as it is applied to art.  But 
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this is most decidedly not an example of how the experimental method might 
conscientiously be employed to improve the quality of art or of aesthetic theory.  This is 
an account of how the experimental method already operates in art because the artist is 
“born an experimenter.”  This sheds no light on how I, as one interested in the study of 
art, might make use of the experimental method, and, while I trust that Dewey has an 
answer to this query, I am unable to find it in this volume. 
 
Experience and Nature 
 In many ways, Experience and Nature is Dewey’s most important work with 
respect to the scientific or experimental method and its role in his philosophy.  It might 
be argued that Experience and Nature is simply Dewey’s most important work on any 
topic.  John Herman Randall, Jr., in his memorial remarks at a tribute to Dewey at 
Columbia, called it his “best book,”297 and, even in a critical review of the book, George 
Santayana called it “the weightiest and most incisive account he has given of his 
philosophy.”298  Sidney Hook said that it was “both the most suggestive and most 
difficult of [Dewey’s] writings….”299  It will serve our purposes here because of its 
significance in Dewey’s corpus of work, but also because it provides several instances of 
the experimental method in application. 
 First, Dewey provides not only examples of how the scientific method can be 
applied to areas outside the natural and physical sciences, he also provides an example of 
how the experimental method is applied in the physical sciences.  This might sound odd 
and seem redundant to the current thesis, as I have already stipulated that there are many 
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instances of this in Dewey’s work.  While it is difficult to find examples in Dewey’s 
work of the experimental method applied in non-traditional fields, however, it is almost 
as difficult to find specific examples of the experimental method applied in a scientist’s 
work.  For the most part, Dewey’s descriptions of the scientific method as used in science 
are general accounts of how the experimentalist or scientist operates, not how a specific 
scientist (say a chemist, physicist, or biologist) conducts his or her work.  Experience and 
Nature cites the work of Bacon, Newton, and Einstein and discusses how the work of 
each shaped (or should have shaped) philosophical thinking. 
 The example in the opening chapters of Experience and Nature is a geologist, and 
while the description of his work is rather lengthy, it is worth excerpting almost in its 
entirety: 
A geologist living in 1928 tells us about events that happened not only 
before he was born but millions of years before any human being came 
into existence on this earth.  He does so by starting from things that are 
now the material of experience. …The geologist did not leap from the 
thing he can see and touch to some event in by-gone ages; he collated this 
observed thing with many others, of different kinds, found all over the 
globe; the results of his comparisons he then compared with data of other 
experiences, say, the astronomer’s.  He translates, that is, observed 
coexistences into non-observed, inferred sequences.  Finally he dates his 
object, placing it in an order of events.  By the same sort of method he 
predicts that at certain places some things not yet experienced will be 
observed, and then he takes pains to bring them within the scope of 
experience.  The scientific conscience is, moreover, so sensitive with 
respect to the necessity of experience that when it reconstructs the past it 
is not fully satisfied with inferences drawn from even a large and 
cumulative mass of uncontradicted evidence; it sets to work to institute 
conditions of heat and pressure and moisture, etc., so as actually to 
reproduce in experiment that which he has inferred.300 
 
Again, it is worth remembering that Dewey is explicit elsewhere that he does not expect 
the philosopher to engage in precisely the same sort of activity that the geologist (or other 
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scientist) does.  Instead, there is a “logic” to the geologist’s activity that ought to be 
shared by the philosopher.  Foremost among the other things that a geologist does is that 
he “habitually treat[s] experience as a starting point.”301 
 Thus, the philosopher will have to treat experience as a starting point.  That much 
is clear.  Further, the philosopher will want to look at a great deal of evidence before and 
after drawing conclusions.  In some manner, the philosopher should attempt to reproduce 
“that which he has inferred,” though clearly, that will not come in the form of a 
laboratory experiment (even if it should be accomplished with the “laboratory habit of 
mind”).  It is this final step that seems to demand of Dewey that he provides an example, 
even if simple and therefore artificial, of how this might work in practice.  We can 
understand the “logic” of the experiment as an attempt to test in practice that which we 
have inferred in theory, but how, precisely, does this work for the philosopher?  Where is 
the “laboratory” of the philosopher?  What sorts of “experiments” does he or she 
conduct?  Or, as Richard Rorty suggests, is “talk of ‘observation and experiment’…as 
irrelevant to the accomplishment of the project [in Experience and Nature] as it was to 
the great predecessor of all such works of philosophy-as-criticism-of-culture, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology”?302 
 The geologist begins and ends with experience:  he takes observable facts about 
the nature of his surroundings, he thinks about them and classifies and compares them 
with other facts, and then, using the hypothesis he has drawn from this reflection, he tests 
his inferences in a laboratory through experiment.  The experiment, though it entails 
artificial surrounding and control, provides further experience.  It is a link between the 
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primary experience which prompted the geologist’s activities and the reflection he 
engaged in with the intent to solve some problem.  But the problem itself demands that he 
returns to primary experience with the results of his reflection.  This is generally true of 
the work of scientists, Dewey thinks, but it is seldom true of the work of philosophers. 
 Perhaps, then, given the nature of the book, it is not surprising that we find in 
Experience and Nature something resembling concrete examples of the experimental 
method applied to the work of philosophers.  Though most of these examples do not 
follow the specificity of the description of the geologist, they come as close as anything 
Dewey provides elsewhere.  The first example appears in Dewey’s discussion of 
“selective emphasis” and its place in the “empirical method.”  If philosophy is to follow 
the logic and model of the experimental method, it will (as scientists themselves do) 
“state when and where and why the act of selection took place, and thus enable others to 
repeat it and test its worth.”303 
 The philosopher must begin her work by explaining why a particular topic has 
been chosen for study, and, further, the philosopher must then continue to acknowledge 
any simplifications in the subject matter or prejudices and biases of which she is aware: 
Selective choice, denoted as an empirical event, reveals the basis and 
bearing of intellectual simplifications; they then cease to be of such a self-
enclosed nature as to be affairs only of opinion and argument, admitting 
no alternatives save complete acceptance or rejection.  Choice that is 
disguised or denied is the source of those astounding differences of 
philosophic belief that startle the beginner and become the plaything of the 
expert.  Choice that is avowed is an experiment to be tried on its merits 
and tested by its results.  Under all the captions that are called immediate 
knowledge, or self-sufficient certitude of belief, whether logical, esthetic 
or epistemological, there is something selected for a purpose, and hence 
not simple, not self-evident and not intrinsically eulogizable.304 
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The “empirical” philosopher must endeavor to acknowledge choices as well as prejudices 
and biases.  The very act of admitting that there are choices made by the philosopher in 
her work constitutes an experiment, according to Dewey.  The empirical method in 
philosophy begins with acknowledging the simple fact that one subject was chosen for 
study over another.  A treatise on morality must begin with an explanation of its origin or 
the author’s impetus for undertaking it.  Without such an explanation, the treatise can 
only be an “affair of opinion and argument.”  This is an important claim:  Dewey is 
arguing that the work of philosophers can only be legitimately philosophical if it is 
prefaced by the proper “evolutionary” account.  This account justifies what follows as 
truly “intelligent” or philosophical, instead of mere bias and opinion on the author’s part.  
To be more, it must be anchored in primary experience.  The philosopher must “State the 
purpose so that it may be re-experienced, and its value and the pertinency of selection 
undertaken in its behalf may be tested.”305 
 In the physical and natural sciences, the scientist provides a detailed account of 
the environment in which he conducts his experiments.  In philosophy, the philosopher 
must give as detailed an account as possible of the environment in which she conducts 
her work.  In the same way that the historical method applied to morality will help 
ascertain the origins of moral custom and principle, the philosopher’s acknowledgement 
of the choices she made (or the problem she intended to solve) in taking up a particular 
subject will help ascertain the origins of her conclusions.  In short, it will give others the 
opportunity to test her conclusions against the problems they are intended to solve.  If the 
conclusions fall short—that is, if the conclusions of the study fail to solve the problem 
they are meant to address—others can reject the work of the philosopher.  In the same 
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manner, if the geologist concludes that the earth’s core is composed of a particular 
mineral and he documents his work, and if other geologists test his results by repeating 
his work and fail to conclude that this mineral exists at the earth’s core, his work will be 
rejected by science.  A philosopher whose work addresses the problem of the relationship 
of the mind and body and draws conclusions which do not “render” “ordinary life-
experiences and their predicaments” “more significant, more luminous to us, and make 
our dealings with them more fruitful,”306 should suffer a fate similar to that of the 
geologist whose conclusions cannot be verified by his peers. 
 That this is not the case in philosophy is, unfortunately, evidence of the 
philosopher’s emphasis on the “cognitive” or non-empirical and her refuge in the same.  
Dewey charges philosophers with a sort of “malpractice:”  that is, they take up questions 
that are of no relevance to “ordinary experience” or, if they should deign to address those 
things which are of interest to the “common man,” they do so in such a way that their 
work can never be subjected to testing.  Sixteen years earlier, in his important essay “The 
Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,”307 Dewey described the sort of philosophy that 
could be subjected to testing:  “a philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the work of 
projecting hypotheses for the education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is 
thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it propounds work out in 
pracice.”308  As long as philosophers busy themselves with things that hold no interest for 
the mass of people and as long as their results are little more than the “plaything of the 
expert,” philosophers cannot be found to be wrong.  They are, sadly, a bit like the 
emperor’s courtiers:  at once assuring everyone that his new clothes are splendid while 
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they stand unperturbed by the murmurings of those around them who protest that they do 
not even see these clothes.  The alternative, an empirical philosophy, shows that “In 
having modesty forced upon it, philosophy also acquires responsibility.”309 
As damning a criticism as this might be and as interesting as Dewey’s general 
account of the value of empiricism in philosophy is, this is still a far cry from the 
specificity of the example of the geologist, the munitions manufacturer, or the finance-
capitalist.  That sort of specificity is not to be found in Experience and Nature in brief 
examples, however.  The remainder of the work includes the best concrete examples he 
provides anywhere of the ways in which the empirical method might operate in 
philosophy, but these examples are also provided in some of the most complex and dense 
prose Dewey has to offer anywhere.  In each chapter, he takes some problem from the 
history of philosophy and examines traditional and conventional approaches to these 
problems, then he subjects these approaches to criticism from the standpoint of an 
empirical philosophy.  He considers metaphysical problems like the nature of existence 
(“Existence as Precarious and Stable”) and “the question of laws, mechanical 
uniformities,…ends, purposes, uses and enjoyments.”310  He also takes up 
epistemological problems (“Nature, Mind and the Subject,” “Nature Life and Body-
Mind,” “Existence, Ideas and Consciousness) and, in a chapter that anticipates his later 
work, Art as Experience, aesthetics (“Experience, Nature and Art”).  Thus, it is fair to say 
that, if one seeks to find Dewey’s concrete examples of the experimental method in 
operation in traditionally non-empirical fields, Experience and Nature is the best resource 
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available for this.  Whether these examples are sufficient to support Dewey’s conclusions 
regarding this method is a question I will return to in my conclusion. 
 
Logic:  The Theory of Inquiry 
Dewey’s Logic was one of the final substantial works of his life.  Indeed, Dewey 
may well have regarded it as the most important book he ever wrote.311  Though the 
subject of the work is, like so many of Dewey’s works, a proposed reconstruction (this 
time in logic), the theme of the experimental method, its success and its significance 
pervades the Logic as it does the remainder of his work.  In his introduction to the 
volume312 in the Collected Works, Ernest Nagel describes the Logic as a continuation of 
the project Dewey had begun more than thirty five years earlier in an essay cited above, 
“Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality.”313  Nagel notes that Dewey’s 
concern in “reconstructing” logic was to give it the benefit of the successes of the 
methodology of science. 
Dewey believed that, in order for logic to be relevant to the modern world, it must 
avail itself of the advantages of the methods of modern science.  He argued that, in the 
same way little progress had been made in moral theory because it had rejected or 
ignored empiricism, logic had not progressed since Aristotle’s time.  Despite the fact that 
Aristotle operated from an ontological foundation that science (and, more specifically, 
Darwin) had rendered foreign to modernity, modern men still accepted a logic based on 
this ontology.  Nagel calls the Logic “the outcome of a prolonged effort by Dewey to 
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analyze and codify the general principles he thought were operative in what he believed 
were the most successful attempts—namely, those in the natural sciences—to gain 
reliable knowledge.”314  The Logic is thus an ideal place to look for Dewey’s account of 
the experimental method and its application outside of the natural and physical sciences.  
Not only is the book arguably the most developed work of his philosophy, but it also 
explicitly addresses Dewey’s conception of the experimental method.  Moreover, Nagel 
suggests that the book itself is a “hypothesis” and that Dewey acknowledged he would 
have to rely on his successors to finish the “testing” of his hypothesis for him (Dewey 
was seventy nine when the book was published).315 
Beyond the experimental or scientific method itself, Dewey depends on the 
natural and physical sciences to support his account of logic.  He devotes the first part of 
the Logic to establishing the importance of biology to any logical theory.  Though this 
does not provide us with a concrete example of the practical application of the 
experimental method, it does reiterate Dewey’s conviction that there is no disconnect 
between the natural and the intellectual.  This serves as a reminder to those who have 
been overly influenced by non-empirical philosophy:  “It is obvious without argument 
that when men inquire they employ their eyes and ears, their hands and their brains.  
These organs, sensory, motor or central, are biological.”316  In the same way that it is 
appropriate (and obligatory) for the philosopher to make use of the facts of biology, 
chemistry, and physics when describing human inquiry, it is appropriate (and obligatory, 
if progress is to be made) for the philosopher to make use of the methods of those 
disciplines. 
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If Experience and Nature provides Dewey’s account of the traditional problems 
of philosophy as they might be treated by the “experimental method,” the Logic stands as 
one long example of the experimental method in application.  In short, Dewey believed 
that inquiry was experiment, and in the Logic we see that there need be little concern for 
how the experimental method might be applied in philosophy.  The fact is, according to 
Dewey, we cannot help but experiment when we philosophize.  The problem is not that 
experimentalism has not been applied to philosophical matters, but that philosophers have 
not acknowledged this application.  Still, this does not exempt Dewey from the 
responsibility of providing concrete examples of precisely how experimentalism works in 
logic, epistemology, moral theory, or aesthetics, and the Logic does an admirable job of 
answering this obligation. 
In a chapter entitled “The Pattern of Inquiry,” Dewey attempts to lay out the 
pattern by which inquiry takes place and how this pattern has been adopted, to its credit, 
by modern experimental science.  But how should that pattern work with a topic that has 
traditionally been considered to be within the purview of philosophy?  One such topic 
might be that of reasoning or, as Dewey describes it as a part of this pattern of inquiry, 
the process of “developing the meaning-contents in their relations to one another….”317  
Not only does this subject provide an example of how inquiry applies the experimental 
method in practice, but Dewey follows this example immediately with a comparison of 
the process to “scientific reasoning.”318 
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 According to Dewey’s example, in the course of our primary experience, we are 
regularly presented with an “indeterminate situation” or a situation that involves us in a 
“troubled state of affairs.”319  Changes or obstacles in our environment cause us, as 
biological beings, to attempt to restore an “equilibrium” or, in philosophical terms, 
stability or certainty.  The recognition that equilibrium needs to be restored, even if at a 
subconscious level, begins the process of inquiry.  We judge a situation to be 
“problematic”320 and therefore in need of some sort of resolution, and we do everything 
within our power to produce such a resolution.  Meaning is, for Dewey, the result of this 
process, and we can only gain meaning through a return from the “cognitive” stages of 
problem-solving to the pre-cognitive or “primary” experience.  Our return to the unstable 
nature of “ordinary” experience may present many possible meanings to us for the 
products of our reflection.  If we accept the first (or any) meaning that is suggested, 
inquiry has come to an end.321  If, however, we engage in “reasoning,” we will compare 
possible meanings to others in our accepted “system” of meanings.  We will try to restore 
the continuity to our habits and the system of meanings which was already a part of our 
being prior to our encounter of the “indeterminate situation.” 
 Though an important part of the process of inquiry is reflection and abstraction, 
the conclusion of the process is a return to ordinary experience.  This is the only way that 
meaning can be had.  Dewey details the process of reasoning: 
If such and such a relation of meanings is accepted, then we are committed 
to such and such other relations of meanings because of their membership 
in the same system.  Through a series of intermediate meanings, a 
meaning is finally reached which is more clearly relevant to the problem 
in hand than the originally suggested idea.  It indicates operations which 
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can be performed to test its applicability, whereas the original idea is 
usually too vague to determine crucial operations.  In other words, the idea 
or meaning when developed in discourse directs the activities which, when 
executed, provide needed evidential material.”322 
 
It requires little imagination to make the connection between this description and 
“scientific reasoning.”  The possible meaning or meanings serve as “an hypothesis,” and 
this hypothesis is “developed in relation to other conceptual structures until it receives a 
form in which it can instigate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those 
conditions which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the 
hypothesis should be accepted or rejected.”323 
 Inquiry is itself a form of experimentation; thus, it follows that any field which 
conscientiously utilizes inquiry (in the same way that individuals do instinctively and 
through habit) will also engage in a form of experimentation.  An empirical philosophy 
would engage in experimentation if it treated theories and conclusions as hypotheses.  It 
should next develop that hypothesis “in relation to other conceptual structures until it 
receives a form in which it can instigate and direct an experiment” which will allow the 
hypothesis to be tested.  Upon testing, the hypothesis will either be accepted or rejected.  
In the end, of course, it matters little whether we actually call a particular conclusion or 
theory in philosophy a “hypothesis.”  Dewey was, I believe, less concerned with 
nomenclature than he was with methodology.  The important question is whether the 
conclusion or theory is subject to verification by other philosophers and, ultimately, by 
those who will benefit from enlarged meaning in ordinary experience (i.e., everyone).  In 
order for such verification to occur, philosophy cannot continue as a non-empirical study.  
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Instead, it must be acknowledge the methods of experimentalism that occur in inquiry 
itself. 
 
Experimental Economics 
 One might imagine that philosophy is one of the few academic or intellectual 
disciplines that might survive as a non-empirical discipline in a world that relies heavily 
on the practical problem-solving efficacy of the natural sciences.  Certainly, the 
humanities, more generally, might seem less conducive to the use of hypothesis, 
experimentation, and verification by testing.  It seems, however, less likely that the same 
might be said for the social sciences.  As “sciences,” we might expect that empiricism, a 
“laboratory habit of mind,” and the testing of conclusions constitute the “tools of the 
trade.”  Dewey certainly gave the social sciences more credit in this respect than he did 
philosophy.  Yet his repeated calls for the “naturalization” of the experimental method 
were not more influential in the social sciences than they were in philosophy.  Though 
there are likely more parallels between the methods of the natural and physical sciences 
and the social sciences than there are between the former and philosophy, 
“experimentation” has not, until recently, been regarded as one of the standard tools of 
economics.  Even now, after the recent awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics to an 
experimentalist, there are many economists who are suspicious of the work of their peers 
which emerges from “laboratories.” 
 Nonetheless, the use of experimentalism in economics is an important example 
for Dewey’s theory of pragmatism.  If, as Dewey suggests, the experimental method can 
be brought to bear on fields that have, traditionally, been “non-empirical,” there is further 
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support for the use of this method in philosophy.  In short, if philosophy can be shown to 
be one of the few areas that has not made use of the experimental method in light of the 
progress it has generated in other fields, Dewey’s case for its application in philosophy 
(despite the paucity of examples he himself provides) may well be strengthened.  His 
claim that the lack of progress in moral theory is striking and instructive next to that of 
the physical, natural and social sciences will undoubtedly be supported if the method can 
be shown to have effected progress in traditionally non-empirical social sciences. 
Beyond the natural sciences, experimentalism has certainly been used in 
psychology, but it was not until the latter part of the twentieth century that it made an 
appearance in economics.  Then, economists began applying the “laboratory methods of 
inquiry to the study of motivated human interactive decision behavior in social contexts 
governed by explicit or implicit rules.”324  “Explicit” rules are those rules which govern a 
particular example or experiment.  For instance, an experimenter may instruct a subject 
that he or she is not allowed to conduct trades with a particular sort of individual or 
group.  Explicit rules may also be the laws which govern commerce, whether generally or 
in a particular context.  Some auctions, for example, have very specific rules about how 
bidding occurs.  “Implicit” rules, on the other hand, “are the norms, traditions and habits 
that people bring to the laboratory as part of their cultural and biological evolutionary 
heritage….”325  Explicit rules, then, can generally be controlled by the experimenter 
while implicit rules, generally, cannot be controlled. 
The purpose of using experiments in economic study is to better understand 
“motivated human interactive decision behavior in social contexts governed by explicit or 
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implicit rules.”  Thus, the purpose of experimental economics is, as much as possible, to 
replicate the conditions of “ordinary” experience.  Ordinary experience is full of rules, 
whether those rules are explicit (as in the case of actual laws and rules created and 
enforced by governments) or are of the implicit variety, the sort that also comprise part of 
human nature as Dewey understands it:  “norms, traditions and habits.”  And what 
experimental economics has come to show, in fact, is that incentives do matter. 
This is hardly a revolutionary claim:  behavioral economists have been making 
this very claim for a long time.  It is precisely the sort of claim of which Dewey would 
have been skeptical because it seems overly simplistic:  of course incentives matter, but 
what sorts of incentives matter?  Recall that Dewey was critical of the notion of homo 
economicus or the “economic man” who is motivated solely by selfish (or self-interested) 
desires.  The suggestion that the dynamic nature of human behavior and life can be 
reduced to one fundamental, fixed desire was something that Dewey rejected.  How, then, 
has experimental economics progressed where non-empirical economics has not?  More 
importantly, how might experimental economics support Dewey’s call for the 
naturalization of the “laboratory habit of mind” in traditionally non-empirical fields? 
 Experimental economics has indeed established that incentives matter, but there is 
a proviso to this conclusion: 
But the incentives to which people respond are sometimes not those one 
would expect based on the canons of economic [or] game theory.  It turns 
out that people are often better, and sometimes worse, at achieving gains 
for themselves and others than is predicted by standard forms of rational 
analysis.  These contradictions provide important clues to the implicit 
rules that people may follow and can motivate new theoretical hypotheses 
for examination in the laboratory.326 
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Experimental economics demonstrates, by use of empirical methods, that the assumptions 
and theories made by economists and political scientists do not, in fact, hold up in 
simulations of “ordinary” experience.  Moreover, the result of work in experimental 
economics proves that much of the theorizing that occurs in traditional economics does 
not fully capture the details of “ordinary” experience.  Laboratory experiments in 
economics have shown that there are implicit rules followed by individuals that have 
often not been accounted for by economic theory.  That is, for many years, economists 
have turned from the facts of ordinary experience, reflected on them and attempted to 
systematize them, but they have not bothered to check their conclusions and systems 
against the facts that served as the original impetus for reflection. 
Importantly, experimental economics has challenged traditional notions of 
“rationality” as held by economists.  Faced with a result that would be unexpected by 
traditional economics—for instance, “people in certain contexts choose outcomes 
yielding the smaller of rewards”—the experimentalist does not reject this fact and revert 
to the accepted theory of economic rationality in order to figure out what is “wrong” with 
the subject.  The experimentalist “ask[s] why, rather than conclude that this is 
irrational.”327  Experimental economics has, in a manner that Dewey would undoubtedly 
have applauded, attempted to understand the individual as he or she is.  And such an 
understanding requires acknowledgement of imperfection, uncertainty, and, in the 
traditional economic sense, irrationality. 
The role of uncertainty and risk were of concern to Dewey, and he, like 
experimental economists, worried that this characteristic of human existence had not been 
adequately represented in the work of non-empiricists.  Vernon Smith, one of the fathers 
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of experimental economics, might have paraphrased Dewey when he wrote, 
“Acknowledging and recognizing the workings of unseen processes are essential to the 
growth of our understanding of social phenomena, and we must strive not to exclude 
them from our inquiry, if we have any hope of understanding data inside or outside of the 
laboratory.”328  According to Smith, experimentalism and its application are the keys to 
understanding “social phenomena,” and Dewey would have agreed.  Whether Dewey was 
successful in his claim that this method could be applied to philosophical matters is, I 
think, an open question.  Whether the application of the experimental method in 
economics will be revolutionary or not is, however, a matter that has been authoritatively 
decided.  I will return, in my conclusion, to the subject of experimental economics and its 
potential as a “pragmatic economics.”  
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CERTAINTY, UNCERTAINTY, AND RISK 
 
 Certainty, uncertainty, and risk are all concepts that are familiar to the game 
theorist, but they are also significant for Dewey’s pragmatism.  On this subject as much 
as any other, economists and Dewey seem to be in agreement, and it seems odd that 
Dewey would not have taken advantage of this agreement.  It is clear that Dewey had a 
good deal of familiarity with economic literature and that concerns about economic issues 
are at the heart of his later work in particular.  Yet Dewey never availed himself of the 
writings of economists that might have further supported his arguments for reconstruction 
in philosophy.  Economists, unlike philosophers, had already acknowledged the 
“precarious” existence that he attempted to describe and put forward for philosophers in 
Experience and Nature.  Much of the work being done in economics during Dewey’s life 
included efforts to explore the details of this precariousness while, at the same time, 
providing useful predictions and observations about economic activity. 
 
The “Precarious” and Unstable Nature of Existence  
In Experience and Nature, Dewey’s first description of the precarious nature of 
existence is striking: 
Man finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence involves, to 
put it baldly, a gamble.  The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, 
unstable, uncannily unstable.  Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to 
be counted upon as to their times and seasons.  Although persistent, they 
are sporadic, episodic.  It is darkest just before dawn; pride goes before a 
fall; the moment of greatest prosperity is the moment most charged with 
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ill-omen, most opportune for the evil eye.  Plague, famine, failure of 
crops, disease, death, defeat in battle, are always just around the corner, 
and so are abundance, strength, victory, festival and song.  Luck is 
proverbially both good and bad in its distributions.329 
 
Though Dewey does include these final words about the existence of “abundance, 
strength, victory, festival and song,” this is not a particularly encouraging account of the 
situation in which man finds himself.  For someone who has often been accused of being 
naively optimistic, Dewey has certainly here provided a bleak description of existence. 
 Though bleak, the picture Dewey paints is hardly unique.  As cited above, Frank 
Knight made a similar observation in his book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, published 
four years before Experience and Nature:  “It is a world of change in which we live, and 
a world of uncertainty.  We live only by knowing something about the future; while the 
problems of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little.”330  
Near the beginning of The Quest for Certainty, Dewey’s words sound very similar:  “The 
distinctive characteristic of practical activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be 
eliminated, is the uncertainty which attends it.  Of it, we are compelled to say:  Act, but 
act at your peril.”331  Knight, an economist at the University of Chicago, criticized Dewey 
freely in his own work, but there is not a single instance of Knight’s name in Dewey’s 
Collected Works.  It would be safe to assume that Knight fell into the category of 
“laissez-faire” economists or liberals that Dewey repeatedly criticized, but as the above 
shows, there was at least one thing upon which the two agreed:  the precarious nature of 
human existence and the fact that human action is plagued by risk and uncertainty. 
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 Both Knight and Dewey agreed, in fact, that in this “scene” of risk, uncertainty, 
and instability, the lot of man is that he still must act.  He can do so blindly or by 
following his passions, or he can do so by intelligent action.  For Dewey, the latter meant 
that, while acknowledging the biological foundation of human behavior and the 
significant role of habit, the best philosophy will be one which allows us to reflect upon 
both human nature and habit and to employ the products of that reflection in future 
“ordinary” experience.  For Dewey, these facts about the world should give philosophers 
important direction.  It is neither possible nor desirable to ignore the “precarious” nature 
of the human condition.  Without misfortune, fortune would have little meaning for us, 
and so we should never wish that the elements of uncertainty and risk be entirely 
removed from our lives.  Moreover, philosophers who focus all of their efforts on 
identifying or discovering the “fixed and final” and the “certain” are not only misled, 
they are also doomed to fail in their efforts because of “the fundamentally hazardous 
character of the world.”332 
 The question that interests Dewey as well as the economist is this:  what is the 
best way (whether that means the most moral or the most rational way) for individuals to 
behave in a world that continually surprises us and reminds us that we will never be able 
to escape risk and uncertainty?  How are we to make decisions about our behavior when 
we can see that, as time progresses and the environment changes, a decision that seems 
good today may be disastrous tomorrow?  One possible response would be to abandon as 
futile the attempt to make any decisions.  We might instead do just what we want to, 
whenever we want to because the alternative is to have our hopes and plans constantly 
dashed by fortune.  In short, we would “ally” ourselves with “destiny” because we cannot 
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conquer it.333  Or, if we like, we might choose the path of the non-empirical philosophers 
Dewey disparages throughout his work.  We might ignore altogether the fact that the 
world is an uncertain and risky place.  We would instead build entire systems of thought 
based on the notion that the highest end we might achieve would be knowledge of the 
“fixed and final” or absolute certainty.  In doing so, we might assuage the fears that come 
from a frank view of the world’s “hazardous character,” but we would be living a lie—
one that might lead us to irreconcilable conflicts.  Moreover, this approach would require 
us to dismiss the contrary empirical evidence provided by our senses about the uncertain 
nature of existence. 
 The economist, at least, takes the “facts of the world” as given, and he quickly 
moves on to the practical questions of human behavior and decision.  Dewey must have 
seen the advantage to this approach, though he never makes any explicit statement to that 
effect (at least not with respect to economics).  Obviously, he is highly laudatory of the 
efforts of natural and physical scientists, and there are numerous examples in his work of 
calls for similar methodology to be applied to “social problems,”334 but most of Dewey’s 
references to economics suggest that he believes there is still much to be done to 
accomplish the “naturalization” of the empirical method in the “social sciences.”  Yet 
Dewey must have viewed the economist’s work as part of the “other course,” the attempt 
to “invent arts and by their means turn the powers of nature to account….”335 
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Thinking and the “Quest for Certainty” 
 As far as the philosopher is concerned, however, the “ultimate evidence of 
genuine hazard, contingency, irregularity and undeterminateness in nature,”336 Dewey 
argues, is that human beings think.  Thinking is the result of a breakdown in instinct and 
habit.  Without hazard, contingency, irregularity and “undeterminateness,” we should be 
able to rely on the instinct and habits that regularly drive our behavior.  Our action would 
continue unimpeded, and there would be no need to leave “ordinary experience” and 
engage in reflection in order to improve our ability to “construct freer and more secure 
goods”337 or to derive meaning from our experience.  Dewey recurs, in Experience and 
Nature, to the importance of experimentalism and its role in facing the hazards of an 
uncertain and risky world:  “Reflection occurs only in situations qualified by uncertainty, 
alternatives, questioning, search, hypotheses, tentative trials or experiments which test the 
worth of thinking.”338  Again, without the presence of uncertainty in our “ordinary 
experience,” thinking and reflection would be superfluous to the behavior of human 
beings.  According to Dewey, philosophy has thus traditionally provided an account of 
existence which is exactly the reverse of the facts. 
 From the Greeks forward, philosophers have disparaged “ordinary” experience, 
and they have suggested that this experience can teach us little (if anything) about the 
nature of existence.  Reality, as Dewey’s characterization of the argument goes, is an 
“ordered whole,” it is a “rational system,” and if we simply remove ourselves from the 
constant distractions of “ordinary” experience long enough, we might just be able to 
catch a glimpse of this “system.”  Behind the commotion and disturbance of everyday 
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life, there lies something “fixed and final,” something “immutable” and unchangeable.  
To put it simply, beyond the uncertainty of daily existence, there is something better, 
something “absolute and unshakeable,”339 and it can be grasped if we just look for it in 
the proper way.  We can leave the world of commotion and disturbance behind—if we 
develop the right skills and tools. 
 But thinking and reflection are not tools that exist in order to verify the fixed and 
final and that which is certain, and Dewey is at pains to prove this to his reader.  The “life 
of the mind” is not, despite appearances, a life which has its origin in some insight into 
objective truth or reality.  The “life of the mind” is an outgrowth of the uncertainty which 
suffuses the human condition.  To be sure, according to Dewey, it is a perversion of this 
fact:  thinking and reflection are caused by the necessity of living meaningfully in a 
world that is not “a rational system,”340 but the notion that thinking and reflection should 
therefore replace (and are superior to) the facts of our “ordinary experience” is, 
nonetheless, a response generated by fear.  As Stephen Toulmin summarizes this 
response: 
He [Dewey] saw the Platonist demand for certainty and necessity as 
having its own emotional origins:  it was an “escape from peril.”  These 
origins were partly cultural, being the product of superstitions that went 
back ultimately to the astrotheology of the Ancient Empires, but they were 
also partly personal—an expression of an urge for a psychological security 
which the world of practical life does not provide.341 
 
Dewey did not condemn this urge:  he claimed that men are “compelled to seek for 
security” because they do live in a “world of hazards.”342  What he could not abide, 
however, was the failure of philosophers to “intellectually disrobe” and acknowledge its 
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influence on their thinking.  The “life of the mind,” as philosophy has historically 
undertaken it, is the natural desire for “escape from peril” taken to an unhealthy extreme.  
There were other attempts to escape from peril which preceded philosophy:  principally, 
superstition, mythology, drama, and poetry, and Dewey is not critical of these.  These 
attempts, however, always remained checked by the demands of survival, and it was not 
until men developed the leisure to “philosophize” that they tried to forget that they too 
were subject to these demands. 
 Dewey’s criticism of the history of philosophical thinking about the nature of 
existence was sharp, particularly in his more mature work.  He believed that the denial or 
dismissal of uncertainty and risk evidenced “the philosophic fallacy.”343  This fallacy, of 
which too many of his predecessors were guilty, was a “conversion of eventual functions 
into antecedent existence….”344  The “real” world, for Dewey, is the world of “ordinary 
experience,” the world in which most of us find ourselves on a daily basis.  Yet 
philosophers have converted this world into one that cannot tell us anything about reality 
and, in fact, will stand in the way of us knowing about reality.  Instead, the “eventual 
function,” reflection and “secondary experience,” had been taken to be the primary or 
antecedent act.  Reflection, as a consequence of “the philosophic fallacy,” was argued to 
be the true nature of man, the identity to which he should return, forsaking the 
distractions of sensory and “ordinary” experience. 
This fallacy is the impetus for Experience and Nature and, it might be argued, the 
whole of Dewey’s philosophy.  Dewey was disgusted by what he thought philosophy had 
become:  a refuge for those who were afraid to acknowledge and to live honestly in a 
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world of contingency.345  Not only would the experimental method oblige us to return to 
the world of “ordinary” experience, but it would also demand that we acknowledge that 
world to be one which was unstable and, ultimately, beyond our control.  We would still 
have to live under the “strain of uncertainty,”346 but we would be able to derive meaning 
from our existence by a means other than escaping from it. 
 
The Role of Philosophy in an Uncertain World 
 As Richard Rorty rightly acknowledges, however, John Dewey would never have 
jettisoned philosophy as a superfluous or outmoded activity.  While Rorty argues that 
philosophy should be “therapeutic” and that its mission is to “make itself obsolete,347 he 
also notes that Dewey “never quite brought himself to adopt [this] Bouwsma-like 
stance….”348  The work of philosophy and of inquiry cannot be separated from the facts 
of human existence.  “Uncertainty,” wrote Dewey, “is primarily a practical matter.”349  
Philosophy exists as the product of uncertainty, and so it should ultimately be a practical 
discipline.  Dewey was, “first and foremost,”350 a philosopher, and, accordingly, he 
endorsed the aims of philosophy, if not always its methods: 
The trouble, then, with the conclusions of philosophy is not in the least 
that they are the results of reflection and theorizing.  It is rather that 
philosophers have borrowed from various sources the conclusions of 
special analyses, particularly of some ruling science of the day, and 
imported them direct into philosophy, with no check by either the 
empirical objects from which they arose or those to which the conclusions 
in question point.351 
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Dewey bore no ill will toward those who engaged in “reflection and theorizing.”  These 
activities were an integral part of the only intelligent response to the “uncertain, 
unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous” “world of empirical things.”352 
 The “quest for certainty,” as Dewey described it, had laudable goals.  It does aim 
at “the security of values, of the things which are admirable, honorable, to be approved 
and striven for.”353  Such things are things of “general human import” and concern all 
people, not just “professional philosophers.”354  In that sense, Dewey does not begrudge 
those who believe the “quest for certainty” is the way to attain such things.  In the spirit 
of the “laboratory habit of mind,” it might even be said that the quest, as traditionally 
taken up by philosophers, represents a first hypothesis, a first test as it were, of the means 
for achieving that which is “admirable, honorable” and for a “security of values.”  Like 
all hypotheses, however, this quest (or these means) had to be tested and re-tested and 
offered up for the consideration and verification of others. 
 And here, finally, is where thinkers like Descartes had failed, according to 
Dewey.  The “urge” to “escape from peril” that caused Descartes to undertake his 
meditations was perfectly natural and certainly compelling.  Dewey believes this is the 
way inquiry generally begins.  Further, the meditations lend themselves easily to 
interpretation as experimentalism.  Descartes began with a problem, he formulated a 
hypothesis about the means of solving the problem, and he undertook testing.  To this 
point, Dewey cannot fault his motivations or his efforts, and he cites approvingly 
Descartes’ understanding that “there had to be some warrant for the application of ideas 
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to nature.”355  In order to follow through with the experimental method, however, 
Descartes would have had to return the products of his meditation to the facts of primary 
experience.  He would have had to have subjected his conclusions to testing and re-
testing in ordinary activity, and this, Descartes explicitly acknowledges, he cannot do.   
The quest for certainty must end at the facts of ordinary experience because these 
facts prove repeatedly that certainty (as philosophers have sought it) is not something to 
be attained in this world (as we know it).  Instead of turning his powerful intellect to the 
question of how we might live more intelligently in this world, Dewey thought that 
Descartes (and many of his predecessors and successors) had ultimately rejected his 
empirical data in favor of a hopeless quest.  The quest for certainty, as Dewey understood 
it, is “an effort to transcend belief”356 where belief is distinguished from knowledge.  
Knowledge provides access to the world of ideas or forms, but belief is thought to be on a 
par with opinion, the shadows of Plato’s cave.  Knowledge is thus superior to belief, and 
it is thereby the object of philosophers’ study.  “The quest for certainty” embodies that 
distinction.  The quest for certainty is a quest to replace every bit of opinion or belief with 
knowledge or “complete assurance.”357 
If certainty is equivalent to “complete assurance” and the quest for certainty seeks 
the replacement of all beliefs with “knowledge,” certainty (as traditionally understood by 
philosophers) can only be a matter of theory and never a part of the world of “practical 
action.”358  Recall Dewey’s words:  “Uncertainty is primarily a practical matter” and “all 
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matters of practical action involve an element of uncertainty….”359  Non-empirical types 
of  philosophy are the only sorts of philosophy that can seek certainty since they are also 
the only philosophies which make no reference to matters of practical experience.  
Dewey’s claim is a strong one:  by definition, practice involves uncertainty, and the only 
way to avoid that uncertainty is to leave the world of practice.  The quest for certainty, in 
short, is a quest to escape the difficulties of practical action, and such an endeavor can 
never pass Dewey’s test for philosophy.  Worse yet, it is an endeavor that can never 
really be a part of ordinary experience, nor can it therefore constitute the whole of human 
life.  It is an attempt to move beyond “contingent probability,” and, according to Dewey’s 
characterization of the world of human experience, we cannot move permanently beyond 
contingent probability.  Does the quest for certainty render “ordinary life-experiences and 
their predicaments” “more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with 
them more fruitful”?360  It cannot do this because it refuses to accept “ordinary life-
experiences and their predicaments” as legitimate objects of knowledge. 
The consequences for this sort of philosophy and those who have practiced it are 
rather unappealing.  Reconstruction in Philosophy is a book that often provides the most 
strongly-worded criticisms that Dewey makes of philosophical investigation as it has 
traditionally been conceived and pursued.  On the subject of philosophy which has 
divorced itself from the world of practical action, he is particularly disparaging: 
Thus arises that appearance of abstract definition and ultra-scientific 
argumentation which repels so many from philosophy but which has been 
one of its chief attractions to its devotees.  ¶  At the worst, this has reduced 
philosophy to a show of elaborate terminology, a hair-splitting logic, and a 
fictitious devotion to the mere external forms of comprehensive and 
minute demonstration.  Even at the best, it has tended to produce an 
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overdeveloped attachment to system for its own sake, and an over-
pretentious claim to certainty.361 
 
Philosophy has not only divorced itself from the world of ordinary experience and 
practice, but it has also made itself repulsive to those engaged in that world.  And this, for 
Dewey, may be the most disheartening result of the “quest for certainty” since he is an 
advocate for philosophy—empirical philosophy—as the means to sustained, intelligent 
action. 
 If thought is the result of the uncertainty of existence, then philosophy is the 
attempt to organize thought in the manner best suited to face this uncertainty.  Philosophy 
is as much the consequence of uncertainty as is fear.  In Reconstruction in Philosophy, 
Dewey’s positive account of what philosophy might yet be is as pointed as his negative 
account of what it had, unfortunately, become:  “…it will be seen that the task of future 
philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own days.  
Its aim is to become so far as is humanly possible an organ for dealing with these 
conflicts.”362  We must acknowledge that strife and conflict can never be permanently 
resolved, but we are not thereby consigned to sit idly by and the let the “commotion” and 
“disturbances” of experience command our lives.  There is hope for mitigating the “social 
and moral strife,” and this hope lies in a philosophy that bridges the gap between 
reflection and ordinary experience. 
 
The Social and Economic Obligations of Dewey’s Pragmatism 
It is worth taking a moment to connect Dewey’s epistemological and 
metaphysical claims to his moral concerns since, for Dewey, there can be no separation 
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between these things.  As Dewey’s career advanced and he was invited to lecture around 
the world, his work increasingly reflected his interest in class difference and the 
accompanying economic and moral problems.  As noted above in Chapter V, Dewey saw 
the “quest for certainty” as a part of the movement that had effectively disparaged the 
world of practice and, more importantly, the actions of those who live in it.  There is a 
social aspect to the traditional epistemology and metaphysics of non-empirical 
philosophy, and it recalls Dewey’s criticisms of Aristotle.  As the body of knowledge 
human beings possess develops from the superstitious, dramatic, and poetic to the 
“matter-of-fact,” there is also a distinction between the “social classes” which possess 
each kind of knowledge:  “The religious and poetic beliefs having acquired a definite 
social and political value and function are in the keeping of a higher class directly 
associated with the ruling elements in the society.”363 
In the same way that Aristotle could speak of natural slavery, the non-empirical 
philosopher can dismiss the experimental method and those who practice it because they 
“are likely to occupy a low social status.”364  This method, according to such 
philosophers, could never provide anything like “true knowledge,”365 and the only 
scholars who can have a claim to legitimate activity are those who are engaged in seeking 
true knowledge.  This is not to suggest that artisans, industrial workers, and experimental 
scientists are engaged in pointless activity.  Even non-empirical philosophers must 
recognize the value of indoor plumbing, penicillin, and warm clothes since “the 
requirements of continued existence make indispensable some attention to the actual facts 
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of the world.”366  Though they might seek to escape the disconcerting “facts of the 
world,” non-empirical philosophers are no less subject to the fact that “the environment 
does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under penalty of extinction.”367  Even so, 
while they might acknowledge the utility of those who provide material comforts and 
they may also acknowledge that their own existence is, in turn, dependent upon such 
people, those engaged in the quest for certainty have nonetheless played a distinctive part 
in denigrating these same activities and the livelihood of those who perform them. 
Once again, Aristotle serves as the focus of Dewey’s criticism and as an example 
of how the misdirected quest for certainty has affected those well beyond the confines of 
academic philosophy: 
So because of impatience and because, as Aristotle was given to point out, 
an individual is self-sufficient in that kind of thinking which involves no 
action, the ideal of a cognitive certainty and truth having no connection 
with practice, and prized because of its lack of connection, developed.  
The doctrine worked out practically so as to strengthen dependence upon 
authority and dogma in the things of highest value, while increase of 
specialized knowledge was relied upon in everyday, especially economic, 
affairs.  Just as belief that a magical ceremony will regulate the growth of 
seeds to full harvest stifles the tendency to investigate natural causes and 
their workings, so acceptance of dogmatic rules as bases of conduct in 
education, morals and social matters, lessens the impetus to find out about 
the conditions which are involved in forming intelligent plans.368 
 
The result can hardly be a surprise for anyone familiar with Dewey’s writings.  Though 
Dewey did not believe that these problems had their origin in philosophy alone, he did 
argue that philosophy’s glorification of the “ideal” of the impractical led to an increased 
stratification of class, the decline of education, and, in general, a world where intelligent 
action (as Dewey defines it) is unlikely to occur very often. 
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 By the same means that philosophy has been so detrimental to moral and social 
issues, however, Dewey believes it has the opportunity to be the means of radical 
improvement in the world of ordinary experience:  “That which may be pretentiously 
unreal when it is formulated in metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely significant 
when connected with the drama of the struggle of social beliefs and ideals.”369  What is 
needed in philosophy is a re-focusing or, as Dewey so frequently put it, a 
“reconstruction.”  Philosophy must turn itself away from the “somewhat barren 
monopoly of dealings with Ultimate and Absolute Reality”370 and bring its powerful tools 
to bear on the risk and uncertainty which are characteristic of human existence.  An 
empirical philosophy will “do justice”371 to the facts of experience, and it will do so by 
embracing the uncertainty and risk from which non-empirical philosophy has fled. 
Empirical philosophy, in short, will have social and economic obligations.  
Dewey’s frequent writing on policy issues was not, as some might imagine, merely an 
attempt to influence public opinion in favor of his own “pet” projects.  Rather, his 
contributions to public dialogue were a necessary part of his pragmatism.  His 
philosophical thinking obliged him to be a part of the world of “ordinary experience,” 
and that world is rife with social and economic problems that require intelligent action.  
Dewey’s work in public forums was an attempt to bring the methods of his pragmatism to 
bear on the facts of ordinary experience, and, as a pragmatist, he was obliged to do no 
less. 
 We have already looked at what it might mean to apply the methods and 
successes of the experimental sciences to other disciplines, including philosophy.  But 
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how will philosophy, which has for so long been fascinated with the fixed and final, 
abandon the task which has preoccupied it since Plato’s time?  What will replace this 
quest, and what role will “certainty” play in it?  Is it possible, then, in Dewey’s 
pragmatism, to have “certainty” of any kind?  Is “certainty” redefined, like so many other 
terms, to have a distinctive meaning in Dewey’s philosophy?  Does Dewey speak of a 
“certainty” that can be achieved in human practice yet is not susceptible to the sort of 
“certainty” which motivates the “quest” Dewey describes as having so many ill-effects? 
 The “reconstructed” philosophy will be one whose study will “render” “a special 
service” to individuals precisely because it will turn away from its old subjects and 
become a study of “life-experience.”372  Dewey describes empirical philosophy as a sort 
of “intellectual disrobing,” and, as noted above, that disrobing represents an important 
parallel to the experimental method.  Instead of noting specifics like temperature and 
pressure in the laboratory environment, however, the “intellectual disrobing” of empirical 
philosophy will ask us to “inspect” our intellectual habits and prejudices.  Philosophy will 
become a “critique of prejudices” where “prejudices” are the “absorbed borrowings” 
which have come to settle in our experience.373  The quest for certainty is one such 
“prejudice,” and it is one that Dewey believes will be abandoned when properly 
“disrobed” and shown for what it is and what it has accomplished (or, as the case may be, 
not accomplished).  If economists treat certainty, uncertainty, and risk as differing 
degrees of probability, traditional philosophical thinking will have had little to do with 
economics:  “Variant philosophies may be looked at as different ways of supplying 
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recipes for denying to the universe the character of contingency which it possesses so 
integrally.”374  The “classic” or non-empirical philosopher cannot stomach contingency. 
 
Probability and the “Reconstructed” Philosophy 
 A reconstructed philosophy, however, would treat certainty, uncertainty, and risk 
very much like economists do.  Questions of “certainty,” “uncertainty,” and “risk” are 
not, as non-empirical philosophers would have us believe, matters of degree in 
knowledge of the immutable.  Instead, they are terms which deal with probability, and 
Dewey argues that a “courageous” philosophy would acknowledge this.  He cites Butler’s 
declaration that “probability is the guide of life,” and adds that philosophers have not, 
traditionally, been “satisfied with anything that is merely probable.”375  Though it goes 
against the history of philosophical inquiry, Dewey encourages his philosophical peers to 
“satisfy” themselves with that which “is merely probable.”  Not only must philosophers 
be satisfied with the probable, they should embrace it in the same way that they had 
formerly attached themselves to certainty and the “fixed and final.”  It may well be the 
case that “philosophy can proffer nothing but hypotheses,”376 but hypotheses, though they 
may be nothing more than conjectures about probability, will nonetheless help “render 
men’s minds more sensitive to life about them….”377  The method and the focus may be 
different, but deriving meaning from our environment was the ambition from which 
philosophy was originally born.  Empirical philosophy is simply a return to that aim and 
the use of hypotheses an update of the methods used to achieve it. 
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 In the place of “certainty,” empirical philosophy will use hypotheses to 
“enlighten” “the moral forces which move mankind” and contribute “to the aspirations of 
men to attain to a more ordered and intelligent happiness.”378  A “more ordered and 
intelligent happiness” is the most “certainty” we can hope for in a world which is 
characterized by uncertainty.  Does this mean that, equipped with the products of 
philosophical activity that we will be able to control everything around us and to 
eradicate the precariousness and instability?  To answer this question in the positive is 
simply to repeat the mistakes of non-empirical philosophers.  Instead, Dewey believes 
that philosophy must become a “method of intelligence,” and it should take part in the 
sorts of activities that define that method:  “The striving to make stability of meaning 
prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort.”379 
We cannot eradicate instability, but we can attempt to derive meaning from our 
existence in such a way that this meaning will improve the probability that we will 
achieve our goals or learn to exercise some control over the hazards in our environment.  
Those hazards and dangerous instability will always remain as a part of human existence, 
but we can hope to reduce the size of that part significantly.  We must always, however, 
remember that the nature of such uncertainty is that new hazards may surprise us at every 
turn. 
 Dewey never speaks of achieving “certainty.”  At best, we can work to “mitigate” 
uncertainty and risk.  This is a task in which philosophy can play an important role, but 
philosophers must have the courage to take up that role: 
Upon the side of wisdom, as human beings interested in good and bad 
things in their connection with human conduct, thinkers are concerned to 
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mitigate the instability of life, to introduce moderation, temper and 
economy, and when worst comes to worst to suggest consolations and 
compensations.  They are concerned with rendering more stable good 
things, and more unstable bad things; they are interested in how changes 
may be turned to account in the consequences to which they contribute.  
The facts of the ongoing, unfinished and ambiguously potential world give 
point and poignancy to the search for absolutes and finalities.380 
 
It might seem surprising that Dewey would begrudge non-empirical philosophers even 
the “point and poignancy” of their search.  But the above description is the sort of quest 
that Dewey feels ought to replace the quest for certainty.  There is no doubt that we 
would prefer “absolutes and finalities,” and, in truth, there is little harm in searching for 
them.  The danger comes when the search consumes us to the point that we miss the other 
products of this search.  Instead of “certainty,” this search can provide “a thing which is 
stably good in quality and hence worth of persistent and continued choice….”381  That is 
a meaningful product and one that is unquestionably the result of reflection and cognitive 
activity.  Too often, however, philosophers have lacked the courage to take the next step:  
“the effort to give [the thing which, upon reflection, is ‘stably good in quality’] some 
such stability in observed existence as it possesses in quality when thought of.”382 
 There is some irony in the fact that “certainty”—or, the next best thing on 
Dewey’s terms, some stability—must be achieved through precisely the opposite course 
which philosophers have traditionally taken.  The only way to effect improved stability in 
an unstable world is to apply the results of reflection (results gathered in the decidedly 
stable and safe environment of cognition and reflection) to the commotion and 
disturbance of that world.  Dewey’s argument is that philosophers can introduce some 
measure of stability into an unstable world and, even when they fail in this respect (as 
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they inevitably will because of the nature of existence), they might still prove themselves 
useful in providing “consolations and compensations” for disappointments.  Again, 
however, this would require that philosophers actually acknowledge disappointments and 
the legitimacy of “ordinary” experience. 
 It is not sufficient to object to Dewey’s account of uncertainty on the grounds that 
Dewey is talking about the precarious nature of everyday existence and most of the 
philosophers he criticized were concerned with a technical matter of rationality.  We 
cannot criticize Dewey by arguing that, like Knight, when he speaks of “uncertainty,” he 
means the fact that we do not know what will happen tomorrow or that we cannot be sure 
of the consequences of our actions.  Other philosophers, the objection might continue, are 
interested in exploring the relationship between belief and knowledge, what it means to 
say that we possess knowledge of something, how we can say of something that we are 
certain about it.  The description of these seemingly different approaches to certainty and 
uncertainty may be accurate, but Dewey has anticipated the objection by arguing that 
these two things describe the same process.  The only difference is that Dewey’s 
pragmatism places an obligation on the philosopher to consider certainty, uncertainty, 
and risk in the context of “ordinary experience” and to evaluate any conclusions in terms 
of their effects on this type of experience.  The non-empirical philosopher feels no such 
obligation and, in fact, rejects the notion that such a test is legitimate.  If we want a 
criterion for knowledge, the non-empirical philosopher argues, “ordinary” experience is 
the last place we will look for it.  Dewey, on the other hand, believes that ordinary 
experience is the only place we will find our criterion. 
 
  207 
Uncertainty, Philosophy, and “Pragmatic Economics” 
 
 Dewey’s understanding of certainty, uncertainty and risk bears some resemblance 
to that of economists.  For Dewey, “certainty” could only ever be a matter of probability, 
and for the economist, the “perfect information” that would guarantee “certainty” is a 
model.  As noted above in Chapter II, few economists would actually argue that, in fact, 
consumers have “perfect information” about every decision they make.  Like other 
economic models and scientific constructs, however, this assumption helps to clarify and 
explain other behavior and assumptions.  Economists do not believe that conditions of 
“certainty” obtain in reality, and, in this respect, Dewey would undoubtedly agree.  For 
an economist, “uncertainty” entails having too little information to determine the 
probability that a given action will lead to a given result.  One can imagine that Dewey 
believes such situations do obtain in reality; that is, situations in which there is too little 
information to determine what the results of a particular action are likely to be.  The 
hazardous nature of the world would suggest that this is the case, but Dewey would 
amend this by saying that the number of such situations could be greatly decreased by 
intelligent action. 
 A “reconstructed” philosophy requires the philosopher to be a part of the world of 
ordinary experience, and Dewey was, therefore, obligated to involve himself in public 
affairs like the Pullman Strike, Jane Addams’ Hull House, the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, the League of Nations, the Trotsky hearings, and so 
many others.  In an address to the Graduate Department of Philosophy at Columbia in 
1947, Dewey outlined his understanding of the work of the philosopher: 
The principal task of philosophy is to get below the turmoil that is 
particularly conspicuous in times of rapid cultural change, to get behind 
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what appears on the surface, to get to the soil in which a given culture has 
its roots.  The business of philosophy is the relation that man has to the 
world in which he lives, as far as both man and the world are affected by 
culture, which is very much more than is usually thought.383 
 
To fault Dewey for the fact of his writing on public policy and his actions in political and 
economic issues is to fault Dewey’s philosophy.  I will do neither, but I will conclude this 
thesis by suggesting that Dewey may not have taken this obligation in the spirit which his 
work on “intelligent action” and the “experimental method” demanded.  In particular, his 
own understanding of and familiarity with economics required him to frame a “pragmatic 
economics.”  Unfortunately, his work in economics was anything but pragmatic on his 
own terms. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND FULFILLMENT 
 
 I will end this thesis where it began:  with questions about the nature of John 
Dewey’s pragmatism and its use of and relationship to economics.  There is, to be sure, 
much more to be said on the subject, but I will attempt in this final chapter simply to 
address the claims I made in my introduction: 
1. According to Dewey, philosophy must concern itself with economics. 
 
2. Those who practice the “scientific” or “experimental” method face the same 
pitfalls that Dewey identifies in the history of “non-empirical” philosophy, 
and that scientists and social scientists have been subject to “the philosophic 
fallacy” in their own work. 
 
3. The “experimental method,” while central to Dewey’s philosophy, is an 
underdeveloped theme in his work.  It is not clear how that method is to be 
applied nor is it clear how it will enable Dewey to meet the challenge of his 
own “test” of philosophy:  Does it render the facts of ordinary experience 
more meaningful? 
 
4. The obligations of Dewey’s pragmatism required him to be more systematic 
with respect to the relationship between philosophy and economics.  
Nonetheless, there is work being done today in experimental economics that 
may stand as an illustration of the sort of empiricism that Dewey advocated 
throughout his work. 
 
Though economists disagree as to whether their discipline is positive or normative and 
whether their own conceptions of “the good life” play a significant role in their work, it is 
clear that a “pragmatic economics” would require its practitioners to “intellectually 
disrobe” and inspect those conceptions. 
Dewey believed that a philosopher could not help the fact that his own prejudices, 
education, and environment played a role in the work that he did.  All that could be hoped 
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for was that this role would be acknowledged and, ideally, understood.  Dewey’s own 
references and interest in economics should, I think, continue to prove useful in 
determining whether Dewey himself took part in this “intellectual disrobing” and 
inspection. 
 
Philosophy and Economics 
The sheer volume of references that can be found in Dewey’s work demonstrates 
conclusively that he was preoccupied with economic issues throughout his life.  These 
references occur not only in Dewey’s denser, more philosophical works such as 
Experience and Nature and Human Nature and Conduct, but also in essays he wrote on 
returning from Japan and China, in lectures he gave regarding education, and in articles 
published in the popular press.384  Moreover, Dewey explicitly tells us that “Philosophy 
which does not take into account the economic enterprise and its human consequences is 
an escapist intellectual gymnastic.”385  I think there is little that is controversial about the 
claim that Dewey believed philosophy must concern itself with economics, and, if such 
controversy exists, a brief reading of the attached appendix will quickly resolve it. 
What is perhaps more interesting about the relationship between philosophy and 
economics is, on Dewey’s view, that economists must concern themselves with 
philosophy.  That is, economists cannot afford the luxury which Lionel Robbins insists 
they have by studying only the “is” and not the “ought.”  Economics and moral matters 
are not disparate, according to Dewey.  It is worth citing Robbins words explicitly, 
though they appear above in Chapter II: 
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The proposition that the price of pork fluctuates with variations in supply 
and demand follows from a conception of the relation to pork to human 
impulses which, in the last resort, is verifiable by introspection and 
observation.  We can ask people whether they are prepared to buy pork 
and how much they are prepared to buy at different prices.  Or we can 
watch how they behave when equipped with currency and exposed to the 
stimuli of the pig-meat markets.  But the proposition that it is wrong that 
pork should be valued, although it is a proposition which has greatly 
influenced the conduct of different races, is a proposition which we cannot 
conceive being verified at all in this manner.386 
 
I would hope that my thesis has definitively shown that, while Dewey never specifically 
responded to Robbins’ in print,387 he would have raised serious objections to this 
statement. 
 First, Robbins insists that questions of “ought” are not to be determined by 
economists.  The economist’s jurisdiction is that of “introspection and observation.”  A 
proposition like “the price of pork fluctuates with variations in supply and demand” can 
be subjected to empirical observation, this observation can be documented and reflected 
upon, and the proposition can be verified or rejected.  This is the business of economists, 
according to Robbins.  The other proposition—“that it is wrong that pork should be 
valued”—is, Robbins acknowledges, significant in its own right and something that 
someone should consider, but that “someone” would not be economists because they are 
unable to evaluate propositions which cannot be verified through “introspection and 
observation.” 
 If we accept Dewey’s methodology and the arguments which support it, we can 
boldly say that this dilemma, of the positive or normative nature of economics, has been 
                                                
386 Robbins (1946), 148.  The emphasis is Robbins’. 
387 Robbins book was first published in the 1920’s and was both influential and controversial among 
economists.  There is no question that Dewey would have had access to it while he was in his sixties and 
that his older brother, Davis, would have been familiar with it.  Thus, the suggestion that he might have 
responded to it in print is not an absurd one. 
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resolved.  Dewey’s pragmatism relies on the experimental method, and this method, 
though it is not identical to the one used in the natural and physical sciences, is built on 
the facts of “ordinary” experience as they are constantly observed (by philosophers, 
economists, or biologists).  The “logic” of the experimental method which Dewey so 
admires is that it finds both its impetus and its termination in “ordinary” experience.  The 
only way to determine moral claims, from a pragmatic perspective, is to observe that 
which occurs in fact, reflect upon it, and test the products of this reflection in practice.  
Whether this method can work in philosophy is a question I have raised in Chapters VI 
and VII, and I will take it up again in the third section of this chapter.  The point at 
present, however, is that if we accept Dewey’s claims about the power of the “laboratory 
habit of mind” when applied in moral theory, Robbins must be wrong:  the “ought” 
proposition can be verified in the same manner that economists verify the “is” 
proposition. 
Economists, as much as philosophers, are obligated to consider both the 
proposition that “the price of pork fluctuates with variations in supply and demand” and 
“the proposition that it is wrong that pork should be valued.”  Robbins claims that the 
verification of the “is” proposition occurs through observation:  “We can ask people 
whether they are prepared to buy pork and how much they are prepared to buy at 
different prices.  Or we can watch how they behave when equipped with currency and 
exposed to the stimuli of the pig-meat markets.”  Dewey would undoubtedly respond by 
noting that, while we might ask someone how he or she might behave under hypothetical 
circumstances, we must still test any hypothesis against their behavior in fact.  And, 
while we might watch how people behave in fact, we must endeavor to remember that 
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their behavior is the dynamic result of a complicated process that begins with instinct and 
is shaped by culture from the moment of conception (according to Dewey).  Economists 
forget this at the risk of theorizing that human behavior can be reduced to a few simple 
motives and desires.  Human behavior cannot be reduced to a few simple motives and 
desires, and a pragmatic economics would acknowledge this fact. 
In the same way that a philosophy “which does not take into account the 
economic enterprise and its human consequences” would be “an escapist intellectual 
gymnastic,” an economics which does not take into account the complex facts of human 
behavior and activity would be similarly “un-pragmatic.”  The sort of economics that 
Robbins describes is no more useful in “rendering the facts of ordinary experience more 
meaningful” than is a philosophy which ignores the facts of ordinary experience in favor 
of a “fixed and final Reality.”  Instead of attempting, perhaps arbitrarily, to reduce the 
facts of human behavior and action to a few simple motives and desires, the pragmatic 
economist will understand an individual’s preferences as things which are in flux as the 
individual moves through different environments and attempt (as all biological beings do) 
to navigate the disturbances of daily life.  For the economist, preferences are “given” and 
any further discussion of preference must occur outside the realm of economic theory.  
For the pragmatic economist, preferences are dynamic, and any further analysis which 
involves preference must be conducted with this in mind.  This analysis must also be 
conducted within the province of economics if economics is to contribute to making the 
“facts of ordinary life more meaningful.” 
Thus, a pragmatic economics should be able to address the proposition “that it is 
wrong that pork should be valued.”  This is not meant to imply that a pragmatic 
  214 
economist should be able to confirm or deny that pork should not be valued.  But it is 
clear, from Dewey’s remarks on philosophy as well as economics, that the philosopher 
and the economist should both have something meaningful to say about this proposition.  
Robbins believes that the economist must be silent on this issue, yet Dewey would argue 
that both the economist and the philosopher are obligated, by the nature of their 
disciplines, to address this proposition.  The economist, like the philosopher, should be 
able to speak intelligently about what people should or should not do.  Again, this does 
not mean that the economist is obligated to tell people that they are wrong to purchase or 
to not purchase pork on moral grounds.  However, the economist should attempt to look 
at human behavior as something more than utility maximization or “rational” action.  If 
Dewey is right, the sort of observation scientists engage in will aid the economist in 
achieving a better understanding of the reasons why people do or do not value pork. 
According to Dewey, that sort of improved understanding should be important to those 
who study economics.  Likewise, that sort of understanding should be important to those 
who consider themselves philosophers. 
Like philosophers, economists are obliged to engage in “intellectual disrobing.”  
Intelligent “furthering of culture,” according to Dewey, requires the philosopher or 
economist or biologist to “divest” himself, at least temporarily, of “the intellectual habits 
we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of our own time and place.”388  
Economists are welcome to debate whether or not their own conceptions of the “good 
life” and human fulfillment play a role in the work they do as economists, but for Dewey 
this debate is one whose outcome has been predetermined.  There is simply no question 
that these conceptions affect the professional work of economists as they affect every 
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aspect of human life.  The key to intelligent action is not dissociating these conceptions 
from professional work or adopting a value “neutral” economics.  Instead, Dewey argues 
that intelligent action requires the economist to acknowledge the influences and habits 
which play in important role in the work that he does. 
If economics is at all concerned with “human nature,” then philosophy must also 
be concerned with economics.  It is not coincidental that some of Dewey’s most detailed 
discussions about the business and activity of economics and economists appear in his 
writing on human nature.  In the same way that human nature cannot be understood 
without reference to habit, an understanding of economics must include attention to the 
habits of human activity.  Again, a “pragmatic” economics would be one based on a 
realistic understanding of human nature, not on an understanding of human nature as 
something which must be subjugated.  Even if the economist believes that men, by native 
instinct, have a desire to accumulate wealth or possessions, Dewey will argue that the 
force of habit will play a significant role in any economic institution or arrangements.  
Thus, it is specious for any economist or any economic theory to claim that a particular 
set of institutional arrangements are, by nature, necessary. 
Philosophers, according to Dewey, have traditionally used theories of the 
intransigence of human nature to rationalize existing social and economic institutions, 
and economists have been similarly affected by such theories.  A pragmatic economics 
would take a broader view of human nature; specifically, that view would be open to the 
possibility (as Dewey describes it) of “changing human nature.”  As Dewey described 
“current economic psychology” in Human Nature and Conduct, it had reduced all human 
behavior to motives of “personal gain.”  In a like (and not unrelated) manner, 
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philosophers had long argued in favor of a notion of human nature as something that 
consisted of nothing more than a set of natural, static instincts. Philosophers and 
economists alike, according to Dewey, should address themselves to a reconstruction of 
their notions of human nature.  This reconstruction would require both groups to 
acknowledge the relatively strong influence of habit over such instincts, and, at the same 
time, this reconstruction would acknowledge the difficulty of isolating such instincts in 
an environment that is, from birth, subject to many influences. 
 
Non-Empirical Social Science 
 Philosophers are not the only ones who have to worry about the dangers of 
prolonged reflection.  Though Dewey calls the tendency to mistake consequents 
(reflection and secondary experience) as antecedents “the philosophic fallacy,” I think 
this is itself a mistake, and I think Dewey recognized this late in his life.  If the act of 
reflection or “cognitive experience” carries with it the danger that turning away from 
ordinary experience will be so satisfying that one is unwilling to return to the facts of 
ordinary experience, this is no less a problem for theoreticians in economics, physics, 
sociology, and psychology than it is for philosophers.  To be sure, Dewey was probably 
most comfortable criticizing philosophers because he was himself a professional 
philosopher, but those who practice the “scientific method” are human, and to be human 
is to wish to escape the contingent and hazardous character of existence.  Philosophers 
may have been more explicit in their attempts to find transcendent truth and thus “escape 
from peril,” but novelists, physicists, and economists are motivated by the same desire.  
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The economist’s attempts to “separate and isolate the economic from the moral and 
political”389 reflect this desire. 
 The business of moral and political life is a messy one, and, despite attempts by 
brilliant thinkers to systematize these aspects of life, the fact remains that ordinary 
experience continues to be hazardous and uncertain.  The problem that Dewey identifies 
in his criticism of philosophers’ “quest for certainty” is one which plagues theorizing in 
general.  Any activity which attempts to find order in an inherently disorderly world will, 
at some point, come into conflict with ordinary experience.  The nature of an economic 
model, as noted in Chapter II above, is that it does not always resemble the “real world” 
and may, in fact, seem ludicrous to non-economists because it has so little resemblance to 
the facts of ordinary experience.  One way to counteract this problem is to call it to the 
attention of those who engage in “cognitive” activity so that they are aware of it and note 
it wherever possible. 
 Another way to respond to the dangers of theorizing is to demand of those who 
engage in it that they test their results in the arena which first prompted their attempts at 
“problem solving.”  This can be done by virtue of the “experimental method,” according 
to Dewey.  I will leave aside, for the moment, the problem of how, precisely, the 
experimental method is to be applied in philosophy, and I will stipulate that Dewey’s 
claims regarding this method are accurate and that the progress he foresees in 
traditionally “non-empirical” fields will, in fact, be achieved.  Even with that stipulation, 
however, I wonder whether Dewey’s conviction, that the empirical method must be 
“naturalized” or brought to bear on all fields, is right. 
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 Surely, there has been progress in economics recently because of the use of the 
experimental method, and I will say more about that in the next section of this chapter.  
But the fact that this progress has occurred and, that in many respects, economists have 
proven themselves increasingly better at providing the “means of control, of enlarged use 
and enjoyment of things,”390 does not mean that economists (or philosophers, for that 
matter) were previously wholly unsuccessful in this respect.  Dewey himself recognized 
the importance of using the “evolutionary” or “historical” method in moral theory.  Moral 
progress will not be had by a complete break with the history of moral conduct, and, even 
if we envisioned such a break as necessary for progress, Dewey reminds us that the force 
of habit and the “lag” in human behavior is tremendous. 
 In the same manner, we must acknowledge that “better” “objects”391 and 
intelligent action do not appear from thin air, unaccompanied by a history of inquiry.  
The work of experimental scientists was, in at least some respects, the product of the 
work non-experimental scientists.  Similarly, the work of an “empirical” philosopher like 
Dewey is possible, at least in part, because of the work of people like Aristotle, Kant, and 
Hegel.  The work of Vernon Smith, an experimental economist, is, at least in part, 
possible because of the work of non-experimental economists like Lionel Robbins. 
I will not disagree with Dewey when he says that “cultivated common sense” 
looks “askance at philosophy” because “so many philosophies” have terminated “in 
conclusions that make it necessary to disparage and condemn primary experience.”392  I 
have no doubt that “cultivated common sense” does look askance at much current work 
in philosophy, in the same way, undoubtedly, that men of “cultivated common sense” 
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hundreds of years ago had little interest in debates about how many angels might fit on 
the head of a pin.  But I am not entirely comfortable with the notion that “cultivated 
common sense” should be the final test of the value of a philosophy or of a science.  If 
cultivated common sense were applied to the principles and theorems of quantum physics 
and funding for research in quantum physics were dependent on the approval of common 
sense, I fear that there would be little left of the field. 
Do the products of a theoretical study improve the course of human life and do 
they help us to exercise control over that which is unstable in life?  This is, I grant, a fine 
test of the products of reflection and certainly a useful way in which to judge the value of 
a given study.  If philosophy cannot produce anything which helps us to exercise control 
over some of the instability in our lives, then there is no question that it will eventually 
fade into complete irrelevance.  However, I wonder if it is always immediately clear 
which products of reflection will be useful in making the things of ordinary experience 
more “fruitful.”  The fact that the conclusions of a study or experiment do not solve the 
problem they were intended to solve does not mean that these conclusions are useless, 
will always be useless, or that they will be useless in every field. 
In short, as Dewey himself recognized “Philosophy, like all forms of reflective 
analysis, takes us away, for the time being, from the things had in primary experience as 
they directly act and are acted upon, used and enjoyed.”393 Dewey’s claim is that 
philosophy, unlike other forms of reflective analysis, never makes the “return journey” to 
the facts of primary experience.  This claim is based, in large part, on the fact that other 
forms of “reflective analysis” employ the experimental method in order to ensure that the 
“return journey” occurs.  The reconstruction of philosophy Dewey called for is dependent 
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on our ability to use the “experimental method” in traditionally non-empirical fields like 
philosophy.  And, thus, we have returned to the problem of the application of the 
experimental method in philosophy (and the non-physical and natural sciences). 
 
The Application of the Experimental Method 
As I have already noted, I think that Dewey’s development of the experimental 
method as a philosophical principle is an important contribution to pragmatism.  It is one 
of the central features of his philosophy, and he refers to it throughout the middle and 
later works with consistency.  What he does not do, however, is provide enough specific 
examples of how this method might operate in philosophy or, for that matter, other fields 
that he considered “non-empirical.”  And this, I think, is a serious problem.  If the 
experimental method is central to our understanding of Dewey’s pragmatism and his 
criticisms of the history of philosophy are based on its “non-empirical” nature, the 
success of his philosophy is, I believe, ultimately dependent on his ability to show that 
the experimental method will pass his “first-rate test of the value of any philosophy”394 
where others have failed.  The use of the experimental method in philosophy, whatever 
that entails, must “render” our “ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments” “more 
significant, more luminous” and “make our dealings with them more fruitful.” 
Dewey must realize that the use of the experimental method, though standard in 
the natural and physical sciences, will not come naturally to philosophy.  His criticism of 
the history of philosophy is based on his conviction that philosophers have been 
unwilling to use the experimental method and have repeatedly sought to avoid trials of 
their conclusions in “ordinary experience.”  Thus, he must see that the use of the 
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experimental method in philosophy will be a “tough sell.”  If so, why would he then fail 
to provide more specific examples of precisely how this method will operate on 
traditional philosophical problems?  With the exception of Experience and Nature, his 
examples are few and far between, and, when they exist, they are hardly very specific or 
concrete. 
Even if we grant that Experience and Nature provides the best set of specific 
examples of the experimental method brought to bear on the perennial problems of 
philosophy, there are those who will dispute that there is anything “experimental” about 
that work.  Most notably, of course, Richard Rorty has challenged Dewey’s claim that his 
method in Experience and Nature “differs no whit from that of any investigator who, by 
making certain observations and experiments, and by utilizing the existing body of ideas 
available for calculation and interpretation, concludes that he really succeeds in finding 
out something about some limited aspect of nature.”395  As Rorty notes, “…two 
generations of commentators have been puzzled to say what method might produce ‘a 
statement of the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to 
their differentiation into mental and physical’ while differing ‘no whit’ from that 
employed by the laboratory scientist.”396 
A more generous reading would be that Dewey provides a detailed account of the 
experimental method in the sense that he identifies those traits in scientific work and 
reasoning that illustrate the “logic” necessary to employ experimentalism in philosophy.  
Among those traits are “genetic” accounts of phenomena, the ability and information 
necessary for others to repeat and verify results, isolation and abstraction of phenomena, 
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a bridge of the gap between general statements and particular events, and, finally, an 
insight into the continuity of the process of inquiry.  Though it might still be objected that 
this account of the experimental method is not terribly specific, this would at least meet 
part of Rorty’s objection.  One must, of course, regret Dewey’s claim that this method 
differs “no whit” from that of the laboratory scientist since, elsewhere, he is clear that the 
experimental method provides the “logic” necessary to make philosophy empirical, and 
he does not indicate that he expects philosophers to do exactly what laboratory scientists 
do. 
But even this more generous reading, that Dewey does give a detailed account of 
what the experimental method entails, will not save him from the objection that there are 
few clues to demonstrate precisely how this method will be applied.  To speak in general 
or even specific terms about the experimental method is not the same as providing 
concrete, clear examples of that method in action in philosophy.  That Dewey does not 
provide such examples is, I fear, a problem that throws the success of his philosophy into 
question.  Moreover, it seems clear that Dewey realized there was little hope for an 
empirical philosophy in his lifetime, but he did see the potential for the experimental 
method in other disciplines. And I find it odd that, given his reliance on matters of 
economic concern in his philosophy and his knowledge of political economy, he would 
not have turned to practical examples of how the experimental method might operate in 
economics. 
In 2002, just a day before he was told he had been awarded the Nobel Prize in 
economics, Vernon Smith and I discussed John Dewey.  Though Smith was somewhat 
familiar with Dewey’s work and certainly knew him by reputation, he was surprised to 
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learn that Dewey advocated the use of the experimental method in economics or 
philosophy.397  When I suggested to Smith and his colleagues at the Interdisciplinary 
Center for Economic Science at George Mason that Dewey might have anticipated their 
research and that the connection could be useful for their attempts to improve 
interdisciplinary work in economics, they all nodded and smiled at me.  As if to justify 
the lack of enthusiasm in their response to me, Smith explained that “lots of people” have 
“talked’ about experimentalism in economics, but few have done anything about it. 
It should be noted that Smith is truly an interdisciplinary scholar, and, in addition 
to his interests and research in anthropology, sociology, and biology, he has looked more 
carefully at Dewey’s work since the conversation I have described.  The point of this 
anecdote, however, is not to give credit to Smith’s broad interests or to glorify the work 
of an economist who has been praised by far more interesting and authoritative thinkers 
than me.  What is interesting about this exchange is that Smith was undoubtedly right, 
and it seems a terrible shame:  ‘lots of people,’ Dewey not least among them, may have 
considered the possibility that the experimental method would lead to important progress 
in economics.  I suspect, however, that few of these other people had spent as much time 
and effort as Dewey did thinking and writing about this possibility.  Sadly, however, 
there is, as Smith pointed out, little to suggest that his work had any influence whatsoever 
on the development of experimental economics. 
I would not presume to condemn Dewey’s work because it did not directly lead to 
an important development that could later be connected to it by an observer.  That would 
be absurd, and I suspect there would be no end to such things because Dewey was a 
philosopher with many interests and many outlets for his interests.  But I do believe that, 
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had Dewey provided more specific examples of how the experimental method might be 
applied to philosophy or to economics or to other fields, his critics might have been able 
to respond more clearly to his work.  Though Dewey might never have convinced his 
critics that he was right, the ensuing conversation and exchanges might have provided the 
impetus for the earlier development of experimental economics and, one might even 
hope, experimental philosophy.  Though Dewey’s influence in social and educational 
issues cannot be doubted, his influence in professional philosophy most certainly has 
been doubted.  There may be many reasons that his work was not as influential as it 
might have been in professional philosophy, but primary among those must be that he 
was not pragmatic enough in his writing and in his lectures.  His philosophy, I am afraid, 
may not have been able to pass the very test he set for it. 
 
Dewey and “Pragmatic Economics” 
Since I have attempted to criticize Dewey because he was not pragmatic enough, 
it is only fair that I should be held to the same standard.  What could it mean to speak of a 
pragmatic economics?  What, specifically, might Dewey have meant by the application of 
the experimental method to a traditionally “non-empirical” field?  As I have noted above, 
I believe the work of experimental economists is the closest example we may have to 
Dewey’s philosophy in practice.  Thus, to provide an example of what it would mean to 
speak of a pragmatic economics, I will rely on the work of Vernon Smith who is widely 
recognized as a pioneer of experimental economics. 
In an important article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Smith outlines 
seven reasons that economists should conduct experiments: 
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1. To test a theory, or discriminate between theories 
2. To explore the causes of a theory’s failure 
3. To establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory 
4. To compare environments 
5. To compare institutions 
6. To evaluate policy proposals 
7. To use the laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design.398 
 
Note the similarities between Smith’s justification for bringing the “laboratory habit of 
mind” to economics and Dewey’s claims about the value of experimentalism in 
traditional non-empirical fields. 
 First, Smith believes that economists should employ the experimental method in 
order to test and evaluate various economic theories.  In addition, experimentation in 
economics will help explain why a particularly theory failed.  Dewey’s test for 
philosophy is whether or not it renders our ordinary life-experiences more significant and 
more meaningful.  Smith argues that the conclusions of economics theories should be 
tested against “experimental observations.”  Using the conclusions of economic theory, 
economists must test the predictions based on these conclusions against empirical 
observations of human behavior.  Quite simply, “the greater the frequency with which the 
observations hit these ‘predictions,’ in the context of a design in which hits are unlikely 
to occur by chance, the better the theory.”399  In fact, Smith’s work in experimental 
economics has demonstrated that a number of the assumptions traditionally made by 
game theorists do not, in fact, hold true in empirical testing.  Dewey would undoubtedly 
have suggested the same criteria for evaluating economic or philosophical theory:  both 
the economist and the philosopher are trying to establish validity,400 and this can only be 
accomplished by testing theories and assumptions again empirical evidence.  Theory 
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alone cannot demonstrate a theory’s failure; thus, in addition to evaluating theories, 
experimentation is necessary to determine why theories fail. 
 Dewey criticized economists (and theorists more generally) for attempting to 
reduce the explanation of human behavior to a few simple assumptions. As if to confirm 
this criticism, Smith recognizes that “Microeconomic theory tends to build upon 
simplifying assumptions, and to eschew attempts to model many of the complex trading 
and contracting institutions that we observe.”401  In short, non-empirical theory is not 
equipped to deal with the complexities of human behavior, but laboratory observation is 
so equipped: 
But in the laboratory, especially with computerization, institutions with 
complex trading rules are as easy to study as are simple single unit 
auctions.  This makes it possible to range beyond the confines of current 
theory to establish empirical regularities which can enable theorists to see 
in advance what are the difficult problems on which it is worth their while 
to work.402 
 
Neither Smith nor Dewey believes that theory should be abandoned or that it is not 
worthwhile to engage in theorizing.  But one of the values of experimentation is that it 
may provide direction for further theorizing and make the work of the theorist more 
efficient (albeit non-empirical). 
 Vernon Smith’s experimentation in economics has produced results which are 
remarkable in the degree to which they differ from traditional non-empirical economic 
theory.  One of the results of his experimentation is that “economic agents can achieve 
efficient outcomes which are not part of their intention….”403  As smith notes, this was 
the conclusion of another important thinker named Smith:  Adam Smith.  Yet this 
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conclusion was largely treated as “just one more theory” by most professional economists 
until the middle of the twentieth century.  The empirical work done by Vernon Smith and 
other experimental economists has demonstrated that this particular theory articulates an 
important aspect of human behavior.  This is a theory which is valid because it obtains in 
reality, and, unlike the frustrating nature of many economic models, even the most 
uninformed observer can examine Vernon Smith’s results to determine that Adam 
Smith’s conclusions provide valuable insights into human behavior.  This is no longer a 
theory that must be accepted on faith or anecdotal evidence, and, through their work in 
the laboratory, the experimentalists have returned the objects of reflection to primary 
experience. 
 Vernon Smith’s work has also provided insight into notions of fairness and 
unfairness,404 and he has also reflected on the nature of methodology in economics and 
the nature of experimentation.405  Fairness, unfairness, methodology of social science, the 
nature of science:  these are all issues which have occupied the attention of philosophers 
for hundreds (if not thousands) of years.  Dewey, in particular, was interested in these 
issues, and he was frustrated by the lack of progress in philosophical investigation in 
these matters.  He advocated the adoption of “the laboratory habit of mind” in 
philosophy, and he repeatedly called for philosophy to become an empirical discipline.  
He further argued that traditionally non-empirical fields would benefit by the use of 
experimentation. 
 I believe the work of Vernon Smith demonstrates conclusively that Dewey was 
right about this last claim. Without question, Smith’s experiments have forced game 
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theorists and other economists to reconsider their conclusions.  There is no question in 
my mind that if Dewey were alive today, he would point to Smith’s work as a testament 
to the value of experimentation in a traditionally non-empirical field.  He would, I 
believe, have called Smith’s work “pragmatic economics.”  I am just as confident that he 
would have been unsettled by the results of much of Smith’s work because these results 
are often in sharp contrast to Dewey’s own conclusions about human nature and rational 
behavior.  In other cases, Smith’s findings support Dewey’s claims.  But, if Dewey took 
seriously the notion that philosophers must attempt to become more empirical in their 
work and to follow the “intelligent method” (i.e., they must become pragmatists), he 
would be forced to adapt his own thinking to accommodate Smith’s findings. He could 
not, on the one hand, laud the practice of assessing the results of reflection in “common” 
experience and, on the other hand, dismiss the products of this practice when he did not 
like them.  To do so would be to fall victim to the same sort of mistake for which he 
criticized so many other philosophers. 
 While Dewey might have been surprised by many of Smith’s findings, he would 
not have been surprised by the skeptical reception Smith’s work has often received from 
other economists.  Although Smith is a Nobel laureate, there have been many (including 
other Nobel laureates) who have questioned the legitimacy of employing the 
experimental method in economics.406  Like philosophy, economics is a field that has 
long shunned the use of experimentation or empirical observation.  Unlike philosophers, 
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however, economists have slowly been forced to accept the fact that their 
experimentalism has an important role in the study of economics.  Perhaps one of the 
reasons that philosophers have been slow to accept a similar conclusion about their own 
discipline is that Dewey, the main proponent of experimentalism in philosophy, never 
actually entered the laboratory as Smith did.  Smith devised and conducted experiments, 
and he published his results, despite the ridicule he often received from those in his 
profession.  He reflected on the nature of experimentalism in economics, and he detailed 
how the results of these experiments made the work of economists more accurate and 
meaningful.  Ironically, Dewey spent a great deal of time reflecting on the value of 
experimentalism in philosophy and he claimed that it would make the work of 
philosophers more meaningful, but I have argued that he never devised or conducted the 
experiments that might have given this claim adequate support.  Whether this is because 
it is impossible to devise and conduct such experiments or because Dewey never realized 
the value of doing so, the result is, unfortunately, the same:  philosophers have largely 
ignored Dewey’s call for “empirical philosophy.” 
 
Conclusion:  Human Development and Fulfillment 
 Again, it would be ridiculous to criticize Dewey for not anticipating the work that 
Vernon Smith would later undertake in economics.  Had Dewey been thoroughgoing in 
his attempts to develop and conduct experiments in philosophy, it is quite likely that 
Smith would have had more familiarity with Dewey’s work because of its relation to his 
own.  It is doubtful, however, that such familiarity with Dewey and a subsequent reliance 
on his arguments regarding the value of experimentation would have made Smith’s work 
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any more legitimate in the eyes of other economists.  It is just as unlikely that Smith’s 
work would have served to convince philosophers that Dewey’s work demanded further 
attention.  The fact that there has been little or no scholarly research that has compared 
and combined Dewey’s work with Vernon Smith’s is indeed regrettable, but it is also 
something that can be corrected.  This dissertation is, in part, an attempt to begin the 
correction. 
 While Dewey cannot be criticized for failing to anticipate Smith’s work, he 
certainly can and should be criticized for failing to meet the obligations of his own 
evaluative criteria.  Throughout his work, Dewey was interested in economic life and the 
day-to-day economic conditions of the common man.  He refers to many of the 
difficulties of economic life throughout his work.  Being “subject to the whims of a 
foreman or to impersonal authority” is, for the laborer, detrimental to his “self-
respect.”407  Work in modern industry, according to Dewey, is dehumanizing for many 
who must do it:  “Under a régime of highly centralized finance and industry, the mass of 
individuals, who are subordinates, tend to become cogs in a vast machine whose 
workings they do not understand, and in whose management they have no part or lot.”408  
In 1935, Dewey decried the fact that “millions have no work, no security and no 
opportunity either to produce or to enjoy what is produced.”409  He attributed this 
situation to an unwillingness to treat “intelligence, skill and character” as social goods, 
and, throughout his work, he identified this unwillingness with various social, political, 
                                                
407 LW7, 391. 
408 LW11, 252 (From an essay entitled “Freedom” that was first published in the National Education 
Association’s Implications of Social-Economic Goals for Education:  A Report of the Committee on the 
Social-Economic Goals of America). 
409 Ibid., 159 (From a speech broadcast on January 16, 1935 in New York City). 
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and philosophical developments.  As I have noted above, Aristotle was complicit in this 
problem because of his view of human nature and the notion of “natural slavery.” 
 There can be no complaint that Dewey was not concerned about the economic 
conditions of ordinary experience.  From the numbing effects of the repetition inherent in 
many contemporary factory jobs to the destruction of family units to the demise of 
meaningful individualism, John Dewey made every effort to document the economic 
problems that plagued the average human being.  For this, he should be commended 
since, as he noted, philosophers had not historically been as attentive to such things as 
they might (or should) have been.  In this respect, Dewey was unquestionably a 
pragmatist. 
 But in other respects, Dewey was himself insufficiently Deweyan.  He praised the 
experimental method and its ability to make ordinary experience more “fruitful” and 
“luminous.”  Yet clues as to how this method will be used by philosophers to correct the 
evils of modern economic life are few and far between in the thirty seven volumes of 
Dewey’s collected works.  Dewey commiserated the fact that “cultivated common sense” 
would always “look askance at philosophy” because it had become too remote from 
everyday experience.  He understood that modern life brought with it many challenges, 
often economic, and that human development and fulfillment were constantly in danger 
of being stunted by the dulling tendencies of a commercial culture.  Surely, “cultivated 
common sense” would welcome nothing more than prescriptions for remedying this 
situation, and Dewey’s claims about the nature of experimentation and the “intelligent 
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method” should have held great promise for rescuing philosophy from its “remoteness 
from the concerns of daily life.”410 
 Dewey was, however, unsuccessful on this count, and the sad irony is that he was 
unsuccessful precisely because he failed to follow his own methodology.  He understood 
the value of the experimental method and he conveyed, in great detail, its potential for 
constructing “freer and more secure goods.”411  But he never provided the same degree of 
detail when suggesting exactly how the “intelligent method” would be utilized by 
philosophers in order to bring about all of these very desirable consequences.  In 
speaking of his “reconstruction” of philosophy and comparing the improved empirical 
philosophy to the non-empirical philosophy of tradition, Dewey wrote: 
Carelessness and routine, Olympian aloofness, secluded contemplation are 
themselves choices.  To claim that intelligence is a better method than its 
alternatives, authority, imitation, caprice and ignorance, prejudice and 
passion, is hardly an excessive claim.  These procedures have been tried 
and have worked their will.  The result is not such as to make it clear that 
the method of intelligence, the use of science in criticizing and re-creating 
the casual goods of nature into intentional and conclusive goods of art, the 
union of knowledge and values in production, is not worth trying.  There 
may be those to whom it is treason to think of philosophy as the critical 
method of developing methods of criticism. But this conception of 
philosophy also waits to be tried, and the trail which shall approve or 
condemn lies in the eventual issue.412 
 
The conception is, as yet, untried in philosophy, and this is regrettable both for the 
discipline and for Dewey’s legacy. 
 
 
 
                                                
410 LW1, 18. 
411 Ibid., 325. 
412 Ibid., 326. 
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Appendix: 
 
 
 
A Catalogue of References to “economics” 
 
 
 
Ethics – 1908 (MW5) 
 
29 “The Kinship and Family Groups are also Economic and Industrial Units” 
 
77 In a chapter entitled “Sociological Agencies in the Transition,” section I, entitled 
“Economic Forces”:  “The action of economic forces in breaking up the early 
kinship group or joint family may be noticed in the history of many people.  The 
clan flourishes in such conditions of hunting life or of simple agriculture as were 
found among Australians and Indians, or among the Celts in Ireland and the 
Scottish Highlands.  It cannot survive when a more advanced state of agriculture 
prevails.” 
 
78 “But we get a broader view of economic influences if we consider the methods of 
organizing industry which have successively prevailed.  In early society, and 
likewise in the earlier period of modern civilization, the family was a great 
economic unit.  Many or most of the industries could be advantageously carried 
on in the household. 
 
112 Though no explicit reference to “economics,” a chapter entitled “Commercial and 
Political Individualism” discusses the relationship of the Greeks to commercial 
interest. 
 
178 In a chapter entitled “Moral Differentiation and the Social Order”:  “Two 
processes went on side by side in the movement we have traced. (I)  The primitive 
group, which was at once a kinship or family, an economic, a political, a 
religious, an educational, and a moral unit, was broken down and replaced by 
several distinct institutions, each with its own special character.” 
 
“The Family.—When the family was largely determined by status, when it was an 
economic, a political, and a religious unit, it had a strong support.” 
 
179 “For while savages have often practiced infanticide for economic reasons, it is 
doubtful if any savage family ever equaled the more refined selfishness and 
cruelty of the child labor which modern families have furnished and modern 
society has permitted.” 
179- 
180 “The Economic and Industrial.—The economic lost powerful restraints when it 
became a separate activity divorced from family, religious, and, in the view of 
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some, from moral considerations.  It has worked out certain important moral 
necessities of its own.  Honesty, the keeping of contracts, the steadiness and 
continuity of character fostered by economic relations, are important 
contributions.  Modern business, for example, is the most effective agency in 
securing sobriety.  It is far more efficient than ‘temperance societies.’  Other 
values of the economic and industrial process—the increase of production, the 
interchange of services and goods, the new means of happiness afforded by the 
increase of wealth—are obvious.  On the other hand, the honesty required by 
business is a most technical and peculiarly limited sort.” 
 
180 “The maxim ‘Business is business’ may be made the sanction for any kind of 
conduct not excluded by commercial standards.  Unless there is a constant 
injection of moral valuation and control, there is a tendency to subvert all other 
ends and standards to the purely economic.” 
 
181 “The Religious Life.—When freed from interdependence with kinship, economic, 
and political association, religion has an opportunity to become more personal and 
more universal.  When a man’s religious attitude is not fixed by birth, when 
worship is not so closely bound up with economic interests, when there is not 
only religious ‘toleration,’ but religious liberty, the significance of religion as a 
personal, spiritual relation comes to view.  The kinship tie is sublimated into a 
conception of divine fatherhood.” 
 
 
 
Contributions to Cyclopedia of Education_(MW6) 
 
“Altruism and Egoism” 
 
367 “By the latter part of the eighteenth century this type [Hobbes’] of moral 
philosophy was elaborated to a point where it became the psychological 
foundation for the economic theory of Adam Smith and the utilitarianism of 
Jeremy Bentham-the two most influential doctrines of the time.  Adam Smith 
made sympathy the basis of ethics and intelligent self-interest the basis of 
economics, and bent his energies to proving that if intelligent self-love, or the 
reasonable desire for personal comfort and profit, were left free from arbitrary 
political regulations, it naturally brought men together in natural agreement 
(contracts) so that each man, in serving himself, served his fellow.  In this way, 
under the guidance of the ‘invisible hand’ of Providence, men in seeking their 
own interests promoted unconsciously the welfare of society as a whole even 
more efficaciously than if they had sought to do so from motives of conscious 
philanthropy.” 
367- 
368 “Jeremy Bentham furnished the natural pendant to this doctrine.  Without 
committing himself upon the psychological question of whether sympathy is as 
innate as self-love, he held that the sole moral criterion is the tendency of acts to 
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promote universal happiness, so that benevolence is the ultimate virtue.  He also 
held that men’s need for the approval, esteem, and aid of others is so great that 
ultimately the dictates of universal benevolence and of intelligent self-love 
coincide.  In promoting the happiness of all, the individual is taking the best 
means to secure his own greatest happiness, and vice versa.  Thus Bentham’s 
moral doctrine effectively supplemented the economic theory of Smith.” 
 
 
 
“Vocational Education in the Light of the World War” (MW11) 
 
62 Dewey is suggesting possible uses for the “large cantonments and buildings and 
various resources” left unused from the first World War:  “Now upon this 
physical basis that we have spent millions of dollars securing, an education should 
be built which comprises the four essentials of preparation for a vocation, namely:  
Physique, economic efficiency, social competency and a trained capacity for the 
consumption and for the employment of labor.  A thorough-going solution of the 
economic and industrial problem from the labor point of view in this country is a 
national scheme of socialized education applying to the youth between the older 
ages, just as we have already made our more elementary system universal and 
conscriptive.” 
 
63 “By the second element, economic efficiency, I mean industrial training in its 
stricter sense.  The plan that we already have, can, if imaginatively and wisely 
used, be made the basis for instruction in agriculture, various kinds of farming, 
various forms of productive industry, manufacturing distribution, household 
management of different forms.  The aims should not, of course, be immediate, 
highly-specialized efficiency that is so immediate and so specialized as to limit 
future growth or to predestine individuals to occupy simply a particular niche.  It 
should be aimed, rather, at a discovery of personal aptitude to practice familiarly 
with fundamental processes of industry and should be devoted to the development 
of as much initiative, as much variety, as is possible.”  Dewey continues after this 
for several pages on the importance of vocational training for industry. 
 
 
 
“America in the World” (MW11) 
 
70 A piece on the fact that, on Washington’s birthday (Feb. 22, 1918), the United 
States is debating entering the war:  “While once there was enough to do in 
conquering a wilderness, we have now come to the end of the pioneer period, and 
have a margin of energy to draw upon.¶  The change has, of course, been brought 
about by that same development of industry and commerce which has annihilated 
distance, drawn all peoples into closer relations, and made the affairs and interest 
of one nation the concern of all, for weal or for woe.  The fact that the 
interdependence which the new industry and the new methods of transportation 
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and intercommunication have brought about should first reveal itself in strains 
and alignments for conflict does not alter the essential fact that the world for the 
first time now finds itself a round world, politically and economically as well as 
astronomically.” 
 
71 “Of late we have been afflicted with national bashfulness, with a shy self-
consciousness as to noting even that there is an American idea, lest we be guilty 
of spread-eagleism.  We have assumed a self-depreciatory, almost apologetic, 
attitude towards the rest of the world.  But unless our contribution to the present 
world stuggle is to be confined to military and economic force, it must be that we 
have an idea to contribute, an idea to be taken into account in the world 
reconstruction after the war.” 
 
 
 
“Internal Social Reorganization after the War” (MW11) 
 
74 Dewey describes the difficulties that have arisen as a result of the first World War 
and possible responses to these “weaknesses” in the existing social order:  “All 
other wars have been, to a large extent, wars of armies, wars of those who have 
been expressly mobilized for military service; but it is the commonest of 
commonplaces about the present war that the men on the front, the men in the 
trenches, the men in uniform, represent merely the first line of that larger army 
which includes practically the entire organization of all of the people.  Now, it is 
because this war has thrown such a strain upon the entire economic, industrial and 
social organization, that it is so fraught with symptoms of change.” 
 
 
 
“Liberalism in Japan” (MW11) 
 
160 A section titled “The Economic Factor” 
 
 “Even the most hardened upholder of the impotency of intellectual and moral 
forces might however concede that without certain changes of mental attitude and 
disposition, there are certain alterations of society which cannot be accomplished, 
that intellectual changes are at least a negative condition, a sine qua non.  And this 
concession will be met not with an admission but an assertion that it is fortunate 
for the prospects of liberalism in Japan that the intellectual modifications already 
dealt with are accompanied and reinforced by active and aggressive economic 
changes.” 
 
164 “In intellectual circles there is animated discussion of whether Japan must in its 
economic development pass through the stage of antagonism of capital and labor 
characteristic of Western development.” 
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 “The liberals who have come most under the influence of Western ideas contend 
that the principle [the principle of ‘kindness’] is only a belated feudal relic and is 
bound to fail.  They hold that it is morally as well as economically  necessary for 
the laborers to assert themselves; that they cannot develop unless they organize 
and win their rights for themselves, instead of accepting concessions from 
benevolent patrons.  This is known as the principle of ‘rights.’  But the feudalists 
of the chosen, unique-nation type counter by saying that it is only the materialism 
of the West that has made the development of industry take the form of struggle 
for liberties and rights; that the superior moral standards of the Orient are capable 
of applying the principle of kindness and sympathy to the growth of industrial 
relations and thus escaping the class war which has disgraced Western 
civilization.” 
 
165 “In one of the private universities a teacher gave his class in advanced political 
economy a chance to vote as to whether they would take up for study Commercial 
Expansion, Labor Movements, or Socialism.  The vote was a hundred for the last 
topic, to three for the first.” 
 
166 “There have been of late many arrests for possession and circulation of 
‘revolutionary’ literature.  There are even those who prophesy a political 
revolution on an economic basis in Japan within the next five years.  But they 
seem to me too sanguine.” 
 
 
 
“On the Two Sides of the Eastern Sea”  (MW11) 
 
176 “It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the report that influential 
Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanese funds and these corrupt 
officials are the agencies by which political and economic concessions were 
wrung from China while Europe and America were busy with the war.  But in 
China nobody even takes the trouble to deny it, or even to discuss it.” 
 
 “In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japan itself, one 
must refer to the economic situation because of its obvious connection with the 
international situation.  In the first place, there is the strong impression that Japan 
is over-extended.” 
 
179 The Chinese economic situation in comparison to that of the Japanese:  “If the 
economic straits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan has 
hurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainings with Chinese 
traitors and her industrial invasion.” 
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“The Discrediting of Idealism” (MW11) 
 
183 “There is another force, an immense force, which might have been used in behalf 
of the war ideals of the United States, a force which might still be employed 
through less effectually.  There is the economic and financial force of the United 
States.  It may be doubted whether the world has even seen such a spectacle as 
that of the last few years.  The United States has extended money and credit 
almost ‘without stint’ to governments of Europe irrespective of whether they were 
supporting the announced policies of the United States, nay, even when those 
governments were doing what they could to undermine American ends.” 
 
 
 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (MW12) 
 
177 The belief in fixed values has bred a division of ends into intrinsic and 
instrumental, of those that are really worth while in themselves and those that are 
of importance only as means to intrinsic goods.  Indeed, it is often thought to be 
the very beginning of wisdom, of moral discrimination, to make this distinction.  
Dialectically, the distinction is interesting and seems harmless.  But carried into 
practice it has an import that is tragic.  Historically, it has been the source and 
justification of a hard and fast difference between ideal goods on one side and 
material goods on the other.  At present those who would be liberal conceive 
intrinsic goods as esthetic in nature rather than as exclusively religious or as 
intellectually contemplative.  But the effect is the same.  So-called intrinsic goods, 
whether religious or esthetic, are divorced from those interests of daily life which 
because of their constancy and urgency form the preoccupation of the great mass.  
Aristotle used this distinction to declare that slaves and the working class though 
they are necessary for the state—the commonweal—are not constituents of it.  
That which is regarded as merely instrumental must approach drudgery; it cannot 
command either intellectual, artistic or moral attention and respect.  Anything 
becomes unworthy whenever it is thought of as intrinsically lacking worth.  So 
men of ‘ideal’ interests have chosen for the most part the way of neglect and 
escape.  The urgency and pressure of ‘lower’ ends have been covered up by polite 
conventions.  Or, they have been relegated to a baser class of mortals in order that 
the few might be free to attend to the goods that are really or intrinsically worth 
while.  This withdrawal, in the name of higher ends, has left, for [178] mankind at 
large and especially for energetic ‘practical’ people the lower activities in 
complete command.” 
 
178 “No one can possibly estimate how much of the obnoxious materialism and 
brutality of our economic life is due to the fact that economic ends have been 
regarded as merely instrumental.  When they are recognized to be as intrinsic and 
final in their place as any others, then it will be seen that they are capable of 
idealization, and that if life is to be worth while, they must acquire ideal and 
intrinsic value.  Esthetic, religious and other ‘ideal’ ends are now thin and meager 
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or else idle and luxurious because of the separation from ‘instrumental’ or 
economic ends.  Only in connection with the latter can they be woven into the 
texture of daily life and made substantial and pervasive.” 
 
 “The other generic change lies in doing away once for all with the traditional 
distinction between moral goods, like the virtues, and natural goods like health, 
economic security, art, science, and the like.  The point of view under discussion 
is not the only one which has deplored this rigid distinction and endeavored to 
abolish it.” 
 
200- “We began by pointing out that European philosophy arose when intellectual 
201  methods and scientific results moved away from social traditions which had 
consolidated and embodied the fruits of spontaneous desire and fancy.  It was 
pointed out that philosophy had ever since had the problem of adjusting the dry, 
thin and meagre scientific standpoint with the obstinately persisting body of warm 
and abounding imaginative beliefs.  Conceptions of possibility, progress, free 
movement and infinitely diversified opportunity have been suggested by modern 
science.  But until they have displaced from imagination the heritage of the 
immutable and the once-for-all ordered and systematized, the ideas of mechanism 
and matter will lie like a dead weight upon the emotions, paralyzing religion and 
distorting art.  When the liberation of capacity no longer seems a menace to 
organization and established institutions, something that cannot be avoided 
practically and yet something that is a threat to conservation of the most precious 
values of the past, when the liberating of human capacity operates as a socially 
creative force, art will not be a luxury, a stranger to the daily occupations of 
making a living.  Making a living economically speaking, will be at one with 
making a life worth living.  And when the emotional force, the mystic force one 
might say, of communication, of the miracle of shared life and share experience is 
spontaneously felt, the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be 
bathed in the light that never was on land or sea.” 
 
 
 
Human Nature and Conduct (MW14) 
 
9 Freedom and economics and morality:  “one has to turn from moral theories to the 
general human struggle for political, economic, and religious liberty, for freedom 
of thought, speech, assemblage and creed, to find significant reality in the 
conception of freedom of will.  Then one finds himself out of the stiflingly close 
atmosphere of an inner consciousness and in the open-air world.  The cost of 
confining moral freedom to an inner region is the almost complete severance of 
ethics from politics and economics.  The former is regarded as summed up in 
edifying exhortations, and the latter as connected with arts of expediency 
separated from larger issues of good.” (my italics) 
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11 “A morals based on study of human nature instead of upon disregard for it would 
find the facts of man continuous with those of the rest of nature and would 
thereby ally ethics with physics and biology.  It would find the nature and 
activities of one person coterminous with those of other human beings, and 
therefore link ethics with the study of history, sociology, law and economics.” 
  
46 “The conditions which determine the nature and extent of the particular grouping 
in question are matters of supreme import.  But they are not as such subject-
matter of psychology, but of the history of politics, law, religion, economics, 
invention, the technology of communication and intercourse.” 
 
78 “Like Greek slavery or feudal serfdom, war and the existing economic regime are 
social patterns woven out of the stuff of instinctive activities.  Native human 
nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes the machinery and the 
designs.” 
 
79 “An infantile logic, now happily expelled from physical science, taught that 
opium put men to sleep because of its dormitive potency.  We follow the same 
logic in social matters when we believe that war exists because of bellicose 
instincts; or that a particular economic regime is necessary because of acquisitive 
and competitive impulses which must find expression.” 
 
82 “History does not prove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs 
and institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in politics and 
economics will also generate the war-pattern.” 
 
“The case of economic institutions is as suggestive as that of war.  The present 
system is indeed much more recent and more local than is the institution of war.  
But no system has ever as yet existed which did not in some form involve the 
exploitation of some human beings for the advantage of others.  And it is argued 
that this trait is unassailable because it flows from the inherent, immutable 
qualities of human nature.  It is argued, for example, that economic inferiorities 
and disabilities are incidents of an institution of private property which flows 
from an original proprietary instinct; it is contended they spring from a 
competitive struggle for wealth which in turn flows from the absolute need of 
profit as an inducement to industry.” 
 
83 “Those who attempt to defend the necessity of existing economic institutions as 
manifestations of human nature convert this suggestion of a concrete inquiry into 
a generalized truth and hence into a definitive falsity.” 
 
84 “The idea of a thing intrinsically wholly inert in the sense of absolutely passive is 
expelled from physics and has taken refuge in the psychology of current 
economics.  In truth, man acts anyway, he can’t help acting.” 
 
  241 
86 “How then does it come about that current economic psychology has so 
tremendously oversimplified the situation?  Why does it recognize but one type of 
motive, that which concerns personal gain?  Of course part of the answer is to be 
found in the natural tendency in all sciences toward a substitution of artificial 
conceptual simplifications for the tangles of concrete empirical facts.” 
 
 “The social peculiarity which explains the emphasis put upon profit as an 
inducement to productive serviceable work stands out in high relief in the 
identification of work with labor.  For labor means in economic theory something 
painful, something so onerously disagreeable or ‘costly’ that every individual 
avoids it if he can, and engages in it only because of the promise of an 
overbalancing gain.” 
 
87 “The alleged need of an incentive to stir men out of quiescent inertness is the need 
of an incentive powerful enough to overcome contrary stimuli which proceed 
from the social conditions.  Circumstances of productive service now shear away 
direct satisfaction from those engaging in it.  A real and important fact is thus 
contained in current economic psychology, but it is a fact about existing industrial 
conditions and not a fact about native, original, activity.”  
 
88 “War and the existing economic regime have not been discussed primarily on 
their own account.  They are crucial cases of the relation existing between original 
impulse and acquired habit.  They are so fraught with evil consequences that any 
one who is disposed can heap up criticisms without end.  Nevertheless they 
persist.  This persistence constitutes the case for the conservative who argues that 
such institutions are rooted in an unalterable human nature.” 
 
89 “The existing psychology of the industrial worker for example is slack, 
irresponsible, combining a maximum of mechanical routine with a maximum of 
explosive, unregulated impulsiveness.  These things have been bred by the 
existing economic system.  But they exist, and are formidable obstacles to social 
change.  We cannot breed in men the desire to get something for as nearly as 
nothing as possible and in the end not pay the price.  We satisfy ourselves cheaply 
by preaching the charm of productivity and by blaming the inherent selfishness of 
human nature, and urging some great moral and religious revival.  The evils point 
in reality to the necessity of a change in economic institutions, but meantime they 
offer serious obstacles to the change.  At the same time, the existing economic 
system has enlisted in behalf of its own perpetuity the managerial and the 
technological abilities which must serve the cause of the laborer if he is to be 
emancipated.  In the face of these difficulties other persons seek an equally cheap 
satisfaction in the thought of universal civil war and revolution.” 
 
89 “Is there any way out of the vicious circle?  In the first place, there are 
possibilities resident in the education of the young which have never yet been 
taken advantage of.  The idea of universal education is as yet hardly a century old, 
and it is still much more of an idea than a fact, when we take into account the 
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early age at which it terminates for the mass.  Also, thus far schooling has been 
largely utilized as a convenient tool of the existing nationalistic and economic 
regimes.  Hence it is easy to point out defects and perversions in every existing 
school system.  It is easy for a critic to ridicule the religious devotion to education 
which has characterized for example the American republic.  It is easy to 
represent it as zeal without knowledge, fanatical faith apart from understanding.  
And yet the cold fact of the situation is that the chief means of continuous, 
graded, economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the 
opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and 
desire.” 
 
99 “Critics of the existing economic regime have divided instincts into the creative 
and the acquisitive, and have condemned the present order because it embodies 
the latter at the expense of the former.  The division is convenient, yet mistaken.  
Convenient because it sums up certain facts of the present system, mistaken 
because it takes social products for psychological originals.  Speaking roughly we 
may say that native activity is both creative and acquisitive, creative as a process, 
acquisitive in that it terminates as a rule in some tangible product which brings the 
process to consciousness of itself.” 
 
100 “An increasingly large portion of economic work is done with machines.  As a 
rule, these machines are not under the personal control of those who operate them.  
The machines are operated for ends which the worker has no share in forming and 
in which as such, or apart from his wage, he has no interest.  He neither 
understands the machines nor cares for their purpose.  He is engaged in an activity 
in which means are cut off from ends, instruments from what they achieve.  
Highly mechanized activity tends as Emerson said to turn men into spiders and 
needles.  But if men understand what they are about, if they see the whole process 
of which their special work is a necessary part, and if they have concern, care, for 
the whole, then the mechanizing effect is counteracted.  But when a man is only 
the tender of a machine, he can have no insight and no affection; creative activity 
is out of the question.” 
 
 “From the standpoint of orthodox economic theory, the most surprising thing 
about modern industry is the small number of persons who have any effective 
interest in the acquisition of wealth.  This disregard for acquisition makes it easier 
for a few who do want to have things their own way, and who monopolize what is 
amassed.  If an acquisitive impulse were only more evenly developed, more of a 
real fact, than it is, it is quite possible that things would be better than they are.” 
 
101 “Acquisition is necessary as an outcome, but it arises not from love of 
accumulation but from the fact that without a large stock of possessions one 
cannot engage effectively in modern business.  It is an incident of love of power, 
of desire to impress fellows, to obtain prestige, to secure influence, to manifest 
ability, to ‘succeed’ in short under the conditions of the given regime.  And if we 
are to shove a mythological psychology of instincts behind modern economics, 
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we should do better to invent instincts for security, a good time, power and 
success than to rely upon an acquisitive instinct.  We should have also to give 
much weight to a peculiar sporting instinct.” 
 
147 Why utilitarianism “took its onesided course (and thereby provoked an intensified 
reaction to transcendental and dogmatic morals)”:  “We can deal with only one 
factor, the domination of intellectual interest by economic considerations.  The 
industrial revolution was bound in any case to give a new direction to thought.  In 
enforced liberation from other-worldly concerns by fixing attention upon the 
possibility of the betterment of this world through control and utilization of 
natural forces; it opened up marvelous possibilities in industry and commerce, and 
new social conditions conducive to invention, ingenuity, enterprise, constructive 
energy and an impersonal habit of mind dealing with mechanisms rather than 
appearances.” 
 
151 “We do not eat money, or wear it, or marry it, or listen for musical strains to issue 
from it.  If by any chance a man prefers a less amount of money to a greater 
amount, it is not for economic reasons.  Pecuniary profit in itself, in other words, 
is always strictly instrumental, and it is of the nature of this instrument to be 
effective in proportion to size.  In choosing with respect to it, we are not making a 
significant choice, a choice of ends.” 
151- 
152 “We have already seen, however, there is something abnormal and in the strict 
sense impossible in mere means, in, that is, instruments totally dissevered from 
ends.  We may view economic activity in abstraction, but it does not exist by 
itself.  Business takes for granted non-business uses to which its results are to be 
put.  The stimuli for economic activity (in the sense in which business means 
activity subject to monetary reckoning) are found in non-pecuniary, non-
economic activities.  Taken by itself then economic action throws no light upon 
the nature of satisfaction and the relation of intelligence to it, because the whole 
question of satisfaction is either taken for granted or else is ignored by it.” 
 
152 “In short the attempt to assimilate other activities to the model of economic 
activity (defined as a calculated pursuit of gain) reverses the state of the facts.  
The ‘economic man’ defined as a creature devoted to an enlightened or 
calculating pursuit of gain is morally objectionable because the conception of 
such a being empirically falsifies empirical facts.  Love of pecuniary gain is an 
undoubted and powerful fact.  But it and its importance are affairs of social not of 
psychological nature.  It is not a primary fact which can be used to account for 
other phenomena.  It depends upon other impulses and habits.  It expresses and 
organizes the use to which they are put.  It cannot be used to define the nature of 
desire, effort and satisfaction, because it embodies a socially selected type of 
desire and satisfaction.” 
 
 “The reason that it is so easy and for specific purposes so useful to select 
economic activities and subject them to separate scientific treatment is because 
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the men who engage in it are men who are also more than business men, whose 
usual habits may be more or less safely guessed at.” 
 
153 “Support of family, of church, philanthropic benefactions, political influence, 
automobiling, command of luxuries, freedom of movement, respect from others, 
are in general terms some of the obvious activities into which economic activity 
fits.  This context of activities enters into the real make-up and meaning of 
economic activity.  Calculated pursuit of gain is in fact never what it is made out 
to be when economic action is separated from the rest of life, for in fact it is what 
it is because of a complex social environment involving scientific, legal, political 
and domestic conditions.” 
 
186 “Yet the whole tendency of modern economic life has been to assume that 
consumption will take care of itself provided only production is grossly and 
intensely attended to.  Making things is frantically accelerated; and every 
mechanical device used to swell the senseless bulk.  As a result most workers find 
no replenishment, no renewal and growth of mind, no fulfillment in work.  They 
labor to get mere means of later satisfaction.  This when procured is isolated in 
turn from production and is reduced to a barren physical affair or a sensuous 
compensation for normal goods denied.  Meantime the fatuity of severing 
production from consumption, from present enriching of life, is made evident by 
economic crises, by periods of unemployment alternating with periods of 
exercise, work or ‘over-production.’ 
 
187  “The history of economic activity thus exemplifies the moral consequences of the 
separation of present activity and future ‘ends’ from each other.  It also embodies 
the difficulty of the problem—the tax placed by it upon thought and good will.  
For the professed idealist and the hard-headed materialist of ‘practical’ man, have 
conspired together to sustain this situation.  The ‘idealist’ sets up as the ideal not 
fullness of meaning of the present but a remote goal.” 
 
 
 
“If War Were Outlawed” (MW15) 
 
110 “We have been thinking in terms of gradual approaches, of ‘steps’ towards an 
eventual abolition, by arbitration treaties; conciliation courts, reduction of 
armaments; condemning the guilty nation after war has broken out; political 
combinations to enforce peace by coercion through superior force; educating the 
moral sentiments of the people; economic reforms to do away with causes of 
national rivalries, etc.” 
 
111 “The argument that it is fantastic to outlaw war until the economic causes that 
bring about war have been radically altered puts the cart before the horse.  It is 
fantastic to suppose that serious attention to the causes of economic evils is going 
to be possible as long as men live under the shadow of the war system.” 
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111- 
112 “How can the most ardent devotee of any project of basic economic and social 
reorganization expect to get even a fair hearing for his ideas as long as the shadow 
of war is over every social question?” 
 
 
 
“War and a Code of Law” (MW15) 
 
125 “The history of diplomacy demonstrates that the issue of immigration is not the 
cause of war; friction on this point is merely utilized to arouse popular feeling to 
the point of supporting a war that is really waged for quite other reasons—in this 
case presumably economic causes connected with control of the Asiatic 
mainland.¶ It may be replied that to form a code that would regulate such 
economic conflicts would be even more difficult than one regulating immigration.  
The answer to this objection is that it would be totally unnecessary.” 
 
“No one can conceive either Japan or the United States publicly avowing that its 
real object was the economic control or monopoly of China, and going to the 
Court for a decision on that case.” 
 
126 “To get a picture of the dependence of the possibility of securing support for war 
upon covering up economic causes with idealistic reasons, we need only recall 
that at one time the mere suggestion that the late World War was at bottom an 
economic conflict was almost enough to land its author in jail.” 
 
“The School as a Means of Developing a Social Consciousness and Social Ideals in 
Children” (MW15) 
 
155 “It seems to me necessary also to say something regarding the causes of social 
divisions that come from economic and industrial forces.  Here, too, largely by 
the fortune of our geographical position, and our wealth of unused territory, we 
have not had until recently class divisions and conflicts.  We do not have them yet 
in anything like the extent of the Old World.  But it is a commonplace that these 
economic and industrial divisions and the problems relating to them, the problems 
of capital and labor, are looming larger in our life than they have in the past.” 
 
156 “We cannot teach isms, economic or social, in the schools.  It is highly desirable 
that they be kept out of the schools.  But does not the average boy or girl leave 
school today with altogether too innocent and naïve a state of mind about the evils 
and the problems he is going to meet, whether or no, when he gets out of school?” 
 
“I believe in respecting the innocence and the hopefulness of children and youth.  
They have a right to enjoyment and to respite from the hard economic and 
political struggles and problems of life.  I do not mean that these things should be 
forced upon them prematurely.  But out instruction in history and geography and 
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our social studies in general should be intellectually more honest, they should 
bring students into gradual contact with the actual realities of contemporary life 
and not leave them to make acquaintance with these things in that surprised way 
which even college students coming from some of the educational institutions in 
this country may run across them today.” 
 
“I think these things can be presented in a spirit which will appeal to all of the 
idealism which is fortunately so common in our American youth, to make them 
realize that they are sharers in this making of the country, that these problems to 
be faced are like the obstacles our forefathers had to face, so that while 
geographical pioneering must stop in this country, there is still a call for pioneers 
in improving the welfare of the mass of the people, and that the accepting of this 
new economic problem is an opportunity which all of the children and youth of 
the country are called upon as they go into life to deal with together.” 
 
 
 
“Culture and Professionalism in Education” (MW15) 
 
194 “At the present time there is no social class predestined to play the major role in 
politics and in social management.  Actual control has passed largely into the 
hands of practical business men, but this class is not a closed class but is every 
changing its personnel with the ups and downs of economic fortune.  The masses 
have been politically emancipated and in theory at least share in the control of 
society and state.” 
 
195 “The decline of the traditional leisure class has given a shock to the studies and 
intellectual interests associated with it.  The economic and political elevation of 
the masses has intensified the studies and interests which have been in the past the 
pre-occupation of the masses while it has also afforded facilities for realizing their 
practical ambitions.” 
 
 
 
“Syllabus:  Social Institutions and the Study of Morals” (MW15) 
 
240 “I.  Illustration of domination by blood-ties of all interests, the submergence of 
economic, political and scientific interests.  See, for some facts, though they are 
not in every reference linked up with the moral consequences of the kinship bond, 
Westermarck, chs. 20, 25, 26, 34; Sumner, Folkways, ch. 13; Hobhouse, Morals 
in Evolution, Vol. I, ch. 3.” 
240- 
241 “3.  At the present time in the west the economic group and its patterns of activity 
and interests have similarly exaggerated place.  Note the prevalent complaints of 
materialism, commercialism, mechanism, individualistic egotism, competition in 
their bad moral consequences.  More analytically almost all of the writings of 
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Veblen point out the present dominating influence of considerations derived from 
modern industrial society.” 
 
241 “If complete separation [of compartments of modern life] were possible, there 
would be impoverishment of life, but not conflict.  Since it never becomes 
complete, (because the consequences of one group activity carries over into the 
others, as noted above in the case of economic groups), there is a rivalry of 
standards and ideals, and a disorderly mixture of values and efforts:  unrest, 
discontent, exaggerated love of change and rapid movement are symptoms.  Note 
also the separation of the secular, temporal, etc., from the spiritually significant.” 
242- 
244 “VI. I.  Much controversy about the individual and society is due to the many 
different meanings of the terms, so that ‘Individualism’ for example, is employed 
in at least seven meanings:….(5) An economic doctrine and policy:  the theory of 
‘laissez-faire,’ a minimum of legislative and administrative political action, 
limited to ‘justice’ legalistically defined.  Frequently held in conjunction with 
political natural rights theory—government limited to protection of natural rights 
of liberty and property and its interference in industry and commerce illegitimate; 
a doctrine capable of being asserted independently, as by Bentham and the 
utilitarians on the ground that such government interference is unwise.” 
 
244 “(6) The ethical doctrine of self-interest, or egoism, based upon the psychological 
notion that the sole motive of action is self-love, or private pleasure.  May be used 
to support political and economic individualism, as these have just been defined, 
or to justify the need of a strong central power—as with Hobbes.” 
 
245 In theories that emphasize “individualism,” there are ambiguities.  Individualism 
“may be identified exclusively with the institutional, conventional, authoritative 
control, with the goods or values that are common, with mutual support, service, 
etc., and thus prized or condemned indiscriminately.” (p. 244)  One such theory:  
“(4) The doctrine that all moral good is common, shared, usually associated with 
the idea that economic goods as such are competitive and divisive, and hence to 
be subordinated by collective action to the moral good.  See T.H. Green, 
Principles of Political Obligation, pp. 44-47, 123-24;  Prolegomena, pp. 210-31.” 
 
251 Also in the syllabus, a section entitled “Economic analysis”:  “IV.  Criterion and 
Ideal.  The limit of the biological cycle is something that may indifferently be 
termed productive consumption or consummatory production.  When this 
becomes a conscious object or meaning, it supplies a criterion for evaluating any 
particular economic state and operation.  Does it tend toward integration of 
production—(energy expended in modification of environment) and 
consumption—(the return consequence of external modification into life-
activity)—or toward their separation?  Division of occupations and exchange of 
services and commodities makes possible a separation not found upon the simpler 
plane, so that securing and maintaining the integration becomes an object of 
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deliberation and endeavor—a problem increasing in scope and acuteness as 
economic operations are more and more mediated.” 
 
253 In Section VI., “Application of Criterion for Judgment”:  “2.  Restriction and 
perversion is thus evident when the state of economic processes (I) Results in 
drudgery on one hand and enjoyments without antecedent expenditure of energy 
on the other.  The problem is that of the intrinsic reward of the occupation itself:  
artistic activity in contrast with mechanical and external expenditure of energy:  
Liberation and enslavement.”, etc. 
 
254 In the same section:  “3.  Obvious traits of the present state of economic affairs 
are (I) The scope and complexity of processes intervening between initiation of a 
productive activity and its enjoyed consummation.”, etc. 
 
“B. Historical:  The rise of economic social philosophy, into independence of and 
superiority to political and ethical theories.” 
255- 
256 “Note especially the primacy of wants, passions, with respect to reason and 
understanding, and the definitely economic origin and function of government.  
Also that, morally, while ordinary prudence and sympathy as restricted generosity 
are natural virtues, justice and allied virtues,—keeping promises, etc.—are of 
social-economic origin.” 
 
256 “Other economists developed the ‘iron law’ of wages, and the natural tendency of 
the reward of the laboring class to each the subsistence level; ‘the dismal science.’  
The idea of natural laws hardened into something fatalistic.” 
 
257 “IX.  Philosophy of historical evolution; succession of stages controlled by 
economic considerations; classic political economy as a reflection of the 
capitalistic stage of private industry; political state as a consequence and 
instrument.  ‘Scientific’ socialism.  Dialectic of fall of present regime.” 
 
258 “III.  That which was termed natural by the earlier economic school was in reality 
a compound of physical forces and social customs, legal and otherwise, which 
determined the direction and consequences of the physical forces, as far as there 
was any social regulation.  The ‘natural’ theory, while nominally non-ethical, 
operated to supply an ethical justification of certain tendencies and policies; what 
is inevitable is accepted; futility of contravening natural laws.  On the other hand, 
there is an equal fallacy in arguments which hold the economic philosophy 
responsible for the present industrial regime—Tawney’s Sickness of an 
Acquisitive Society.” 
 
“The most that can be said is that the philosophy was unable to supply 
suggestions for dealing with the practical evils and tended to disguise and protect 
them.  Falsity of the economic theory shown by difference of actual facts and 
theoretically deduced facts; but the facts themselves have independent sources.” 
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259 “2.  The conclusions of intelligence, collectively organized and transmitted, have 
intervened.  The industrial revolution is the product of the scientific revolution.  
Any conception which ignores intellectual discovery, invention and organization 
as economic factors is in that far mythical.  Psychological factors could never 
have produced the existing situation nor can they explain it.” 
 
“3.  The present social situation on its economic side is mixed; in no sense is it a 
pure manifestation of a single principle.  The adherent of the theory of natural 
laws and rights is entitled to some extent to reply to criticisms that his theory has 
never as yet been tried.  Customs, traditions, legal and political institutions 
inherited from the pre-industrialized period have entered into and modified the 
workings of the newer economic forces.  There is a cultural lag.  (Ogburn, Social 
Change).  What is called ‘natural’ is actually a compound of physical forces 
needing direction, and of social artifices adapted to past conditions.” 
 
260 “4.  Widening and diversification of the environment.  As a consequence of 
economic developments a gratuitous non-economic environment develops; things 
to which persons have free access as a matter of course.  Surplus Economy, 
Simon Patten’s view.  Parks galleries, libraries, schools; cheap reading matter, 
pictures, transportation.” 
 
261 “2.  Political-legal:  property not an economic fact, but an economic fact affected 
by legal considerations.  Hence the attempt to derive the system of property 
holding and distribution from wants assumed to be purely psychological is 
mythical.  For the formation of wants and their external expression is always 
conditioned upon legal-political arrangements subject to collective regulation 
because of collective origin.” 
 
“Even admitting that legal-political structures are effects of prior economic 
activities and relations, they have properties and powers of their own.” 
 
262 “(3) Prevalence of insecurity and fear; large proportion of economic failures; 
situation stimulates excess desire for money as protection against future 
breakdown of social position, stimulation of speculative undertakings.  (4) 
Arbitrary wants for power and luxury in upper class, and hazardous character of 
all arbitrary wants.  Ostentatious waste and conspicuous consumption.  (Veblen, 
Theory of the Leisure Class).” 
 
263 “VII.  Values and Valuations.  The fundamental problem is the relationship which 
exists between human goods (values) and economic satisfactions (values).  Two 
theoretical possibilities, namely, that human values determine economic values, 
or that the two kinds of value exist independently in separate regions, not in 
accord with facts.  The theoretical possibility that economic values and valuations 
determine an adequate system of human values—that welfare and wealth 
coincide—is negated in the existing situation by the fact that the economic system 
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is one of internal oppositions and conflicts, so that the human equivalent is one of 
mixed utilities and disutilities.” 
 
“We first consider the classic theory according to which a free and competitive 
economic system effects at least a rough equivalence of personal and social 
good.”  
 
264 “The phenomena of the market (price-system) thus constitutes a balancing 
together of all wants and satisfactions of all economic units such that the last 
possible increment of value is squeezed out and assigned to its proper place.”  
‘Putting a price on each article is the act of the collective organism in estimating 
the importance to itself of each of its own products….It is the act of society in 
economizing its productive forces and turning them where they will do the most 
good.’ (Clark, Distribution of Wealth, p. 46)” 
 
“The essential fallacy is that the theory assumes that original and natural wants 
determine the economic phenomena of production and exchange.  In fact, before 
they become economic wants—effective demands—they are reshaped by the 
existing distributive-exchange system.  The market and business determine wants, 
not the reverse; the argument moves in a vicious circle.” 
264- 
265 “I.  Ambiguous middle term:  want as psychological and want as actual demand—
accompanied by ability, that is, to make an effective offer. (Chapman, Political 
Economy—preference as objective selection and rejection; actual buying and 
selling. P. 34; ‘assuaging of most intense cravings,’ p. 36)” 
 
265 “Only with respect to the objects of a distributed system of activities does each 
object have a definite value.  So far as this system is not apprehended in thought, 
it exists in the system of habits as these are determined by the economic status of 
the person in an objective economic system; the standard of living appropriate to 
a certain economic class.  The other is found in the amount of energy demanded 
to maintain the standard of living, which assigns place to each particular want and 
satisfaction.  The measure of this energy is money.  Retrospective fallacy.  
Suffering, pain, loss not inherently commensurable with welfare, gain; becomes 
so only when converted into an objective social measure.” 
 
266 “VIII.  Fundamental Moral Problem in Industry.  As a conclusion, we are obliged 
to reject two theories; the first, that the economic system naturally and 
automatically effects (in its main tendencies) an equivalence of individual and 
social goods, of personal values and social services; second, the theory that it is 
possible to segregate moral and economic values, treating the former as ideal, or 
‘spiritual,’ and the latter as purely ‘material,’ implying that the problem can be 
solved by a subordination of the material to the moral by animating the material 
industrial system with motives and ideals, derived from an independent moral 
source.  This latter is impossible, because ideals and motives take concrete shape 
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under the influence of social forces in their economic phases; otherwise they are 
too vague, ‘general,’ divorced from effective power.” 
 
267 “Concepts of (i) efficiency (economy) in any undertaking and utilization of any 
material and energy, (ii) coordination in the distribution of various activities, and 
(iii) increased release of energies and multiplication of wants as opportunities and 
means of progress, are the consequences of economic development.  In short, 
rationalization of human activity, the change from an instinctive to a reasoning 
plane, is essentially the product of economic requirements.  The latter have 
enforced recognition of the significance of ways-and-means in connection with 
consequences, and of consequences as varying with ways-and-means in this 
relation; money as a mathematical device, rendering accounting and auditing 
possible.  (See Mitchell, Jn. Pol. Econ. 18, pp. 97 and 197, especially the latter, 
on ‘The Rationality of Economic Activity.’)” 
 
“The essential problem is then one of bringing consumption within the truly 
economic region, rather than of reducing the scope of the latter.” 
 
268 “In fine, consumption is the field both of merely personal tastes, whims, at their 
maximum and of influence of custom at its maximum.  Hence resistance to 
cooperative organization and to scientific determinations.  Economic theories of 
values-in-use assimilate them to the objects of the relatively rationalized 
processes of production for distributive exchange; esthetic and moral theories of 
good usually isolate value from social forces.” 
 
“Hence, they define value exclusively in terms of immediate liking; or define the 
true or moral good in terms of transcendental or non-empirical satisfactions; or of 
goods determined in terms of satisfaction of wants antithetical to those wants 
which are exercised in economic activities; altruism as opposed to self-interest, 
etc.; duties as opposed to rights.” 
268- 
269 “In contemplating the possibility of subordination of distribution-exchange to 
productive consumption, we note the following gaps which if they were supplied 
would modify the consequences of the economic system. ¶ I.  There is no 
human—or psychological—science in existence comparable to physical science; 
control of external energies has outrun control of psycho-physical energies. ¶ 2.  
Publicity in its genuine sense is not an economic force.  The remoteness and 
complexity of the economic situation makes adequate knowledge of what is 
happening throughout it, essential; at present the needed information is lacking or 
is possessed by a few in a one-sided way.” 
 
269 “4.  Consumers are not organized so as to make their wants economically 
effective.  There is a certain amount of collective bargaining in manufacturing and 
transportation, but very little in the relation of consumers to producers and 
distributors.” 
 
  252 
Experience and Nature – 1921 (LW1) 
 
Chapter 9:  “Experience, Nature and Art” 
 
270 “The presence in art, whether as an act or a product, of proportion, economy, 
order, symmetry, composition, is such a commonplace that it does not need to be 
dwelt upon.  But equally necessary is unexpected combination, and the 
consequent revelation of possibilities hitherto unrealized.  ‘Repose in stimulation’ 
characterizes art.  Order and proportion when they are the whole story are soon 
exhausted; economy in itself is a tiresome and restrictive taskmaster.  It is artistic 
when it releases.” 
 
273 The mode of art “which in quantity bulks most largely as fine art” is art in “the 
name of” a particular form of art (e.g. “the production of buildings in the name of 
the art of architecture; of pictures in the name of the art of painting;”, etc.):  “It is 
reminiscent rather than commemorative of the meanings of experienced things.  
Its [this mode’s] products remind their owner of things pleasant in memory 
though hard in direct-undergoing, and remind others that their owner has achieved 
an economic standard which makes possible and cultivation and decoration of 
leisure.” 
 
275 “The notion that means are menial, instrumentalities servile, is more than a 
degradation of means to the rank of coercive and external necessities.  It renders 
all things upon which the name of end is bestowed accompaniments of privilege, 
while the name of utility becomes an apologetic justification for things that are 
not portions of a good and reasonable life.  Livelihood is at present not so much 
the consequence of a wage-earner’s labor as it is the effect of other causes 
forming the economic régime, labor being merely an accidental appendage of  
these other causes.” 
 
292 “But it still remains true that the origin of the art-process lay in emotional 
responses spontaneously called out by a situation occurring without any reference 
to art, and without ‘esthetic’ quality save in the sense in which all immediate 
enjoyment and suffering is esthetic.  Economy in use of objective subject-matter 
may with experienced and trained minds go so far that what is ordinarily called 
‘representation’ is much reduced.  But what happens is a high funded and 
generalized representation of the formal sources of ordinary emotional 
experience.” 
 
The “Unfinished Introduction” – 1949 
 
356 “The identification of the distinctively human with the inner and private made 
psychology or whatever was taken to be the science of the inner and private a 
prime factor in originating and propagating the creed of economic laissez-faire 
liberalism or individualism.” 
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357 “The appeal to natural law and natural right undeniably played a part in 
promoting greater freedom in the conduct of economic affairs.  It also undeniably 
had anti-social consequences.  It degraded political law and rights to the level of 
sheer artificiality, totally devoid of moral authority.  Any attempt to regulate or 
control economic enterprise in the public interest was denounced as interference 
by merely man-made legislation with the beneficent operations of ‘natural law’ 
and hence necessarily destructive of ‘freedom.’” 
 
 “Scientific economists do not make the mistakes of the neo-medievalists.  But in 
their own peculiar ‘scientific’ ways, they also fly in the fact of facts.” 
 
358 “The subject-matter of full-fledged ‘scientific’ economics has been identified 
with aspects of life economists designate as material.  The consequence of this 
identification or definition is to separate and isolate the economic from the moral 
and political.” 
 
“I doubt if it is possible to overstate the importance of the dualism thus set up, as 
if on basic ontological ground, between the sphere of economic activity and the 
sphere of moral-political interests and values.  If any construction of a theoretical 
nature could be more disastrous to human welfare (in the broadest sense of the 
term) I confess ignorance as to what it could be.  Nothing could more effectively 
make moral philosophy irrelevant and more completely reduce political 
philosophy to futility.” 
 
“It is a fact that modern means of production and distribution of commodities are 
the consequences of technologies made possible by physical (or material) science.  
But it is also a fact that the sphere of economic activity—the economic enterprise 
in all its vast and intricate complications—is inextricably enmeshed in social life, 
that it serves human needs, personal and institutional, and is to be judged by how 
well or ill it serves them.” 
 
359 “Scientific economists are inspired by a dehumanized conception of the nature of 
science, still widely prevalent.  The great majority of those who now attribute the 
scientific backwardness of social subjects to absence of proper methods of inquiry 
advocate, as the remedy for this grievous state of affairs, the outright adoption of 
the techniques of inquiry that have proved themselves in dealing with physical 
subject-matter.  They are unmindful of the fact that these techniques have worked 
successfully just because they were designed for experimental operations with 
subject-matters from which human (value) considerations were explicitly ruled 
out.” 
 
“Economists are only one class of ‘scientific’ inquirers into human subjects who 
cannot professionally admit the part played by need, purpose and an unceasing 
valuing (as distinct from evaluating judgments) in the generation and management 
of human affairs.” 
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“But whatever reasons scientific economists may use to justify excluding from 
their professional concern the human consequences of economic enterprise, 
philosophy cannot agree that economics is a domain having its own independent 
subject-matter and career without denying its claim to be comprehensive in scope.  
Philosophy which does not take into account the economic enterprise and its 
human consequences is an escapist intellectual gymnastic.” 
 
“The full bearing of this discussion of economic activity in its relations to the 
problems which are dominant in life and which therefore should be dominant in 
philosophy will be postponed till certain other philosophic questions have been 
considered.  As we shall see, the challenge offered to philosophy can be met only 
be resolute willingness to reformulate its problems with the systematic 
thoroughness demanded by the conditions of the present crisis.” 
 
 
 
The Quest for Certainty – 1929 (LW4) 
 
32 “So because of impatience and because, as Aristotle was given to pointing out, an 
individual is self-sufficient in that kind of thinking which involves no action, the 
ideal of a cognitive certainty and truth having no connection with practice, and 
prized because of its lack of connection, developed.  The doctrine worked out 
practically so as to strengthen dependence upon authority and dogma in the things 
of highest value, while increase of specialized knowledge was relied upon in 
everyday, especially economic, affairs.  Just as belief that a magical ceremony 
will regulate the growth of seeds to full harvest stifles the tendency to investigate 
natural causes and their workings, so acceptance of dogmatic rules as beses of 
conduct in education, morals and social matters, lessens the impetus to find out 
about the conditions which are involved in forming intelligent plans.” 
 
 
 
“Human Nature” – 1932 (LW6) 
 
29 “The significance of the idea of human nature for the social sciences gathers 
about three questions:  (1)  Are contemporary political and economic institutions 
necessary products of human nature?  Or, more generally, does the very 
constitution of human nature show that certain social arrangements are likely to 
be successful while others are doomed to failure?” 
 
33 “After the decay of Athenian culture at the time when the stoics were the ruling 
school of thought it was assumed as axiomatic that men are equal by nature and 
that differences among them are differences of status due to convention, to 
political organization and to economic relations, which are instituted rather than 
natural.” 
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34 “The doctrine [of equality at birth] in its original form did not have radical 
implications regarding existing institutions.  The conception that political and 
economic inequality was based not on nature but on institution carried with it no 
attack on the latter.” 
 
36 A survey of accounts of human nature:  “With the rise of the new industry and 
commerce, however, an important variation was introduced.  The economists 
who set out to give intellectual expression to the rising industrialism started from 
the affective side of human nature in accordance with prevailing English doctrine.  
They developed, however, a much more systematic theory than had ever been 
developed of the nature and operation of wants, out of which came a new 
conception of natural law.  Economic activity, on this view, is basic; from it are 
derived the natural, in the sense of non-artificial, laws of human conduct.  Society 
is the product of the efforts of human beings to satisfy their wants, since division 
of labor, exchange and permanent property are involved in this satisfaction.  
Government and political action exist in a secondary way in order to give security 
to the free play of economic forces.  In its early stage the theory was thoroughly 
optimistic in its anticipations of the future of society when freed from the artificial 
regulations of political action.  The conception of natural harmony was implicit or 
explicit.  The land and rent theory of Ricardo and the population theory of 
Malthus introduced factors of inevitable disharmony and conflict which later gave 
a pessimistic turn to the view entertained of the workings of human nature.” 
 
38 “The present controversies between those who assert the essential fixity of human 
nature and those who believe in a great measure of modifiability centre chiefly 
around the future of war and the future of a competitive economic system 
motivated by private profit.  It is justifiable to say without dogmatism that both 
anthropology and history give support to those who wish to change these 
institutions.  It is demonstrable that many o fthe obstacles to change which have 
been attributed to human nature are in fact due to the inertia of institutions and to 
the voluntary desire of powerful classes to maintain the existing status. With 
regard to the possibility of economic reconstruction history demonstrates the 
comparative youth of the present regime; and revolutionary societies may be 
regarded as social laboratories in which is being tested the possibility of securing 
economic advance by means of other incentives than those which operate in [38] 
in capitalistic countries.” 
 
 
 
Ethics – 1932 (LW7) 
 
28 “The Kinship and Family Groups are also Economic and Industrial Units” 
 
71 In a chapter entitled “From Custom to Conscience” in a section called 
“Sociological Agencies in the Transition”:  “1.  The action of economic forces in 
breaking up the early kinship group or joint family may be noticed in the history 
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of many peoples….  A certain amount of individualism will appear wherever the 
advantage for the individual lies in separate industry and private ownership.” 
 
 “But we get a broader view of economic influences if we consider the methods of 
organizing industry which have successively prevailed.  In early society, and 
likewise in the earlier period of modern civilization, the family was a great 
economic unit.  Many or most of the industries could be advantageously carried 
on in the household.” 
 
103 No specific references to “economics,” but a section on “Commercial and 
Political Individualism” among the Greeks. 
 
128 No specific references to “economics,” but a section on “Roman Society” that 
discusses the importance of commerce and its negative and positive effects on 
morals. 
 
136 In the chapter “Factors in Moral Consciousness” in a section on “The Medieval 
Period”:  “The church attempted and to a considerable degree exercised a 
restraining power over the two great spheres of politics and economics which 
later claimed independence of at least the then prevalent moral standards.” 
 
 “In the economic field the church aimed to govern the excessive greed of gain.  In 
particular it condemned usury.  At that time men did not ordinarily borrow money 
in order to invest it in profitable enterprise.  The borrower was usually a man 
caught in some misfortune.  To take advantage of his necessity was not fair.”  
More about the details of financial transactions and the church’s relationship to 
them. 
 
141 In the chapter “Factors in Moral Consciousness” in a section entitled “The 
Renaissance and Reformation to the Revolutions”:  “4.  The economic 
development in this period saw the change from the feudal system of service to 
the system of money payment.  This was a step toward greater economic liberty.  
The discoveries of new trade routes to the Far East, and of the New World, tended 
to increase the wealth of merchants and to some extent of other classes.” 
 
142 “Along with the growth of commerce and industry came a new theory as to the 
place of trade in national life, and as to the method of regulating economic affairs.  
A policy of economic liberty gradually took shape, which was the natural 
analogue of civil and religious liberty.” 
 
 “The distinctive feature of modern economic life has been the tendency to 
abandon all restriction imposed by an outside moral standard, and to substitute a 
system of free bargaining, free contract.  This is one aspect of the complex system 
called capitalism, although the full development of capitalism was not reached in 
this period.” 
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149 In the subsequent section, “Since the Revolutions”:  “The growth of political 
democracy and the widening of educational opportunity have made for a 
deepening and broadening of moral consciousness.  Another political 
development has added rather to its perplexities.  The power of nationalism has 
increased.  Culture tradition, economic advantage, pride in national strength, fear 
of other nations, military armaments on a vast scale, constant pressure from 
military personnel, imperial expansion of the great powers—all have contributed 
to a war of spirit which culminated in the Great War, and still threatens the peace 
of the world and the existence of civilization.” 
 
150 “Space admits of but the bare mention of three outstanding effects of the 
industrial revolution which set moral problems for present and future, viz., the 
new alignment of classes, the autocratic or oligarchic organization of the 
economic system, and the unequal distribution of the vast wealth produced.  More 
subtle and perhaps more fundamental than any of these have been the changes in 
valuation of goods, in the meaning of a good life, of success and excellence, 
which the direction of our energies toward the hitherto unexpected resources of 
nature has brought about.” 
 
331 In a section of “Morals and Social Problems” entitled “Historic Individualism”:  
“We shall here attempt to illustrate what has been said by reference to the 
movement termed ‘individualism’ in a particular sense determined by historical 
causes.¶  1. In economics, it is the notion that individuals left free to pursue their 
own advantage in industry and trade will not only best further their own private 
interests but will also best promote social progress and contribute most effectively 
to the satisfaction of the needs of others and hence to the general happiness.” 
331- 
332 “3.  Since the doctrine has an ‘ideological’ support, it also signifies a certain 
general philosophy, which may be called that of the ‘natural’ versus ‘artificial.’  
Economic activities on this view are natural and governed by natural laws.  Men 
naturally seek to satisfy their wants; labor or the expenditure of energy is 
naturally economized so that there will be the utmost return for the minimum 
outgo; to make the future secure men naturally abstain from consuming all they 
produce, thus laying by capital to increase their future productivity.” 
 
332 “”Since the output of work is greatest when there is the skill which comes with 
restriction of effort to one field, division of labor is inherent in the development 
and this division brings about exchange and trade.  There results a general 
interdependence in which each is forced to find the line of work in which he is 
most productive and to do the things which, in order to bring the most return to 
himself, will best serve the needs of others.  In contrast with the ‘natural laws’ of 
this economic process, political laws are artificial; the first are implanted by 
nature (often conceived of as vice-regent of God) in the human frame.  The 
second are man-made.  The presumption is always in favor of natural laws and 
their workings and against human ‘interference.’” 
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 “4.  To this idea of natural laws, identical with economic laws, was joined an 
ideal of natural rights.” 
 
333 “The doctrine of economic laissez faire then presented itself as an unshackling of 
human initiative, energy, and inventive skill, as opening a definite road of 
progress.  Established organization on the other hand represented inertia, sloth, 
and repression.” 
 
334 “The doctrine of the superiority of ‘natural laws’ to man-made law led to an 
abdication of effort at intelligent control; economic processes were supposed to 
work of themselves and to a beneficent end.  The idea of natural rights was 
interpreted by courts to forbid legislation which in any way was interpreted by 
courts to forbid legislation which in any way disturbed the status quo in the 
distribution of property, or which, in the interest of workers, limited the power of 
free contract—the legal fiction being that all parties to an industrial arrangement 
were equally free to enter or not into the arrangement.” 
 
 “Meantime the original circumstances, economic and political, under which the 
philosophy of so-called individualism grew up and had had, upon the whole, a 
useful effect, changed completely.  Industrialism supplanted agrarianism as the 
ruling force.” 
 
356 In “Morals and the Political Order” in a section entitled “Some Special Political 
Problems”:  “Moreover, as long as economic conditions were simple, as long as 
comparative, though of course not absolute, equality of industrial opportunity 
existed, there was no great motive for special interests to get hold of 
governmental agencies in order to use them for their own ends.” 
 
 “Economic questions as such are considered in later chapters.  Here we have to 
note that, putting the matter in the most moderate terms, industrial development 
during the past century, occurring largely since the Civil War, has put a 
tremendous strain upon the governmental machinery which was created before it 
took place.  Most political issues of the present arise out of economic conditions; 
they have to do with the distribution of wealth and income, the ownership and 
control of property.” 
 
357 “In any case, there is a problem of value of a moral nature beneath all these 
politico-economic questions.  The question of how far and by what means 
political agencies shall be used to promote social welfare is itself ultimately a 
moral question.” 
 
 “While honest differences of judgment arise among persons equally well-
intentioned on the subject of both social end and political means, we may be sure 
upon one point:  Political thought and action will be confused and insincere as 
long as the importance of economic issues in political life is kept from view.  
Recognition by the general public of their central position in political theory and 
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action would clear the air and make honest differences of conviction more to the 
point and more fruitful.  As long as those who wish to preserve intact certain 
privileges, of which they have become possessed, successfully prevent the 
recognition of the presence of economic issues, and of the human import of the 
decision of economic questions, the workings of professedly democratic 
governments will be so crude and one-sided as to give ground for attack on the 
whole democratic idea in politics.” 
 
 “Because political questions are now economic in nature, because governmental 
action affects seriously the conduct of manufacturing, trade, banking, railways, 
those who have large pecuniary stakes in the success of these industrial 
undertaking, have a business motive for getting control of the agencies of 
government.” 
 
360 In a section entitled “Liberty of Thought and Expression”:  Dewey describes the 
threat to liberty from dictators and fascists, then says “The opposite attack on 
freedom comes from those who are already entrenched in power, economic and 
political, and who fear that general exercise of civil rights, such as freedom of 
speech, writing, press, assembling, although guaranteed by the Constitution, will 
disturb the existing order.” 
 
 “Direct and violent encroachments on liberty of thought and speech are 
perpetrated by police and by organized bands of persons when suggestions for 
important social change in economic lines are put forth.” 
 
362 “But as a matter of fact, a genuine democracy will always secure to every 
individual a maximum of liberty of expression and will establish the conditions 
which will enable the minority by use of communication and persuasion to 
become a majority.  The real culprit is always some powerful minority which 
prefers to use methods of suppressive force or of perversion and degradation of 
opinion by means of propaganda.  One minority, entrenched economically, does 
suppress and misrepresent another minority which is at an economic 
disadvantage.” 
 
364 “Historic democracies have perhaps erred in overlooking the educative effect of 
legal and economic institutions and in exaggerating the educative office of a 
special instrument, the schools.” 
 
366 “On the other hand, economic limitations prevent many persons, probably the 
greater number, from effective access to the means of real cultivation of their 
capacities.  They are taken up with the bare processes of making a living, and 
even when they have leisure they have not been educated to make a significant 
use of it.” 
 
373 “Ethical Problems of the Economic Life” 
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 “The economic problems of life may not be more important now than heretofore, 
since it has always been necessary for man to get a living; but they certainly stand 
out in more striking fashion.” 
 
 “If one looks more closely he sees other signs of the economic influence.  The 
shops provide necessaries and luxuries in profusion unknown at earlier times; 
transport is swift, night is made day, enormous sums of money are transferred; 
loans of millions and tens of millions are arranged.” 
 
 “Men of eminent ability are found increasingly in the world of industry, 
commerce, and finance, whereas in earlier periods they were likely to be found in 
State or church.  The power wielded by those highest in economic fields is 
actually greater, at least in times of peace, than the power exercised by religious 
or political leaders.” 
 
374 “The primacy of economic power in our time is due chiefly to the discoveries and 
inventions which have given man such control over natural resources and forces, 
such new techniques through machines, and such advantages from association and 
cooperation, as the world has not previously known.  These have changed the 
conditions of our work, have made a greater plenty, have brought people to live in 
cities instead of in rural conditions, and have occasioned tensions and conflicts 
between economic and political interests.” 
 
 “Let us consider some of the chief ethical problems which these various phases of 
economic life have forced upon our attention.”  Several sections follow, the first 
of which is entitled “Production, Capitalism, Competition”. 
 
375 “2.  The single word which includes in large measure the outstanding features of 
the present methods of production and economic organization is capitalism.” 
 
378 “In the language of the economist, Henry Clay,….” 
 
379 No reference to “economics” but:  “Thorstein Veblen saw the machine as bringing 
about a division of society into two classes—those who work with machines, and 
those who do not.” 
 
381 “3.  One of the unsolved problems of capitalism is that of insuring measurable 
stability and security.  Under feudal economy there might be a shortage of crops 
and consequent scarcity, but there was little chance for unemployment.” 
 
382 “The situation is aggravated by the resistance of business and the Federal 
government to any attempt to deal with unemployment as a national rather than as 
a local problem.  No doubt economy of administration and greater local 
responsibility are secured.” 
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 “Charity seems a gracious help when flood, fire, earthquake, or pestilence comes 
as a calamity that could not have been anticipated, but to resort to charity to 
remedy a situation which ought to be prevented by the economic system is a 
confession of weakness.” 
423 
424 In a chapter entitled “Toward the Future” in a section called “Tendencies within 
the Capitalistic System”:  “Another tendency, to which Professor Carver has 
directed attention, is called by him ‘the present economic revolution in the United 
States.’ ‘It is a revolution,’ he claims, [block quote] that is to wipe out the 
distinction between laborers and capitalists by making laborers their own 
capitalists and by compelling most capitalists to become laborers of one kind or 
another, because not many of them will be able to live on the returns from capital 
alone.  This is something new in the history of the world.’” 
426 Same chapter, section entitled “Radical Alternatives to Capitalism”:  “Russia and 
Italy at the present time are conducting great experiments in economic systems.  
It is still too early to attempt to a judgment as to the outcome, but we may use 
these as illustrations of other methods than capitalism.” 
 
427 “2.  Italy is attempting an experiment of a different sort.  Where as in Russia 
political power is subordinated to the control of an economic class, in Italy 
economic interests are subordinated to national power.  After a short trend toward 
socialism the Fascist Revolution under Mussolini reversed the balance of power 
and proceeded to supervise or administer the economic life in a way to subserve 
national power and prestige.  On the one hand employers, on the other workmen, 
were admonished that nothing in business policy or workingmen’s efforts must 
interfere with efficiency of economic operations and national strength.” 
 
428 Same chapter, section entitled “If Capitalism Is to Continue”:  “The extreme 
individualism of laissez faire, with competition as the only regulator of the 
economic process, has been shown to be no longer tolerable in present 
conditions.” 
428- 
429 “In a system such as obtains in Western Europe and the United States, the masters 
of the economic system and those of the political systsem form two distinct 
groups selected on different principles.  Economic leaders are chosen principally 
by competition in the market.  This selects men of certain types of ability, and 
gives them wide scope for the exercise of that ability to organize which is so 
largely responsible for the efficiency of modern business and industry.  Leaders in 
the political sphere are selected by votes on the basis of their ability to win public 
approval.  They represent a distinctly different phase of society, and a distinctly 
different interest from that represented by economic leaders.  Perhaps the interests 
of the public are safer when control is thus divided than when it is concentrated in 
one hand.” 
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430 “A further and perhaps the main reason why economic socialism has as yet made 
little headway in the United States is the great and liberal scale on which public 
education has been conceived and measurably carried out in the United States.” 
 
 “It is moreover evident that though for certain ends we may properly rely upon 
law and public administration, there are other ends which can be gained only 
through education and a change of attitude both in producers and in consumers.  
We may roughly divide the field into [list of problems]…(5) problems of juster 
distribution of the enormous gains in economic processes—juster both as 
measured by service to the community, and as measure by the requirements of a 
functional society.” 
 
444 In a chapter entitled “Recent Changes in Society and Ideas Which Affect the 
Family”:  “As the family is probably the oldest among human institutions—older 
than government as a separate factor, and probably older than separately 
organized religion—it is also eminently the institution which concerns men and 
women in daily living.  Rooted biologically in sex it has drawn strength from 
economic, religious, political, and artistic sources.  Shifts from the maternal to the 
paternal type, or from polygamy to monogamy, have been so gradual as to tend 
toward greater strength rather than toward a lessening of permanence and 
community of relationship.  The gradual lengthening of the period of education 
has been an influence toward a continuance of the bond of common interest in 
children, which has made for greater unity between parents.  At the present time, 
however, a conjunction of forces seems to be working in the opposite direction.  
Economic, political, religious conditions form a background for revolutionary 
ideas.” 
 
“Economic changes, and the urban life which is largely the result of them, are the 
first and perhaps the most serious underlying factor in the situation.  The family 
and home of former times, while rooted in sex and parental relations assumed a 
pattern largely shaped by the need of division of labor between husband, wife, 
and children, and by community of property, particularly of a stable dwelling, the 
home.” 
444- 
445 “The industrial revolution sent both men and women into factories.  It took even 
children in large numbers.  The first effect of industrial change was therefore 
upon the working class—the economically poorer strata of society—in which the 
work of both man and wife was necessary to maintain existence and support 
children.” 
 
“Inventions such as the telephone called for women operators; business 
development made room for stenographers, clerks, secretaries, and well-to-do 
classes have come to enjoy the outside contacts and economic independence 
which such employments make possible.  Public education fits them for efficient 
service.” 
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457 In a chapter entitled “Special Sources of Friction and Needs for Adjustment,” in a 
discussion of sources of unhappiness for marriage:  “Among the sources of 
unhappiness with respect to which conditions have improved in recent years may 
be included economic and ‘political’ attitudes.  Among those which have come 
more acutely to consciousness are those of sex.” 
 
“Under economic conditions a distinction must first be made between industry 
and business.  Industry has thus far affected chiefly the less well-to-do and the 
less highly educated.” 
 
“It [the opportunity for careers] has thus made these women less ready to accept 
marriage and domestic life, except on the basis of affection.  Economic stress is 
no longer so important as in the days when the alternative was marriage or 
dependence on upon some male relative.  At first the alternatives of marriage or a 
career seemed mutually exclusive.  No doubt it is still frequently difficult to do 
justice to both, but that it is not impossible is being proved by an increasing 
number.” 
 
458 “In another respect, economic conditions have improved with the general advance 
of woman to suffrage and citizenship, namely, in provision for a proper 
distribution of family income between husband and wife without the necessity for 
the wife’s ‘asking the husband for money.’  No one of mature years likes to be put 
in the position of asking another for money.” 
 
 
 
“Education and New Social Ideals” (LW11) 
 
167 “In the true and original tradition, the ideal of liberty applied to all individuals and 
applied to them in every walk of life.  The reactionary interpretation put forth 
with such subsidized energy today by the so-called Liberty League and all those 
interests it stands for, confines the realization of the ideal of liberty to the 
privileged few, the few privileged in economic position.  It con- 
168 fines the manifestation of liberty to just one channel of expression:  Ability to 
make money in a society where control of economic forces is concentrated in the 
hands of the few.” 
 
 “There is a similar prostitution and degradation of the ideal of equality.  The 
original and genuine American tradition was based on the idea of securing 
equality of opportunity for all; establishing the basic conditions through which 
and because of which every human being might become all that he was capable of 
becoming.  This high conception has been distorted into the notion that because 
laws are nominally the same for all, therefore equality already exists; although the 
slightest exercise of common sense discloses the actual equality of opportunity is 
impossible when vast economic inequality is the established rule.” 
  264 
 
“The demand for a new social order is in fact a demand for the existence of 
economic and political conditions that will allow the realization of the old 
democratic ideas of liberty for all and of equality of opportunity to all for person 
development.” 
 
170 “Unless the schools are free to produce these changes in belief and purposes; 
unless those who conduct the schools, administrators and teachers, have a full 
grasp of the reality of true American ideals; unless they can detect the sham forms 
in which these ideals masquerade; unless they perceive the economic and political 
obstacles that now prevent the realization of original ideals of democratic freedom 
and equality, the changes that are bound to come about sometime will come 
attended with a maximum of violence and bloodshed.” 
 
 
 
“Education, the Foundation for Social Organization” (LW11) 
 
 An address delivered at the opening of the Horace Mann Centennial Celebration 
at Antioch College and taking as its subject matter Mann’s Fourth of July oration 
from 1842 
 
227 “One does not have to read between the lines to see that the state of the nation 
was not a happy one, morally, economically, or politically in the early [eighteen] 
forties.” 
 
232 “I do not suppose that the economic history of any country has been so marked by 
speculation as that of the United States.  In some respects it has doubtless 
accelerated our economic growth.  But it has not been conducive to steadfastness 
nor to stability of social customs.  As a people we are more eager than sturdy; 
more hasty in action than ready to reflect upon what should be done; prone to 
snatch at nostrums and quack remedies in both physical and social ailments.  The 
spirit of speculation has fallen in with the spirit of waste; together they have 
fostered reckless disregard of life itself and have encouraged recourse to crime.” 
233- 
234 On “civics courses”:  “These courses have not been realistic.  They have left the 
future citizen ignorant of the forces that operate in political life and of how such 
forces act.  They have said little or nothing, and done still less, about bosses and 
machines and the devices by which they get power.  They leave the future vote 
hopelessly ignorant of the ways in which politics are inevitably interwoven with 
economic and financial forces in our national life.” 
 
234 “The only question is whether the schools, which means finally teachers and 
administrators, will passively wait and accept whatever the movement of 
economic and other social forces imposes upon them, or whether they will 
recognize that they have a positive function:  that of laying foundations for those 
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attitudes, purposes, and ideas which will enable a democratic society to maintain 
itself, progressively and aggressively.” 
 
235 “Today it is not, then, the absence of educational agencies, but the very existence 
of schools, of libraries, of forums of discussion, of the radio, that presents the 
problem.  For example, while, as I have just said, the demands of society have 
created a movement toward industrial and profession education, and while this 
movement is about the only unifying strand that can be detected in the great 
expansion of the public school, it cannot be said that the movement has been 
based upon any study of economic trends and their attendant consequences.  It 
has been piecemeal and ad hoc.  The crisis that came upon us in 1929, but had 
been preparing ever since the War and before, proves the existence of great 
economic dislocation and strains.” 
 
236 “Until there exists among teachers as a body some coherent, definite, and unified 
idea of what democracy means, and what social consequences, including 
economic and industrial, are compatible with the democratic way of life, there 
will be more talk than reality in discussions about the function of education in the 
maintenance of democratic institutions.” 
 
 
 
Experience and Education (LW13) 
 
22- 
23 In traditional education:  “The school environment of desks, blackboards, a small 
school yard, was supposed to suffice.  There was no demand that the teacher 
should become intimately acquainted with the conditions of the local community, 
physical, historical, economic, occupational, etc., in order to utilize them as 
educational recourses.  A system of education based upon the necessary 
connection of education with experience must, on the contrary, if faithful to its 
principle, take these things constantly into account.  This tax upon the educator is 
another reason why progressive education is more difficult to carry on than was 
ever the traditional system.” 
 
 
 
Freedom and Culture (LW13) 
 
69 In Chapter 1, “The Problem of Freedom,” in a discussion about how Jefferson’s 
“fear of the growth of manufacturing and trade” has “come about and to a much 
greater degree than he could have anticipated”:  Proof is decisive that economic 
factors are an intrinsic part of the culture that determines the actual turn taken by 
political measures and rules, no matter what verbal beliefs are held.  Although it 
later became the fashion to blur the connection which exists between economics 
and politics, and even to reprove those who called attention to it, Madison as well 
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as Jefferson was quite aware of the connection and its bearing upon democracy.  
Knowledge that the connection demanded a general distribution of property and 
the prevention of rise of the extremely poor and the extremely rich, was however 
different from explicit recognition of a relation between culture and nature so 
intimate that the former may shape the patterns of thought and action.” 
 
“Economic relations and habits cannot be set apart in isolation any more than 
political institutions can be.  The state of knowledge of nature, that is, of physical 
science, is a phase of culture upon which industry and commerce, the production 
and distribution of goods and the regulation of services directly depend.  Unless 
we take into account the rise of the new science of nature in the seventeenth 
century and its growth to its present state, our economic agencies of production 
and distribution and ultimately of consumption cannot be understood.  The 
connection of the events of the industrial revolution with those of the advancing 
scientific revolution is an incontrovertible witness.” 
 
72 The “relation of this and that constituent of culture to social institutions”:  “The 
question is whether any one of the factors is so predominant that it is the causal 
force, so that other factors are secondary and derived effects.  Some kind of 
answer in what philosophers call a monistic direction has been usually given.  The 
most obvious present example is the belief that economic conditions are 
ultimately the controlling forces in human relationships.  It is perhaps significant 
that this view is comparatively recent.” 
 
73 “Because of the present fashion of economic explanation, this political view may 
now seem to have been the crotchet of a particular set of historical scholars.  But, 
after all, it only formulated at idea consistently acted upon during the period of 
the formation of national states.  It is possible to regard the present emphasis upon 
economic factors as a sort of intellectual revenge taken upon its earlier all but 
total neglect.  The very word ‘political economy’ suggests how completely 
economic considerations were once subordinated to political.  The book that was 
influential in putting an end to this subjection, Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
continued in its title, though not its contents, the older tradition.  In the Greek 
period, we find that Aristotle makes the political factor so controlling that all 
normal economic activities are relegated to the household, so that all morally 
justifiable economic practice is literally domestic economy.” 
 
 “The rise of totalitarian states cannot, because of the bare fact of their 
totalitarianism, be regarded as mere reversions to the earlier theory of supremacy 
of the political institutional factor. Yet as compared with theories that had 
subordinated the political to the economic, whether in the Marxist form or in that 
of the British classical school, it marks reversion to ideas and still more to 
practices which it was supposed had disappeared forever from the conduct of any 
modern state.  And the practices have been revived and extended with the benefit 
of scientific technique of control of industry, finance and commerce in ways 
which the show the earlier governmental officials who adopted ‘mercantile’ 
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economics in the interest of government were the veriest bunglers at their 
professed job.” 
 
74 “Is there any one factor or phase of culture which is dominant, or which tends to 
produce and regulate others, or are economics, morals, art, science, and so on 
only so many aspects of the interaction of a number of factors, each of which acts 
upon and is acted upon by others?  In the professional language of philosophy:  
shall our point of view be monistic or pluralistic?  The same question recurs 
moreover about each one of the factors listed:—about economics, about politics, 
about science, about art.” 
 
“For these psychological theories have been marked by serious attempts to make 
some one constituent of human nature the source of motivation of action; or at 
least to reduce all conduct to the action of a small number of alleged native 
‘forces.’  A comparatively recent example was the adoption by the classic school 
of economic theory of self-interest as the main motivating force of human 
behavior; an idea linked up on its technical side with the notion that pleasure and 
pain are the causes and the ends-in-view of all conscious human conduct, in desire 
to obtain one and avoid the other.  Then there was a view that self-interest and 
sympathy are the two components of human nature, as opposed and balanced 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies are the moving forces of celestial nature.” 
 
99 “There is now raised the question of what was actually back of the formulation of 
the democratic faith a century and a half ago. Historians of the events that led up 
to the Declaration of Independence, the creation of the Confederation, and the 
adoption of the Federal Constitution tell us that what actually moved the leaders 
of the Rebellion against Great Britain were specific restrictions placed on industry 
and trade, together with levying of obnoxious taxes; and that what figured in 
doctrinal formulation as limitations upon inherent rights to freedom were in fact 
burdens imposed upon industrial pursuits from which persons of prestige and 
influence suffered economic losses.” 
 
100 “Nor have these historians drawn the conclusion that economic forces are the 
only forces that move men to collective action, and that the state of forces of 
production is the ultimate factor in determining social relations.  Historians have 
not ventured so afield into broad generalizations.  But in their capacity as 
historians they have pointed out the effect of specific economic factors in 
producing the Revolution; and of changed economic conditions, after the 
confusion of the period of the Confederation, in producing special provisions of 
the Constitution.  They have called attention to the enduring influence upon 
political events of conflict of interests between farmers and traders.  They show, 
for example, that the difference in the policies advocated by the Republican and 
Federal parties respectively during the first thirty or forty years of the Republic 
represent a difference in the interests of agricultural and commercial sections and 
groups:  conflicts reflected in the party attitudes toward centralized and 
decentralized government, the power of the judiciary, especially of the supreme 
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court, free trade and protective tariff, foreign policies with regard to France and 
Great Britain, etc.” 
100- 
101 On the difference in temper between the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution, referring to the conditions that prevailed at the writing of the 
Constitution:  “…the most urgent need of men of established position to be 
protection of established economic interests again onslaughts of a populace using 
liberty as a cloak for an attack upon order and stability.  There was also need of 
compromise to unite various sections in a single federal government.” 
 
101 “Marxist social philosophy has made a sweeping generalization where historians 
have been content to point out specific economic conditions operating in specific 
emergencies.  The Marxist has laid down a generalization that is supposed to state 
the law governing the movement and final outcome of all the social changes with 
which historians are occupied in detail.  The generalization to which historians 
have pointed is rather a practical maxim:  If you wish to secure a certain political 
result, you must see to it that economic conditions are such as to tend to produce 
that result.  If you wish to establish and maintain political self-government, you 
must see to it that conditions in industry and finance are not such as to militate 
automatically against your political aim.” 
 
“Whether the effect of the economic factor upon political conditions is taken in 
its moderate or its extreme form, the facts involved tremendously complicate the 
problem of democratic freedom as it existed when the Union was formed.  The 
original democratic theory was simple in its formulation because the conditions 
under which it took effect were simple.” 
102- 
103 “There are now persons who think that the anti-democratic effect of economic 
development has so far destroyed essential democracy that only by the 
democratization or ‘socialization’ of industry and finance can political democracy 
be restored.  Whatever be thought of this view, its existence marks an immense 
change in conditions.  To the Founding Fathers control of production and 
distribution of commodities and services by means of any political agency 
whatsoever would have seemed the complete nullification of all they were 
fighting for.” 
 
104 “Whether one is a believer in the necessity for increased social control of 
economic activities or in allowing the maximum possible of private initiative in 
industry and exchange, both sides admit that impersonal forces have been set in 
motion on a scale undreamed of in the early days of the Republic.” 
 
105 “When conditions that make for unemployment are as extensively ramified as 
they are at present, political action assumes an importance for workers, employed 
and unemployed, that it does not have when conditions are settled and opportunity 
for employment is fairly general and secure.  There are movements in all 
industrialized countries to provide work by governmental projects; there are 
  269 
schemes for offsetting, by doles and official relief, evils that have resulted from 
the failure of industrialists and financial captains to provide the means of 
livelihood.  The chiefly palliative nature of these measures is an evidence that 
symptoms rather than causes are dealt with; and this fact is in turn further proof 
that fundamental economic conditions are so far out of control that emergency 
measures are resorted to.” 
 
106 On the relation between economics and politics:  “Since the evils are attributed 
more or less to the action of the party in power, there is a succession of swings 
back and forward as the relative impotency of this and that party and of this and 
that line of policy to regulate economic conditions, sufficiently to prevent 
widespread disaster, becomes clear.  This impotency of existing political forms to 
direct the working and the social effects of modern industry has operated to 
generate the distrust of the working of parliamentary institutions and all forms of 
popular government.” 
 
“As the activities increase of the groups which are radical from the standpoint of 
the possessing class, and especially as they fail to effect a fundamental remedy of 
the situation, the activities of the favored economic class increase.  When 
disorders appear on any considerable scale, the adherence of the middle class to 
the side of ‘law and order’ is won.  Ironically enough, the desire for security 
which proceeds from the two groups of very different economic status combines 
to increase readiness to surrender democratic forms of action.” 
 
“The danger of the rise of an American Fascist movement in this country comes 
from a similar source.  It is absurd to suppose that the class having relatively the 
superior economic status can promote a dictatorship unless it has strong popular 
support—which means the support of those relatively at a disadvantage.” 
 
107 “In brief, economic developments which could not possibly have been anticipated 
when our political forms took shape have created confusion and uncertainty in the 
working of the agencies of popular government, and thereby have subjected the 
idea of democracy to basic strain.  The change in conditions goes far beyond the 
particular consequences which Jefferson feared as a result of growth of 
manufacturing and trade at the expense of agriculture.” 
 
“That the general trend is toward increase of public control of private industry and 
finance in the United States as in other countries is undeniable.  But the 
movement is not clear-cut in theory nor are its consequences consistent in 
practice.  In fact, there is one thesis of Herbert Spencer that could now be revived 
with a good deal of evidence in its support:  namely, the economic situation is so 
complex, so intricate in the interdependence of delicately balanced factors, that 
planned policies initiated by public authority are sure to have consequences 
totally unforeseeable,—often the contrary of what was intended—as has happened 
in this country rather notably in connection with some of the measures undertaken 
for control of agricultural production.” 
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109 “The assertion that men are free and equal by nature unconsciously, possibly 
deliberately, took advantage of the prestige possessed by what is ‘natural’ in the 
first two senses to reinforce the moral force of the word.  That ‘naturalness’ in the 
moral sense provided the imperative ethical foundation of politics and law was, 
however, the axiomatic premise of democratic theory.  Exercise of liberty which 
was taken to be a moral right has in the course of events, especially economic 
events, seriously threatened the moral right to legal and political equality.  While 
we may not believe that the revolutionary effect of steam, electricity, etc., has 
nullified moral faith in equality, their operation has produced a new difficult 
problem.” 
 
110 “The point which is here pertinent is that early theory and practice assumed an 
inherent, and so to say pre-established, harmony between liberty and equality.  As 
liberty has been practiced in industry and trade, the economic inequalities 
produced have reacted against the existence of equality of opportunity.  Only 
those who have a special cause to plead will hold that even in the most democratic 
countries, under the most favorable conditions, have children of the poor the same 
chances as those of the well-to-do, even in a thing like schooling which is 
supported at public expense.  And it is no consoling offset that the children of the 
rich often suffer because of the one-sided conditions under which they grow up.”  
Dewey then continues with an interesting discussion of the relationship between 
liberty and equality, with specific examples drawn from commerce and labor 
relations. 
 
112 “Any adequate discussion of the present relations of politics and economics 
would have to extend to conditions in village, city, county, state and nation, and 
its conclusions would fill volumes. Its conclusions would enforce in detail the 
thesis that the interconnections and interdependence of industry and government 
puts a radically new face upon the problem of democratic politics.” 
 
114 “I am not saying the problem cannot be solved democratically nor that 
‘socialization’ of industry is bound to be followed by the regimentation so freely 
predicted by adherents of laissez-faire individualism.  What I am saying is that the 
issue of democracy has taken a new form, where not much experience is available 
about the relation of economic factors, as they now operate, to democratic ends 
and methods.” 
 
115 “The discussion of this chapter has been one-sided in its emphasis upon the 
economic phase of our culture.  But industrialization and commercialization play 
such a part in determining the qualities of present culture that the primary need for 
analysis of its conditions is made especially clear.  The facts that justify economic 
emphasis do not prove, however, that the issue of cooperative democratic freedom 
can be settled by dealing directly and exclusively with the economic aspect, if 
only because command of the means which would be needed to effect desirable 
changes in industry and in the distribution of income can be achieved only by the 
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aid of correlative changes in science, morals and other phases of our common 
experience.  The facts bring out in sharp outline that as yet the full conditions, 
economic and legal, for a completely democratic experience have not existed.  
Upon both the negative and the positive side, the facts suggest the importance of 
critical examination of the theory that attaches supremacy to economic factors in 
isolation.  The significance of interaction will appear more clearly in the 
contrast.” 
 
116 ff. Chapter entitled “Totalitarian Economics and Democracy” 
117- 
118 On Marxism:  “For its adherents, by reason of the very nature of the theory, 
readily become so absolutistic in their attitude that they can see only a display of 
class-bias, unconscious or deliberate, in any criticism of their theory—an attitude 
now summed up in calling any opposition pro-Fascist.  With those not committed 
it may promote understanding if I say that the criticism is not aimed at denying 
the role of economic factors in society nor at denying the tendency of the present 
economic regime to produce consequences adverse to democratic freedom.  
These things are rather taken for granted.  Criticism aims to show what happens 
when this undeniable factor is isolated and treated as the cause of all social 
change.  One may hold that if there is to be genuine and adequate democracy 
there must be a radical transformation of the present controls of production and 
distribution of goods and services, and may nevertheless accept the criticisms to 
be made—indeed may make or accept the criticisms because one believes the 
transformation is required.” 
 
118 “The Marxist isolation of one factor (one which actually operates only in 
interaction with another one) takes the form of holding that the state of the forces 
of economic productivity at a given time ultimately determines all forms of social 
activities and relations, political, legal, scientific, artistic, religious, moral.  In its 
original formulation, there was an important qualification which later statements 
have tended to ignore.  For it was admitted that when political relations, science, 
etc., are once produced, they operate as causes of subsequent events, and in this 
capacity are capable of modifying in some degree the operation of the forces 
which originally produced them.” 
 
 On the tendency to ignore this qualification and the reason this inattention was 
intentional:  “The only way to decide would be to investigate, and by 
investigation in the concrete decide just what effects are due, say, to science, and 
just what to the naked, so to say, forces of economic production.  To adopt and 
pursue this method would be in effect to abandon the all-comprehensive character 
of economic determination.  It would be put us in the relativistic and pluralistic 
position of considering a number of interacting factors—of which a very 
important one is undoubtedly the economic.” 
 
 “Marx would have a distinguished historic position if the qualification were 
admitted in even fuller extent than he allowed for.  He would not have been the 
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first by any means to recognize the importance of economic conditions in 
determination of political and legal forms.  Their close connection was almost a 
commonplace of the political philosophy of Aristotle.  It was restated in a 
different form by English writers who influenced the ideas of the founders of the 
American republic.” 
 
119 “The great merit, however, of the Marxist simplification, for those who accept it 
in its extreme form, is the fact that it combines the romantic idealism of earlier 
social revolutionaries with what purports to be a thoroughly ‘objective’ scientific 
analysis, expressed in formulation of a single all-embracing ‘law,’ a law which 
moreover sets forth the proper method to be followed by the oppressed economic 
class in achieving its final liberation. …This law is that of the existence of classes 
which are economically determined, which are engaged in constant warfare with 
one another, the outcome of which is direction of social change toward the 
liberation of producers from the bonds which have kept them subjugated in the 
past.” 
 
 “It is quite possible to accept the idea of some sort of economic determinism.  But 
that acceptance does not constitute one a Marxian, since the essence of the latter 
is the view that class warfare is the channel through which economic forces 
operate to effect social change and progress.” 
 
120 “To Marx the economic movement is necessarily as self-determined toward its 
ultimate goal as the movement of logical categories had been in the Hegelian 
system.” 
 
121 “The forties of the last century were also the time of promising radical political 
movements, all of which had a marked economic slant, while some were 
avowedly socialistic and communistic, especially at that time in France.” 
 
122 “All of these circumstances put together, it is not surprising that Marx saw in the 
Hegelian dialectic a principle which, when it was given economic interpretation, 
provided a sure basis for a science of social changes, while at the same time, it 
furnished the revolutionary movement a supreme directive for its practical 
activities.” 
 
 “The fact then that the dialectical formula was borrowed from the most 
metaphysical, in a non-scientific sense, of all modern philosophers was no 
deterrent to the vogue of Marxist synthesis, since its practical character seemed to 
be vouched for not only by actual economic conditions and by Marx’s 
predictions, but in particular by the increase in class conflict that was taking 
place.” 
 
122 “Moreover, Marx’s study of the concrete facts of the factory system in Great 
Britain backed up his general theory with a considerable number of economic 
generalizations which proved sound on any theory:—such as the existence of 
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economic cycles with crises of increasing severity, a tendency toward 
combination and concentration, etc.” 
 
 “Similarly the monolithic and in itself speculative Marxist doctrine took on 
immediate practical coloring in connection with existing economic conditions and 
new forms of oppressions they had produced.  There is nothing novel or peculiar 
in a combination of theory and practice in which practical events give definite 
color to an abstract theory, while the theory serves as a fountainhead of 
inspiration to action, providing also rallying cries and slogans.” 
 
125 “Laissez-faire individualism indulged in the same kind of sweeping generalization 
but in the opposite direction.  Doubtless, in accordance with the law of the union 
of opposites, this background played its part in creating a cultural atmosphere 
favorable to Marxism.  But two opposite errors do not constitute one truth, 
especially when both errors have the same root.  With some disregard for historic 
facts, the Marxist doctrine might even be regarded as a generalized version of that 
aspect of classic economic theory which held that completely free competition in 
the open market would automatically produce universal harmony of persons and 
nations, Marx converting competition of individuals into war of classes.” 
 
126 “One can find evidence that, under a regime of governmental, in stead of social, 
control, economic classes marked by great inequality of income are growing up.  
Such questions of fact are not settled by argument.” 
 
129 In this same chapter, Dewey turns to criticisms of Marxism:  “The large measure 
of sympathy shown by liberals in our own country toward Russian 
totalitarianism—to the extent of asserting the country is essentially a democracy 
with which common cause should be made against Fascist states—is not 
surprising. …More influential still is the fact that those persons who see the 
obstructive power of the existing economic system in our country are moved by 
the fact that one country has done something about overthrowing that system.” 
129- 
130 “While nothing said discounts the effect of economic factors upon other 
components of culture (and certainly not upon political ones at the present time), 
nevertheless democratic methods are proved, even if they lack adequate 
substance, to be indispensable to effecting economic change in the interest of 
freedom.  In common with many others, I have from time to time pointed out the 
harmful consequences the present regime of industry and finance has upon the 
reality of democratic ends and methods.  I have nothing to retract.  But conditions 
in totalitarian countries have brought home the fact, not sufficiently realized by 
critics, myself included, that the forms which still exist encourage freedom of 
discussion, criticism and voluntary associations, and thereby set a gulf between a 
country having suffrage and popular representation and a country having 
dictatorships, whether of the right of left—the differences between the two latter 
growing continually less as they borrow each other’s techniques.” 
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130 “Subordination of the political to the economic has a meaning for those trained to 
take for granted the operation of an indefinite plurality of social tendencies, many 
of which are neither political nor economic, that it cannot possibly have in 
countries that are without the democratic tradition.” 
 
131 “When we assume that we are following common sense policies, in the most 
honorable sense of common sense, we may in fact, unless we direct observation 
of conditions by means of general ideas, be in process of being led around by the 
nose by agencies purporting to be democratic, but whose activities are subversive 
of freedom:  a generalized warning which, when translated into concrete words, 
should make us wary toward those who talk glibly about the ‘American way of 
life,’ after they have identified Americanism with a partisan policy in behalf of 
concealed economic aims.” 
 
133 On the criticism of Marxism as an “appeal to the motive of self-interest”:  “But 
actually it comes close to reversing actual Marxist doctrine—the doctrine that the 
state of the forces of production is the sole causal force.  For according to this 
view, all the factors of human nature are shaped from without by ‘materialistic,’ 
that is economic, forces.” 
 
 On the “matter of classes and of class-consciousness”:  “Physical conditions thus 
demarcate economic classes, and throw into relief the conflict of interests 
between employers and employees, together with the community of interests, if 
only in misery, that bind together the latter.” 
 
134 “The fact is that Marx and every Marxist after him unconsciously assumes the 
existence and operation of factors in the constitution of human nature which must 
cooperate with ‘external’ economic or ‘material’ conditions in producing what 
actually happens.  Explicit recognition of these factors would have the theory a 
different practical slant.” 
 
137 In Chapter 5, “Democracy and Human Nature,” in a discussion of how human 
nature and democracy have been linked:  “The third act…now playing, is that of 
recovery of the moral significance of the connection of human nature and 
democracy, now stated in concrete terms of existing conditions and freed from the 
one-sided exaggerations of the earlier statement….¶  The practically effective 
statement of the point of view is found in economic theory, where it furnished the 
backbone of laissez-faire economics; and in the British liberalism which 
developed in combination with this economic doctrine.  A particular view of 
human motives in relation to social events, as explanations of them and as the 
basis of all sound social policy, has not come to us labeled psychology.  But as a 
theory about human nature it is essentially psychological.  We still find a view put 
forth as to an intrinsic and necessary connection between democracy and 
capitalism which has a psychological foundation and temper.  For it is only 
because of belief in a certain theory of human nature that the two are said to be 
Siamese twins, so that attack upon one is a threat directed at the life of the other.” 
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138- 
139 On Mill and those like him who spoke of the “laws of the nature of individual 
man”:  “The essayed an intellectual formulation of principles which would justify 
the success of the tendencies which present day revolutionaries call the bourgeois 
capitalism they are trying to overthrow.  But it expressed the individualistic ideas 
that animated the economic and political theories of the radicals of the 
time….The books were elaborations of ideas that were propounded in electoral 
campaigns and offered as laws to be adopted by parliament.” 
 
 
 
“Does Human Nature Change?” (LW13) 
 
289 “I do not think, moreover, that anyone will deny that economic conditions are 
powerful among the social causes of war.” 
 
290 “Fellow feeling and the desire to help those in need are intense during war, as 
they are at every period of great disaster that comes home to observation or 
imagination.  But they are canalized in their expression; they are confined to those 
upon our side.  They occur simultaneously with manifestation of rage and fear 
against the other side, if not always in the same person, at least in the community 
generally.  Hence the ultimate failure of pacifist appeals to the kindly elements of 
native human nature when they are separated from intelligent consideration of the 
social and economic forces at work.” 
 
 “An even more burning issue emerges when any fundamental change in 
economic institutions and relations is proposed.  Proposals for such sweeping 
change are among the commonplaces of our time.  On the other hand, the 
proposals are met by the statement that the changes are impossible because they 
involve an impossible change in human nature.” 
 
 “As a matter of fact, economic institutions and relations are among the 
manifestations of human nature that are most susceptible of change.  History is 
living evidence of the scope of these changes.  Aristotle, for example, held that 
paying interest is unnatural, and the Middle Ages reechoed the doctrine.  All 
interest was usury, and it was only after economic conditions had so changed that 
payment of interest was a customary and in that sense a ‘natural’ thing, that usury 
got its present meaning.” 
 
 
 
“Education, Democracy, and Socialized Economy” (LW13) 
 
304 This is an article that responds to articles by Boyd H. Bode and John L. Child in 
Social Frontier.  “The articles agree on the fundamental points that all education 
takes its directions from a social aim, and that in this country the social aim is set 
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by the democratic principle.  We then find that Dr. Bode believes that Dr. Childs 
is so devoted to a certain scheme of economic reform that he would make the 
schools an instrument for accomplishing ‘a specific program for social reform,’ a 
course which is said to commit educators to trying to promote democracy by 
conditioning its movement in a certain direction fixed in advance of, and 
independently of, conclusions reached by democratic procedures.” 
304- 
305 “On the other hand, we find that Dr. Childs believes that Dr. Bode’s refusal to 
consider the relation of the economic order of society to realization of the 
democratic principles leaves him in a kind of educational vacuum, since teachers 
are to study economic and social problems but are to refuse to reach and adopt 
definite conclusions about them.” 
 
305 “As far as I can see, two questions are raised in this clash of views.  One of them 
is:  ‘What in fact is the relation between realization of the ideas and principles of 
democracy and the economic, industrial, and financial order of society?’ 
 
 “Independently, then, of what these writers say about positions taken by the other, 
two issues emerge:  (1) What relation, if any, exists between the actual or effective 
realization of democracy and the economic structure of society? (2) What does 
the democratic end involve as to methods to be adopted in instruction, so as to 
avoid, especially, undemocratic inculcation of ready-made conclusions on one 
hand and aimless vagueness on the other hand?” 
 
 “If the relation between the economic organization of society and the realization 
of the democratic principle is simply a matter of adoption of ‘a specific reform,’ 
then insistence, if it should exist, that educators should use the schools to promote 
this reform conflicts with the professed democratic aim.  But the ‘if’ covers a 
good deal of ground.  The belief that there is an inherent connection between the 
realities of a democratic society, under present conditions, and a change in 
economic affairs in the direction of greater control and planning exercised in the 
social interest does not seem to be correctly described as a ‘specific social and 
economic reform.’” 
305- 
306 “Doubtless there are those who think of it as an end in itself and hence something 
to be attained independently of the effect upon democracy; there is a political 
party which, until recently, has held that it can be effected only by a period of a 
class dictatorship in which democracy is abrogated.  But all this is quite different 
from the position that the democratic end and ideal demands for its own adequate 
realization a pretty thoroughgoing change in the economic structure of society, 
one to be brought about by democratic methods and not by means of suppression 
of democracy.” 
 
306 “now, quite apart from the solution this problem may receive, it should be clear 
that the question at issue is one of fact, not one that can be settled by an analysis 
of the concept of democracy—even though it must be settled in accordance with 
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conclusions reached in analysis of that conception.  I am not going to argue here 
for the thesis that under conditions as they now exist it is democracy itself which 
demands basic reconstruction of economic institutions.  But when the issue is 
looked at as one of fact, it is a question of the bearings of the existing economic 
order upon the liberty, equality, and, possibly, fraternity that are so intrinsic to 
the democratic idea that without them democracy becomes a farce.  Furthermore, 
the problem of the existence of opportunity to work and of the obligation to 
render useful service in work is, in the minds of many, an economic question 
which has moral implications that are fundamentally important for the realization 
of democracy.” 
 
307 “Now, whatever may be the actual conclusion reached in discussion of these 
questions, it ought to be clear that the issue cannot be assumed in advance to be 
one of the relation of merely external mechanical devices to democracy as an 
intrinsic moral end.  This position, it if be taken, begs the exact question at issue, 
namely, whether or not the economic structure of society bears, under present 
conditions, an inherent relation to the realization of the democratic idea.” 
 
308 “If teachers who hold that there is an intrinsic relation between actualization of 
democracy and social planning of economic institutions and relations hope to 
bring others to the same conclusions by use of the method of investigation and 
free co-operative discussion, I see nothing undemocratic in the procedure.  It 
looks to me like an educational procedure, and, moreover, to be of the same sort 
that teachers who have been led to accept the conclusion might then use with their 
own students.” 
 
309 “My intention is to indicate the need of clarifying the issues involved and freeing 
them from irrelevant accretions.  For the present it seems to me that perhaps this 
can best be accomplished by stating a number of principles in hypothetical form 
and exploring the consequences that follow from them as hypotheses.  If 
democracy as a moral principle is independent of economic institutions, we shall 
be directed to a different solution than if the two are closely connected.  
Discussion of the alternative ‘ifs’ or hypotheses will take us, it seems to me, out 
of cloudy generalities.” 
 
 
 
“The Economic Basis of the New Society” (LW13) 
 
316 “The urgent and central question at the present time is whether the needed 
economic-social changes (with which legal and political changes are bound up) 
can be effected in ways which preserve and develop what was fundamental in 
earlier liberalism, or whether social control is to be instituted by means of 
coercive governmental control from above in ways which destroy for a time (a 
time whose length cannot now be measured) all that was best worth conserving in 
older democratic ideas and ideals:  Intellectual and moral freedom; freedom of 
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inquiry and expression; freedom of association in work, recreation and for 
religious purposes; the freedom of intercourse among nations, which always 
hampered by tariff-walls and fear of war, is now deliberately suppressed in many 
countries by a multitude of new technical devices.” 
 
 
 
“The Unity of the Human Being” (LW13) 
 
323 “We have no words that are prepared in advance to be fit for framing and 
expressing sound and tested ideas about the unity of the human being, the 
wholeness of the self.  If we ask an economist, ‘What is money?’ the proper 
official reply is, that it is a medium of exchange.  The answer does not stand in 
the way of a great deal of money being accumulated by using it to obstruct the  
processes of exchange.” 
 
 
 
“What is Social Study?” (LW13) 
 
338 “Questions of family life, of politics and economics, of war and peace, are 
obviously social questions.  The problem I am raising is how far such materials 
can be understood and be educative in the full sense without a background of 
study of matters which lie outside the social as thus limited.” 
 
 “No one would deny, I suppose, that many political questions at the present time 
have economic roots.  Issues of the relation of capital and labor, of concentration 
and distribution of wealth, of economic security and unemployment, occupy the 
attention of our legislative bodies.  They are primarily economic questions but 
they find their way into political action because their impact upon human relations 
and their public consequences are intense and widespread.  Can the student stop 
when he has traced these political themes to their economic sources?  Or does 
understanding of the economic situation demand going further?” 
338- 
339 “It would probably be admitted on all hands that the present economic situation is 
a historical development, and that while present facts may be amassed in 
quantities, the information thus gained needs to be placed in an historic setting if 
it is to be intelligently grasped and used.  Many, perhaps all, of the economic 
questions have also definitely geographical aspects.  The problem of the farmer 
comes to mind, for example, and that of the railways as means of distribution of 
products.”  Other examples. 
 
339 “The reference that was made in an earlier paragraph to the historic context of 
economic questions suggests in turn the scientific background.  The industrial and 
commercial change which has taken place in the world in the last century, in the 
past forty years, is the product of the great change which has taken place in 
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physical, chemical, and more recently biological science.  The prime factor in the 
economic and political history of this period is what is known as the industrial 
revolution.  The story of that revolution is the story of new technologies in the 
production and distribution of goods, which are themselves the result of a 
scientific revolution.  Any vital comprehension of existing economic and political 
issues demands insight into processes and operations that can be grasped only 
through understanding of fundamental physical and chemical operations and 
laws.” 
 
 
 
“Contrary to Human Nature” (LW14) 
 
258 On the practice of using the concept of “human nature” and its “unchangeability” 
as justification for defeating proposed “projects for bringing about social change:”  
“The use of the idea of the unchangeability of human nature as a means of 
opposition to special projects for political and economic change belongs in the 
latter class. That the new project is contrary to some traits of human nature as they 
exist at the time is certain.  For the proposed policy is only one for a change; 
therefore of course it goes against those particular habits which have been formed 
by the very conditions it is proposed to alter.” 
 
261 “If the idea [of needs as demonstrative of human nature] is applied to proposals 
for change in existing economic habits, its meaning will become clearer.  
Economic systems must, if they are to be in accord with constant requirements of 
human nature, be such as to meet the need for support of healthy vigorous life.  
To suppose that the present ‘capitalistic’ system (which is demonstrably the 
product of special historic conditions), is the only one which can effect this result 
is to fall, on a large scale, into the same kind of error which tribes or families fall 
into, on a small scale, when they think that only the particular foods to which they 
have become accustomed are fit for human consumption.” 
 
 “But the need for food does not stand alone.  ‘Man does not live by bread alone.’  
The value of a proposed change in economic habits and relations must be 
considered in its bearing upon other needs, many of which are less tangible than 
the need for food.  It must be analyzed, for example, in its bearing upon the need 
for companionship, for freedom of choice, for rivalry or emulation, for security, 
etc.  Doubtless the conditions of the problem are rendered more complex by this 
approach than when some single idea is used as an adequate standard for 
accepting and urging a particular policy.  But all history and all experience show 
that simplifications which end in leaving out of account some of the conditions 
which are active anyway defeat themselves.” 
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‘ 
“Anti-Naturalism in Extremis” (LW15) 
 
60 “I mention one further instance of the contrast between the relative bearings of 
anti-naturalism and naturalism in connection with social problems.  Because of 
the influence of a low view of human nature and of matter a sharp line has been 
drawn and become generally current between what is called economic and what is 
called moral;—and this in spite of facts which demonstrate that at present 
industry and commerce have more influence upon the actual relation of human 
groups to one another than any other single factor.  The ‘economic’ was marked 
off as a separate compartment because on the one hand it was supposed to spring 
from and to satisfy appetites and desires that are bodily and carnal, and on the 
other hand economic activities have to do with mere ‘matter.’” 
 
 “Whether or not Karl Marx originated the idea that economic factors are the only 
ultimate causative factors in production of social changes, he did not originate the 
notion that such factors are ‘materialistic.’” 
 
 
 
“How, What, and What For in Social Inquiry” (typescript) (LW16) 
 
337 “Look, for instance, at the sharp division that is currently accepted as gospel truth 
between moral subject-matters and economic subjectmatters.  The separation is 
now so thoroughly established as to be regarded as virtually ‘self-evident.’…At 
the very time when the moral (i.e., the human ) consequences of industrial and 
financial arrangements are most in need of systematic critical scrutiny they are 
brought under the cover of being necessary because of the essence of the matter, 
while on the other side the human, or moral, principles and standards which were 
fixed in situations radically other than those which now prevail are given 
thoroughly factitious, artificial authoritative prestige.” 
 
 
 
“Philosophy’s Future in Our Scientific Age:  Never Was Its Role More Crucial” (LW16) 
 
369 “The fine arts, as well as those of political and economic life, had indeed been so 
completely subordinated to religious-ecclesiastical arts that they seemed to be a 
part of the very order of nature.  The new arts continually encroached on the old 
system until they crowded the authority of the sacred arts into a narrow place, 
where they became specialized and technical.” 
 
370 “In philosophy, the net result was the creation of dualisms that are the intellectual 
manifestations of the divisions in life between that which is judged low and that 
which is regarded as supreme in value.  Even today this insulation prevails 
between the subjectmatter of economic theory and the subjectmatter of moral 
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theory.  It prevails in spite of the fact that most moral problems are now what they 
are because of the conditions and problems of our economic life.” 
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